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ABSTRACT
This dissertation explores how traits of a mass casualty event and community institutionalization
affect how a community demonstrates solidarity after a mass casualty event. A systematic
examination of mass casualty events along these lines has not been conducted before.
Theoretically, individual helping behaviors like altruism help explain individual involvement in
demonstrations of solidarity while solidarity and resilience help in explaining group behaviors. A
typology is proposed that breaks up mass casualty events into four different types: terrorism,
criminal, weather and accidents. These types of events make up the majority of non-war mass
casualty events. Experimentally a sample of students is used to assess how individuals are likely
to respond to mass casualty events by gauging how they would respond using five different types
of demonstrations of solidarity. Findings suggest that victim type positively influences
demonstrations of solidarity while casualty number and event type are only selectively
influential. Two cases (Orlando, FL 2016 and San Bernardino, CA 2015) are used to test three
hypotheses that are related to how a community demonstrates solidarity after a mass casualty
event. Results indicate that victim type positively influences demonstrations of solidarity,
particularly through the specific institutions within vulnerable communities that increased access
to demonstrations. Additionally, increased institutionalization within the victim community also
positively influences demonstrations of solidarity. Furthermore, results suggest that event
specific traits do influence demonstrations of solidarity under certain circumstances. However,
more empirical research is needed to examine how individuals respond and the exact processes
available to communities that would aid in their recovery from such an event.
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I wish to dedicate this project to the victims of mass casualty events and the first responders who
deal with the aftermath of such events firsthand. While these events are traumatic and life
changing, a new sense of normalcy is achievable where the victims are honored, causes of such
events are confronted, and the institutional support is plenty.
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CHAPTER 1: AN INTRODUCTION TO RESPONSES TO MASS CASUALTY EVENTS
Natural and man-made disasters are likely to increase as the 21st century progresses
(Rogge 2004). Over the past two decades, the number of events that result in multiple deaths
have increased in the United States (Schenk et al. 2014). These events are often referred to as
mass casualty events and these incidents can take the form of terrorist or criminal acts, acts of
nature or accidents. Though there are some disagreements in the literature, this paper follows the
common definition of a mass casualty event as causing at least five deaths (Arnold, Halpern,
Tsai & Smithline 2004; Park, Shin, Song, Hong & Kim 2016). Between 2000 and 2016 there
were 140 mass casualty events in the United States.1 Violent criminal acts, such as the 2012
Newton Connecticut shooting that killed 28 people, accounted for 42 events. Terrorist acts, such
as the 2012 Boston Bombing that killed 6 people, accounted for only 13 events. Accidents, like
the crash of American Airlines Flight 587 in 2001 that caused 265 deaths, account for 49 events.
Acts of nature, like Hurricane Katrina in 2005 that killed approximately 1,800 people, account
for 36 events.
Mass casualty events not only take lives but also are traumatic for the communities in
which they occur. The community is strained following a mass casualty event and people are
often dealing with sudden loss. Therefore, victims of these events need help following such a
traumatic event to return to normalcy. Some communities respond resiliently with high numbers
of demonstrations of solidarity and return to normal quickly. Other communities do not respond
resiliently; demonstrations of solidarity are few and the return to normalcy for the victim

1

Based on an original database created using news sources of mass casualty events. See Appendix A for complete
database.
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community takes longer. Why do some communities respond resiliently while others do not?
What determines the scale of community response to a mass casualty event? Demonstrations of
solidarity are common when a mass casualty event occurs, however, there is little empirical
research on what influences the scale of the demonstrations. Understanding what influences
demonstrations of solidarity following a mass casualty event can assist in building more resilient
communities facing the trauma caused by these events.
Most of the research involving mass casualty incidents is from emergency management
and focuses on the initial response to the event. However, theories and findings on collective
action and solidarity are becoming more important when analyzing community behaviors
following a mass casualty event. This growing body of research is important because it helps
explain how communities react following a trauma, including which communities demonstrate
solidarity. Understanding of what influences demonstrations of solidarity following an event is
important as it can affect post event behaviors and policy. For example, communities that are
unable to make robust demonstrations of solidarity may need to receive additional financial and
institutional support.
Demonstrations of solidarity begin at the individual level and are driven by individuals
with a strong desire to participate in helping behaviors. Community institutions play a pivotal
role because they transform those individual desires into action by organizing demonstrations
and providing an outlet for those altruistic individuals.
This dissertation has five chapters. Chapter 2 is a literature review focused on social
solidarity, community resilience and charitable giving. Existing literature on social solidarity and
community resilience does not include actual demonstrations of solidarity in their findings.
2

Literature on altruism and charitable giving is common, however, neither have substantial
empirical findings that examine how mass casualty events affect these behaviors. Chapter 3
proposes a theory of individual and community response, and generates four hypotheses:
•

Hypothesis 1: Higher casualty events increase the likelihood of more
demonstrations of solidarity.

•

Hypothesis 2: Violent events will result in more demonstrations of solidarity than
nonviolent events.
o Hypothesis 2a: Terrorist events will cause more demonstrations of
solidarity than other event types.

•

Hypothesis 3: Events that harm victims who are perceived as vulnerable will
generate more demonstrations of solidarity.

•

Hypothesis 4: Victim communities that have a higher level of institutionalization
will have more demonstrations of solidarity following a mass casualty event.
o Hypothesis 4a: A strong response from government institution leaders will
lead to more demonstrations of solidarity.
o Hypothesis 4b: A strong specific institutional response will lead to more
demonstrations of solidarity.

This chapter introduces a figure that explains the processes behind demonstrating solidarity after
a mass casualty event. It also discusses the intervening role the media has in relaying the facts of
an event to the general public. Social capital is also discussed as an unobserved intervening
variable. Social capital and institutional trust allow individuals to demonstrate solidarity with the
help of institutions.
3

Chapter 4 tests hypotheses 1-3 using a survey experiment. The sample of UCF students
participated in an experiment with vignettes that varied casualty numbers, event type and victim
type. After each vignette those surveyed had the option to respond to each event through five
different demonstrations of solidarity; social media response, volunteering time, donating blood,
donating money or participating in a vigil. Results indicate that demonstrations of solidarity are
only selectively influenced by casualty number and weather events influenced demonstrations of
solidarity more than other event types. However, results do suggest that a vulnerable victim type
will motivate individuals to demonstrate solidarity more than when a nonvulnerable group is
targeted.
Chapter 5 tests the first, third and fourth hypotheses using a case study design based on
the cases of the Pulse night club terrorist attack in Orlando, Florida in the Summer of 2016 and
the San Bernardino, California terrorist attack in the Winter of 2015. Case selection does not
meet most similar criteria; each variable is analyzed independently within each case to show
variable influence. In addition to primary and secondary source material, interviews were
conducted with local community leaders to better articulate and understand the demonstrations of
solidarity that followed each mass casualty event. Findings suggest that when vulnerable victim
groups are targeted in a mass casualty event, higher demonstrations of solidarity do indeed
follow. Findings also suggest that greater institutionalization within the victim group increases
demonstrations of solidarity.
Chapter 6 presents the findings and provides suggestions for future empirical research.
Overall, results suggest that multiple community and event related factors can influence
demonstrations of solidarity. Understanding what influences demonstrations of solidarity is an
4

important step in understanding resiliency to mass casualty events. Future experimental research
would benefit from adding more variation in casualty numbers when testing their effects upon
demonstrations of solidarity. Additionally, future experimental research would also benefit from
including other event specific factors (like familiarization) when testing event type effects upon
demonstrations of solidarity. Future qualitative research would benefit from increasing the
number of cases and from implementing a most similar design so the inferences made would be
stronger. Additionally, it is suggested that future research examine general community behaviors
like crime rates (not just demonstrations of solidarity) following a mass casualty event and the
use of quantitative methods.
Mass Casualty Events, Community & Government Response & Demonstrations of Solidarity

In order to understand the research questions, it is important to introduce several
important concepts and factors that will aid in putting this dissertation and its results into proper
context. Mass casualty events are often defined in emergency response literature as “any event in
which emergency medical services and resources are overwhelmed by the number and severity
of casualties” (Mistovich 2013). Many jurisdictions define a mass casualty event based on a
relatively small numerical threshold (5 in New York City, 6 in South Korea etc.) (Arnold,
Halpern, Tsai & Smithline 2004; Park, Shin, Song, Hong & Kim 2016). For the purpose of this
dissertation, events that resulted in five or more deaths from a single cause were considered to be
mass casualty events. Five deaths from a single source often cause an overwhelming of medical
services seen in other definitions as opposed to simply relying on a high count. Additionally, five
deaths from a single source are also likely to receive increased media coverage. This coverage
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then informs the rest of the community the facts of the event and thus enables individuals to
demonstrate solidarity with the victims.
Mass casualty events are often a collective trauma in that they can impact an entire
community not only those immediately affected. They elicit an emotional response amongst
people who are not directly involved with the killings. Collective trauma refers to the
psychological reactions to a major event that can affect an entire society (Hirschberger 2018). It
will be a collective trauma because it is believed that these sudden deaths will cause a
community to react with a surge of behaviors to help the victims and the community.
Community is often defined as groups of individuals who share an origin, culture,
history, laws, values, and geographic proximity, however, there may be considerable diversity
amongst a community (Pfefferbaum et al. 2007). Though proximity to a traumatic event has been
shown to increase solidarity, community is not bound strictly in geographic terms (Brenner et al.
2015). Communities reflect beliefs, perceptions and attitudes that potentially influence behavior.
Interaction between members is crucial because without it, values and norms cannot be shared,
which gives a community its identity. People are not bound to a single community and
communities often exist within one another. Communities nest within each other and coexist side
by side. However, certain sections of a community are often aligned alongside different identity
traits such as ethnicity or religion. These nested communities may respond more strongly to
certain stimuli, such as the sudden death of many of their members and that specific nested
community may demonstrate solidarity strongly. That proximity, and sense of community allows
for a collective effervescence like response to occur following a mass casualty event, resulting in
demonstrations of solidarity (Durkheim 1912).
6

A strong local government response allows for a community that had just been subjected
to a mass casualty event to stabilize and demonstrations of solidarity to begin. It is the primary
responsibility of the local government to respond and prepare to all phases of emergency
management for these events, regardless of specific type. Local governments are also tasked by
the community to organize and participate in demonstrations of solidarity. If additional resources
are needed, then the local government will go through five steps: (1) declare a local state of
emergency, (2) activate mutual aid with other agencies, activate emergency operations center
and/or emergency operations plans, (3) coordinate response with public and private organizations
and (4) notify state emergency management (NAEMT 2017).2 Following that declaration, the
state government can then declare a state of emergency and request federal aid via the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The Governor of a state can then make a request to
the President and an emergency declaration can be made if it is needed to save lives, protect
property, safeguard public health or to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe (NAEMT 2017).
The most serious of disasters can be declared Major Disasters and the response and recovery
efforts to such events can provide more federal assistance. Subsequent involvement of other
government institutions, either through mutual aid or through an emergency declaration, can
affect demonstrations of solidarity greatly. The addition of these other institutions can take some
of the burden off the local government institutions allowing demonstrations to occur, or they
may bring in their own apparatuses to demonstrate solidarity. Relief provided by additional
government institutions allows for local institutions to prioritize demonstrations of solidarity.

2

The National Incident Management System (NIMS) drives disaster response in the U.S. and other areas and it has
been empirically suggested that these principles aid in alleviating many issues that arise when local institutions
respond to large scale events (El Sayed 2013; Dal Ponte et al. 2015).
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Demonstrations of solidarity are acts or behaviors that individuals and communities
engage in. They take place following traumatic events or other scenarios such as the death of a
public figure or polarizing events, etc. Some demonstrations are actual, meaningful behaviors,
while others are symbolic with little or no actual impact. For example, demonstrations like
donating money, blood or volunteering time occur at the cost of the donor. Other demonstrations,
like social media responses, do not occur at the cost of the donor and are more symbolic in
nature. These behaviors often take place following a mass casualty event and are the dependent
variable in this dissertation.

8

CHAPTER 2: DURKHEIM, RESILIENCE, SOLIDARITY & INDIVIDUAL GIVING
BEHAVIORS

In AD 79, Roman Emperor Titus used the imperial treasury to aid the victims of the
Mount Vesuvius eruption in what could be one of the first official demonstrations of solidarity
(Higgins 2009). Informal methods of collectively demonstrating solidarity with the victims of a
traumatic event likely go back to when communities first formed and humans began helping one
another when in need. The French Sociologist Emile Durkheim defined solidarity as a “bond of
unity between individuals, united around a common goal or against a common enemy”
(Durkheim 1893). Durkheim further described solidarity as the “totality of bonds that bind us to
one another and to society, which shape the mass of individuals into a cohesive aggregate”
(Durkheim 1984).
Understanding how communities respond to mass casualty events is the first step in
understanding which communities participate in demonstrations of solidarity and which
communities do not. My analysis of the literature highlights important findings regarding
demonstrations of solidarity and is split into two sections. The first section is focused primarily
on the ideas and work of Emile Durkheim, which include community effervescence and
resilience, social solidarity and group behaviors. The second section is focused on individual
behaviors and covers generally charitable giving behaviors, altruism and social capital.
There are two major limitations in the existing literature. First, while individual giving
behavior has been systematically examined, only very rarely has it been examined as a
demonstration of solidarity to a mass casualty event. A traumatic event, such as a mass casualty
event, is likely to affect existing giving behaviors at the individual level but the effect of such
9

events has not been empirically researched. Prior findings regarding charitable giving would be
applicable to understanding demonstrations of solidarity as the same individual processes would
motivate people to give. Second, community level demonstrations of solidarity following a mass
casualty event have not been examined. Existing literature regarding group behaviors following a
mass casualty event is limited and does not explain how event specific traits could influence
community response.
Group Behaviors, Community Effervescence & Social Solidarity

In 1912, Emile Durkheim described how a community may come together to
communicate the same thought and participate in the same action (Durkheim 1912). This became
known as collective effervescence and it can be easily applied to describe how a community may
come together following a mass casualty event in order to demonstrate solidarity. Collective
action is driven by an individual emotional response which drives people to participate in similar
actions. Collective emotions after a disaster are associated with higher solidarity (Garcia and
Rime 2019). Participating in demonstrations of solidarity reinforces both positive social beliefs
or shared positive beliefs regarding the group (Rime 2005). These demonstrations act as
motivators of commitment with values and beliefs. Participation in these demonstrations helps to
emphasize the positive aspects of collective experience following a trauma. Additionally,
participation in these community wide events has been shown to enhance social identity (Neville
and Reicher 2011), ethnic identification (Gasparre, Bosco and Bellelli 2010) and identity fusion3
(Swann et al. 2012). Participation in collective emotional gatherings has also been shown to

3

Identity fusion is a “sense of oneness with a group and its individual members that motivates personally, costly,
pro-group behaviors” (Swann and Buhrmester 2012).
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increase social cohesion and social integration (Weiss and Richards 1997) and perceived social
support (Paez et al. 2007). Collective effervescence is visible in communities following a mass
casualty event in the group demonstrations (vigils, gatherings, funds gathered etc.) that often
follow, often to express solidarity with the victims.
Durkheim (1893) noted that “heinous crimes shock our collective conscience and elicit a
communal response because of the collective nature of the sentiments the crimes cause” while
also noting that “crime brings together upright consciences and concentrates them.” Conflict,
natural disasters, terrorism and school shootings have been found to produce solidarity, however,
how conflict is produced is elusive (Simmell 1955; Coser 1957; Barton 1969; Collins 2004;
Drabek 1986; Fritz 1961; Hawdon, Ryan and Agnich 2010; Hawdon and Ryan 2011; Turkel
2002). Vuori et al. (2013) tested Durkheim’s notion of crime leading to collective indignation
and examined how particularly heinous crimes can lead to a decline in social order or a
promotion of social cohesion. Their results indicated that both models may be applicable. Factors
like how an event is framed, the size and experiences of the community limit the generalizability
of both models.
Capriano (2006) described solidarity as the degree of trust, sense of familiarity, and
bonding relations between individuals and the collectivity. Social solidarity is an aspect of
human association that emphasizes the cohesive social bond that holds a group together (Gilson
2003). Individuals have different motives for participating in demonstrations of solidarity.
Motives for participating in social solidarity include rational choice, self-interest, shared norms
and beliefs. Using a sample of Virginia Tech students, Hawdon, Ryan and Agnich (2009) found
that feelings of solidarity increased for six months following the 2007 on campus shooting that
11

cost 30 lives before decreasing back to normal levels. Collins (2004), looking primarily at
terrorism, further specified that group solidarity following a conflict exists in four phases: (1) an
initial few days of shock and idiosyncratic individual reaction to attack; (2) one to two weeks of
establishing standardized displays of solidarity symbols; (3) two to three months of high
solidarity plateau; and (4) gradual decline toward normalcy in six to nine months. Brenner et al.
(2015) found that proximity to a traumatic event increased likelihood of participation in
demonstrations of solidarity. Sweet (1998) found that solidarity also increased following a
natural disaster, however, within a month it returned to pre-disaster levels. Hawdon and Ryan
(2011) elaborated on their initial study by using longitudinal data and found that event-specific
parochial and public activities generate solidarity but general parochial activities (such as
attending local meetings and businesses) are needed to sustain solidarity. Rasanen (2014) found
that social solidarity can assist in reducing the worry associated with potential risks and provide
a sense of security, however, benefits are limited.
Social solidarity and collective action are often enhanced by individual trust, reciprocity
and altruism (Woolcock and Narayan 2000). Social altruism deals with community wide helping
behaviors where individual altruism deals with individual desires to participate in helping
behaviors. Social altruism has been defined as “the community’s commitment to provide
essential resources in order to help and protect their members” (Chamlin and Cochran 1997).
Like community effervescence, social solidarity describes group behavior, in this case the
community in which a mass casualty event occurred. However, the main difference is that social
solidarity describes general solidarity feelings whereas collective effervescence describes a
specific collective action.

12

Community Resilience & Demonstrations of Solidarity

Solidarity is part of being resilient because it helps a community address and overcome a
trauma. Community resilience describes the collective ability of a geographically defined area to
deal with stressors and efficiently return to normalization of daily life following a shock (Aldrich
2012). Community resilience is founded in the ability of community members to take
meaningful, deliberate, collective action to remedy the effect of a problem, including the ability
to interpret the environment, intervene, and move on (Pfefferbaum et al. 2007). Resilient
communities demonstrate solidarity following a traumatic event like a mass casualty event.
Mass casualty events are traumatic events that strain a community’s sense of wellbeing
due to the shock and sudden loss of life. Resilience itself is the ability to execute efficient and
effective adjustment processes to alleviate stress and restore balance in the face of trauma,
tragedy or threat (Steinberg and Ritzmann 1990). For a community to be effectively resilient,
members need to cope individually and assist other members of the community to cope with the
situation. Community resilience fortifies a community against a variety of social concerns and
prepares individuals for future hardship (Brown and Kulig, 1996-1997; Kulig 2000). Many
disciplines, such as emergency management, sociology and psychology are slowly
acknowledging the concept of community resilience as a preparedness strategy for mass casualty
events and as a mechanism to prevent damaging psychological, psychosomatic, and social
consequences associated with terrorism and other disasters (Friedman 2005).
Community resilience has grown into a central concept within crisis management
policymaking and its effects are evident within national governments (COAG 2009; CCS 2011;
USDHS 2011), humanitarian organizations (UNISDR 2007; USAID 2012), and across cross13

institutional crisis management forums (Bach et al. 2010). However, solid empirical findings
supporting the concepts behind community resilience are lacking. Community resilience theories
were empirically tested in Queensland, Australia following a series of floods in 2010-2011
(George and Stark 2016; McCrea, Walton and Leonard 2016; Madsen and O’Mullan 2016).
These publications found that a general well-being of the community (prior to the events)
contributed greatly to overall resiliency (McCrea, Walton and Leonard 2016), that a strong
community was formed due to the crisis (George and Stark 2016) and social capital,
connectedness, and optimism are all important features of a resilient community (Madsen and
O’Mullan 2016).
Resilient communities demonstrate solidarity following a mass casualty event.
Communities can become resilient in two ways. First is through prior exposure to traumatic
events. The communities that learn from and persevere through earlier traumatic events become
more resilient as they continue on. As other traumatic events occur, these resilient communities
are prepared for them and respond with meaningful demonstrations of solidarity. However,
communities where disasters or traumatic events have become commonplace may not respond
with high demonstrations of solidarity as the community will have become more accustomed to
them occurring. Return to normalization would be quick for them and they may not appear to
respond resiliently as demonstrations of solidarity would not be as high. However, return to
normalization is the ultimate goal for a community following a mass casualty event and a quick
return to normalization would be a sign of a resilient community. Second, is through training and
preparation for traumatic events. Communities can prematurely increase their resilience by
preparing for different traumatic events that may afflict them. Resilience training includes
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educating people as to the role their institutions play and the methods of demonstrating solidarity
available after traumatic events. Non-resilient communities will have lesser demonstrations of
solidarity and return to normalization would take longer.
When Demonstrations Do Not Occur

Actual demonstrations of solidarity that follow a mass casualty event occur at varying
levels. In some communities, demonstrations occur at minimal levels while other communities
demonstrate strongly. Prominent mass casualty events, like 9/11 or Hurricane Katrina,
commonly raise millions of dollars, receive consistent media coverage and people consistently
demonstrate solidarity for these events well after normalcy has returned. Other mass casualty
events have very little or no demonstrations of solidarity at all. The majority of the 140 events
that occurred in the U.S. from 2000-2016 have no or minimal demonstrations recorded.4 When
demonstrations of solidarity are lacking or nonexistent it is often for three reasons. First,
individual interest in an event is lacking. Lack of interest may occur for a variety of reasons
including a low victim count, unknown victim group, blame for the victims, lack of awareness,
etc. Second, traumatic events may become too common during a timeframe. Trauma fatigue
involves a “numbness” to traumatic events, and if trauma becomes too common then individuals
would not respond to an event at all. Third, institutional support may be lacking around certain
mass casualty events. Without effective institutions to channel those interested in demonstrating
into actual, meaningful behaviors, then demonstrations would be low.

4

Based on an original database created using news sources of mass casualty events. See Appendix A for complete
database.
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In 1965, Mancur Olson suggested that “rational, self-interested individuals will not act to
achieve their common or group interests” (Olson 1965 P.2). This phenomenon became known as
the free rider problem and it is applied to many analyses of collective action. Existing literature
suggests that free riding is common following a disaster (Walsh and Warland 1983; Collins
2004). In the context of this dissertation, free riding would occur when individuals do not
demonstrate or only demonstrate minimally but still reap the social benefits. As Olson suggested,
self-interest has been found to be the biggest driver of free riding following a disaster (Walsh and
Warland 1983). However, communication failures by groups that organize demonstrations of
solidarity also significantly increased free riding (Walsh and Warland 1983). Individuals with
little motivation or who may desire to participate in demonstrations of solidarity but may only
have limited means may respond “slacktively” (Phan 2001).
Slacktivist demonstrations include simple forms of showing solidarity with a cause that
require minimal effort, have minimal effects, and require minimal coordination with others. The
internet and social media play an important part in aiding the slacktivist mentality. For example,
the most often used example of slacktivism is posting a message or picture on social media
showing solidarity with the victims. These messages are simple demonstrations of solidarity but
do not benefit the victims or community in a concrete way.
A multitude of factors can influence a community into responding with low levels of
demonstrations of solidarity. For example, a lack of altruistic individuals would increase levels
of free riding. A lack of community institutions that enable actual demonstrations to occur would
increase slacktivist responses. Communities that do not respond with high levels of
demonstrations of solidarity are less-resilient. Additionally, communities that demonstrate

16

solidarity strongly or return to normalization quickly while meeting all community needs would
be considered resilient.
Demonstrations of Solidarity & Individual Giving Behaviors

In 2017, Americans donated just over $410 billion to charity (Giving USA 2018). Many
recipients of these charitable acts are influenced by world events. For example, $2.4 billion were
donated to the victims of the September 11th terrorist attack and $3.3 billion were raised for
Hurricane Katrina disaster relief (Brown and Minty 2008). Demonstrations of solidarity like
these are one of the dependent variables throughout this dissertation.5
Understanding who participates in charitable behavior has been thoroughly examined.
However, why people demonstrate solidarity and what motives people into demonstrating
solidarity has not been examined. Two factors that influence charitable giving are altruism and
social capital. Altruism is defined as the belief in or practiced disinterested and selfless concern
for the well-being of others (Taylor 2010). Social capital is an idea that is closely related to
solidarity (Bell 2010). Trust and existing social networks are two key components of social
capital. Access to social networks directly increases volunteering and charitable giving indirectly
(Musick and Wilson 2008; Burr et al. 2005; Lee and Brudney 2012; Schervish and Havens
1997). Coleman (1988) proposed that the more dense and diverse social networks are along with
how trusting a person is are likely to influence how involved someone is in solidarity action.

5

This kind of charitable giving is viewed as different from philanthropy by scholars. Charity in general is associated
with a strong, short and emotional response whereas philanthropy is seen as involving a long-term effort (Ruesga
2006) Though philanthropy and charity have a considerable overlap the main difference is that charity aims to
relieve the pain of a specific problem and is often motivated by specific events whereas philanthropy seeks to
solve a root issue (Ruesga 2006; Dietlin 2011).
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Who Demonstrates Solidarity?

Scholars have identified several individual factors that explain who demonstrates
solidarity. Demographically, older people are much less likely to physically volunteer than
younger people (O’Brien and Mileti 1992; Kaniasty and Norris 1995; Haines, Hurlbert, and
Beggs 1996; Bjaklebring et al. 2016). Economically, higher status and more income facilitates
demonstrations of solidarity, particularly financial demonstrations (Nelson 1973; Nelson and
Dynes 1976; Kaniasty and Norris 1995; Bracha and Vesterlund 2013). Previous findings indicate
that women were more likely to participate in demonstrations of solidarity (Helms and
McKenzie 2013; Mesch et al. 2006; Andreoni and Vesterlund 2001). Religiously affiliated
individuals give more than non-religious individuals, particularly when the cause is religious in
nature (Wang and Graddy 2008; Sibley and Bulbulia 2014; Hagood 2016). Higher income status
has also been found to directly affect giving behaviors, both amount and frequency (Bracha and
Vesterlund 2013). Many findings do not consider how traumatic events may impact donation
behavior. An emotional element is necessary for donating to charity and demonstrating solidarity
following a mass casualty event. However, why people demonstrate and how mass casualty
events affect demonstrations has not.
Individual Motivations to Demonstrate

Charitable giving is driven by eight mechanisms; awareness of need, solicitation, costs
and benefits of giving, altruism, reputation, psychological benefits, values and efficacy (Bekkers
and Wiepking 2011). Of those eight mechanisms awareness of need and altruism are the most
important to this dissertation. Following a mass casualty event, the needs of the victim
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community would be paramount and awareness of those needs, along with individual altruism
would drive demonstrations of solidarity. Sympathy and empathy, guilt, happiness and identity
have all been found to influence individuals into giving (Rick, Cryder and Loewenstein 2007;
Cialdini, Baumann and Kenrick 1981; Liu and Aaker 2008). These feelings can all influence
demonstrations of solidarity after a mass casualty event. For example, an individual who feels
pity (sympathy) or understands the feelings (empathy) of the direct victims of a mass casualty
event could feel compelled to demonstrate solidarity.
Public donations, such as donating blood and volunteering time, to relief operations can
be considered a pro-social behavior (Penner et al. 2005). Relatively, Lee and Chang (2007)
found that intrinsic factors like individual altruism led people to donate while specific factors
like educational attainment and income were correlated with higher monetary donation amounts.
Donating previously to a relief campaign had been found to be a predictor of future donation to a
relief campaign (Cheung and Chan 2000). In a comparison of donation types, Lee, Piliavin and
Call (1999) found that personal norms and role identity affect the giving of time, money and
blood. Lee, Piliavin and Call (1999) further established that charitable donations and formal
volunteering are closely related but were unable to establish a relationship between these types of
giving and donating blood.
Altruism

Individual altruism deals with individual helping behaviors while social altruism is
focused on community wide helping behaviors. Disasters positively influence altruism by
increasing donations of material aid and decreasing antisocial behaviors (Mileti et al. 1975;
Drabek 1986; Siegel et al. 1999). People have been found to engage in altruistic helping
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behaviors, putting themselves at risk to save the lives of others (Tierney et al. 2001). An
endogenous relationship appears to exist between acts of altruism and positive feelings. For
example, happy people have been empirically shown to participate in charitable behavior more
than their unhappy counterparts (Isen and Levin 1972; Aderman 1972). However, altruistic acts,
such as gift giving and charitable donations, have also been shown to promote happiness (Anik et
al. 2009). Feelings of competence have been shown to increase helping and volunteering
behaviors (Harris and Huang 1973; Kazdin and Bryan 1971).
Barton (1969) proposed that altruistic feelings within a community afflicted by a
traumatic event may carry on for months after the event. However, other empirical work has
found that a therapeutic, helping community is not enduring (Quarantelli and Dynes 1977). High
altruistic behavior was associated with blood donation frequency, though convenience,
community safety and personal benefit were also found to be correlated with blood donations
(Steele et al. 2008). People who desire to participate in demonstrations but have limited abilities
to do so would likely be directed towards symbolic acts that have little importance. Prior
empirical work examining who is altruistic and participates in donations can be applied to this
dissertation. The same individuals who have donated before or possess altruistic traits would
likely be the ones who demonstrate solidarity after a mass casualty event.
Social Capital, Social Networks and Demonstrations of Solidarity
Social capital has been defined as “social networks and the associated norms of
reciprocity and trustworthiness” (Putnam 2007). Individual level social capital in producing
demonstrations of solidarity has already been well established (Bekkers 2012; Brooks 2005;
Brown & Ferris 2007; Forbes & Zampelli 2014; Jones 2006; Wang & Graddy 2008; Wilson &
20

Musick 1997). Social capital is an important part of understanding the inner workings of a
community as it related to inter-community relationships. Without the trust and inter-personal
networks that comes with high social capital, a community would be disjointed and less likely to
respond to a mass casualty event effectively.
Patulny, Siminski and Mendolia (2015) suggested that the emotional and shared
experience of participating in symbolic interaction rituals (such as those following a mass
casualty event) may affect social capital in that it may bond participants to one another. In a
distressed community social capital sustains problem solving abilities while also linking
individuals to the broader society and other problem-solving efforts (Bendik 1993). Musick and
Wilson (2008) found that individuals who have access to larger social networks volunteer more.
Larger social networks are likely to increase informal volunteering (Haines et al. 1996; Kaniasty
and Norris 1995; Burr et al. 2005; Lee and Brudney 2012) while also drawing people into
charitable giving through information and requests (Schervish and Havens 1997).
As social media usage has increased, social networks have transformed and utilize
cyberspace in order to operate. Social media can provide information to a large number of people
very quickly, which is beneficial during an emergency situation when traditional communication
methods may be overwhelmed. Institutions and organizations are now using the online platform
to reach citizens and to aid in collective action and guide people away from these symbolic
demonstrations into more actual ones (Obar, Zube and Lampe 2012). The ease of access many
people now have to the internet and social media has also aided in collective actions (such as
demonstrations of solidarity) as it has increased networking amongst people while
simultaneously keeping people in touch with organizations and institutions within their
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communities (Obar, Zube and Lampe 2012). The creation of online donation relief funds after a
mass casualty event have become commonplace. These online fundraising efforts make it easy
and convenient for individuals to demonstrate solidarity with the victims. While social media
responses may have minimal effects, they are still demonstrations of solidarity because they are
acts that show personal solidarity with the victims of an event.
Conclusion

In conclusion, demonstrations of solidarity and there causes need to be examined at both
the individual and group level. Prior findings on group behaviors indicate that solidarity and
resilience selectively occur following a traumatic event. Demonstrations of solidarity are
indicative of a resilient community; however, resilient communities do not always demonstrate
solidarity. Prior findings on individual giving behaviors indicate that people donate for a variety
of reasons. Additionally, altruism, social capital and access to social networks are strong
predictors of individual giving behaviors. These individual measures of giving behavior are
likely to indicate participation in demonstrations of solidarity.
Demonstrations of solidarity are made up primarily of individual giving behaviors that
occur following an event that show support with the victims. Individual giving behaviors have
been examined as a demonstration of solidarity. However, how do event specific traits affect
individuals and their giving behaviors. For example, does the number of people killed during an
event influence individual donation behavior? If specific groups are targeted, how does the
perception of the victims affect demonstrations of solidarity? The empirical research within this
dissertation attempts to answer each of these questions.
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Understanding solidarity and resilience and the conditions in which they occur helps
explain how a mass casualty event could affect a community. However, prior work does not
effectively analyze demonstrations of solidarity as a sign of resilience. Additionally, the trauma
of a mass casualty event upon a community has not been examined, particularly along event trait
lines. Do certain types of the mass casualty events affect communities differently than others?
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CHAPTER 3: ELEMENTS OF SOLIDARITY

The facts of an event are what motivates people and institutions to participate in
demonstrations of solidarity following a mass casualty event. This theory is rooted in the notion
that event specific traits (such as casualty number, event type, victim type) will motivate people
to demonstrate solidarity. All altruistic people will not demonstrate solidarity following a mass
casualty event. Additionally, some people with minimal altruistic traits will be motivated to
demonstrate solidarity. However, individuals with altruistic traits are more likely to demonstrate
solidarity, either individually or through a community level organization following a mass

Altruistic Individuals
Individual, Actual, Helping
Behaviors

casualty event. Without institutions and willingness of the community to participate in actual
Facts of the Event

Media Coverage

Case Specific Facts that
Influence the Community into
Responding

Coverage of the
Facts of the Event

helping behaviors, demonstrations of solidarity would likely be lessened. Figure 1 provides a
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visual representation of how a mass casualty event can influence demonstrations of solidarity.

Individual Helping
Behaviors
Altruistic & Other Helping
People

Facts of the Event

Media Coverage

Social Capital

Case Specific Facts that
Influence the Community into
Responding

Coverage of the
Facts of the Event

Social Networks,
Trustworthiness, Organization

Demonstrations of
Solidarity
Actions showing Solidarity with
the Victims and Community

Institutions
Actual Structures within a
Community that are able to
Demonstrate

Figure 1: Solidarity Model
Event specific traits such as casualty amount, type of event, and victim type will
influence people into participating in demonstrations of solidarity. Media coverage acts as an
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Institutions
Actual Structures within a
Community that are able to
Demonstrate

A

intervening variable as the facts of the event can only be influential on individuals and
institutions to respond if those facts are relayed to the community.6 Reporting by the media also
covers demonstrations of solidarity which informs community members of their occurrence and
sparks individual interest to participate in demonstrations. The facts of the event also influence
institutions into responding and providing opportunities for people to demonstrate solidarity.
Community institutions allow for interested people to have methods to demonstrate solidarity.
These institutions often organize and solicit demonstrations of solidarity for the community.
Social capital acts as an intervening variable between individuals and institutions due to the
trustworthiness and social networking associated with it. Without those networks and
trustworthiness in post mass casualty event processes, demonstrations of solidarity would likely
be hampered.
The coverage of an event acts as an intervening variable between the facts surrounding an
event and the response by the community. The media is naturally drawn to covering ongoing or
potential conflicts, particularly shocking, or sensational events (Tuman 2010). Studies of United
States media has found that sensationalism is a strong driving force behind what is covered
(Slattery and Hakanen 1994; Adams 1978; Slattery, Doremus and Marcus 2001). Disasters,
violence, crimes, sex, fires and riots are often typified as sensational (Adams 1978; Grabe et al.
2001; Hendriks Vettehen et al. 2005; Newhagen and Reeves 1992; Ryu 1982). A systematic
examination of cause of death and media coverage revealed that media coverage significantly
covered homicide and terrorism, even though they only account for a small fraction of overall

6

Media sources are only utilized for the qualitative portion of this dissertation. They are not utilized for the
experiment because respondents receive necessary information through the vignette that they would normally
receive through media sources.
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causes of death (Shen et al. 2018). Media coverage accomplishes two things; first it informs the
public as to what had occurred, often profiling victims and identifying issues surrounding
response and needs within the community going forward (Harris 2018). Emotionally charged
images, such as those from coverage of a mass casualty event, have been found to have a
significant impact on donation behavior (Small and Verrochi 2009). Second, media coverage
pressures existing institutions to act. Coverage can impact public policy and even sway policy
decisions (Gilboa 2005). Previous findings indicate that media coverage and individual exposure
to that coverage is a strong predictor of donation to relief agencies (Eisensee and Stromberg
2007; Brown and Minty 2008; Oosterhof, Heuvelman and Peters 2009).
The interest in sensational news is based on the assumption that people are evolutionarily
predisposed to survey their environment and react to anything that may be perceived as
threatening (Vettehen and Kleemans 2017). Additionally, this predisposition is used to explain
why people automatically respond to salient or negative news features (Davis and McLeod 2003;
Lang 2000; Shoemaker 1996). Laboratory studies have shown that sensationalist framing of
negative content had a positive effect on physiological indicators like short term attention and
arousal responses (Grabe et al. 2000, 2003; Lang et al. 1996; Soroka and McAdams 2015).
Social capital acts as an intervening variable between individuals and institutions within
the community. Though social capital has had differing definitions, for the purpose of this
dissertation it is defined as “social networks and associated norms of reciprocity and
trustworthiness” (Putnam 2007). Individuals who desire to demonstrate solidarity may still do so
without institutions. However, institutions organize and advertise their demonstrations, making it
easier for individuals to participate in them and magnifying the effects of their efforts. If social
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capital is low, then people may not trust the institutions and organizations who were coordinating
demonstrations of solidarity and would not participate in them. Social capital is high when
community members communicate well, trust their institutions and organize for a variety of
different issues. When social capital is high, community members trust the institutional
capabilities within their community and seek them out in order to demonstrate solidarity after a
mass casualty event. Individual group membership is accounted for in the experiment based on
the notion that if an individual is personally involved with groups, they trust them and are a part
of those social networks and will thus have more access to demonstrations of solidarity.7
Casualties

Of the facts of an event, the number of casualties would likely impact people the most.
Previous empirical findings suggest that the number of fatalities of natural disaster events
positively influence the amount of money donated to recovery efforts (Evangelidis and Van den
Bergh 2013). The statistical victim count of an event has also been shown to have a positive
effect on donation behaviors (Lesner and Rasmussen 2014).
Casualty Effects on Demonstrations of Solidarity

There are two reasons at the individual level and one at the community level that could
explain why higher casualty numbers affect demonstrations of solidarity. At the individual level,
as more people are killed due to an event, then more people are likely to have been directly
affected by the tragedy through familial and association-based relationships. This leads to more

7

Due to the difficulty in measuring social capital, it is not something operationally accounted for within the
qualitative portion of this dissertation.
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people participating in demonstrations of solidarity (St. John and Fuchs 2002). Death of a loved
one generates a powerful emotional response that often mobilizes into individual or collective
actions (Jasper 1997). Second, costlier events will be more sensational and thus draw more of a
media coverage as found by Kearns, Betus and Lemieux (2019). This increased coverage of the
event signals to people that there is more of a need due to the increased trauma a higher casualty
count event will have. This increased signaling motivates more people to demonstrate solidarity.
At the community level, a costlier event will require more institutional resources to stabilize the
community. These institutions will then continue to be active within the community after the
event has ended and they will organize and participate in demonstrations of solidarity. These
factors suggest that:
•

Hypothesis 1: Higher casualty events increase the likelihood of more demonstrations of
solidarity.
❖ Demonstrations of Solidarity=β0+β1CasualtyNumbers+βx+u
Event Type

Mass casualty events originate from different sources but for the purpose of this
dissertation they fall into one of the following categories: terrorism, crime, acts of nature and
accidents. Some events are the direct result of intentional human action; some are accidents; and
some are natural in origin. When human caused, the intention of such events creates a difference
that is perceived by the community.8

8

Acts of war can cause mass casualty events and cause demonstrations of solidarity (Collins 2004). However, the
acts of war the United States has faced since World War II are rare so they are not included in this dissertation.
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Terrorism and crime are both violent, human-caused events. Terrorism involves a
political goal that is meant to reach a larger audience (Kydd & Walter 2006; FBI 2019; GTD
2019).9 Examples of terrorism include 9/11 and the Boston Bombing. Violent events that do not
meet these criteria are treated as criminal events. The difference between crime and terrorism is
in part a matter of perception. Violent criminal events primarily cover purposefully malicious
acts like murder that do not include a political motive. Violent criminal events with five or more
casualties are not uncommon but prominent examples include the 2007 Virginia Tech Shooting
and the 2013 Washington D.C. Naval Shipyard shooting.
Accidents are either unintentionally human caused events or occur due to a mechanical or
technological failure. The people who cause them do not have a malicious intent to kill others
like in criminal acts. Accidental mass casualty events are often transportation related. Well
known examples of accidental mass casualty events include the Philadelphia train crash in 2015
that killed 8 and the Minneapolis bridge collapse in 2007 that killed 13.
Nature can also cause mass casualty events. Natural events include floods, mudslides,
earthquakes, wildfires and weather events. Unlike some mass casualty events, natural events can
sometimes be predicted and people can either evacuate or better prepare for them. For example,
tracking and projection of hurricanes is common and earthquake fault lines are well known and
building codes reflect the risks of the events. Natural events have the capability to create the
most destruction when they occur and people often fear natural disasters more than other types of
mass casualty events (Healthcare Ready 2018). Weather events include hurricanes, tornadoes

9

Huff and Kertzer (2016) specifically noted how the severity and extremity of violence can influence how likely an
individual is to believe an event is terrorism or not.

29

and other types of storms. People are also most exposed to weather events, making victims more
sympathetic as response to them is more relatable.
Table 1: Event Type Examples
Violent
Terrorism

Year
Location
2016
Dallas, TX
2016
Orlando, FL
2015 San Bernardino, CA
2015 Chattanooga, TN
2015
Charleston, SC

Method
Firearms
Firearms
Firearms
Firearms
Firearms

Crime

Victims
# Dead
Law Enforcement
6
Gay Nightclub
49
Workplace
14
Military Personnel
6
Black Church
9

Year
2016
2015
2014
2013
2012

Location
Burlington, WA
Roseburg, OR
Isla Vista, CA
Washington D.C.
Newton, CT

Method
Firearms
Firearms
Firearms
Firearms
Firearms

Victims
Mall Shoppers
College Students
Women
Naval Base
School Children

# Dead
5
9
6
13
28

Non-Violent
Accidents

Nature

Year
Location
Method
Victims
# Dead
2016
Lockhart, TX
Airballoon Crash
Passengers
16
2015 Philadelphia, PA
Train Crash
Passengers
8
2011
Bronx, NY
Bus Crash
Passengers
11
2006
Lexington, KY
Plane Crash
Local Passengers
49
2003 West Warwick, RI
Fire
Concert Goers
100

Year
Location
Method
Victims
# Dead
2014 Snohomish, WA Mudslide
Residents
49
2013
Yarnell, AZ
Fire
Firefighters
19
2011
Joplin, MO
Tornado
Residents
158
2011 Tuscaloosa, AL Tornado
Residents
44
2005 New Orleans, LAHurricane Poor/Black Residents 1464

Violent Event Effects on Demonstrations of Solidarity

Violent events where numerous people are purposefully killed have a different effect
upon a community than when people die by accident or act of nature. There are three reasons that
explain why a violent event would cause more demonstrations of solidarity than a non-violent
one. First, violent attacks cause a trauma not seen from other event types which causes a stronger
emotional reaction from the community in which they occur. A violent event type shocks people
within a community to feel as if they are under attack which motivates people into demonstrating
solidarity. The lives of survivors of traumatic events become altered, often in revelatory and
uncompromising ways (Herman 1992; Caruth 1996; Humphrey 2002; Edkins 2003). After a
traumatic event, survivors are more likely work through their grief and trauma with a community
that recognizes and identifies with them and a community familiar to them (Fierke 2004).
Commemoration and remembrance following a traumatic event have been found to ease those
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traumatic feelings (Edkins 2003). Each violent event will impact each community differently.
However, a violent mass casualty event does represent a significant trauma upon a community
that is not seen from other event types. That trauma then causes a strong emotional reaction
within the community that leads to demonstrations of solidarity.
Second, a violent event will draw more media coverage than a nonviolent one. Crime and
terrorism are both sensational in nature and draw significant, consistent coverage whenever they
occur. Shen et al. (2018) examined media coverage and found that homicide and terrorism were
significantly covered more than other causes of death. Violent events also often carry legal and
policy narratives, which keep the event in the news cycle for a longer period of time. The
activism that occurs around these narratives draws media attention and the increased media
coverage increases the chances of people learning of or being reminded of an event, which
motivates interested people to demonstrate solidarity.
Third, violent event types are directly caused by people, therefore, survivors and
community members are likely to feel as if the event was avoidable and seek to put blame on
others. These negative feelings are often directed against government leaders and will lead to
more demonstrations. However, instead of those demonstrations being solely with the victims
they are also against whoever is seen as being at fault. For example, the suspect in the 2018
Parkland, Florida shooting had been reported to federal and local law enforcement for suspicious
behaviors. However, nothing was done to act on any of the information reported to law
enforcement and many of the demonstrations that occurred following the shooting were in
solidarity with the victims and against the government (Wamsley 2018). These factors suggest
that:
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•

Hypothesis 2: Violent events will result in more demonstrations of solidarity than nonviolent
events.
❖ Demonstrations of Solidarity=β0+β1ViolentEvents+βx+u
Terrorism is often seen as an attack upon a community, thus causing a stronger reaction

amongst the victim community. Criminal events typically originate within the community and
target based on individual interests. Terrorism often targets a specific group of people which can
activate existing institutions within those nested communities into participating in
demonstrations of solidarity. Knowledge that a specific group was targeted, for whatever reason,
would also add onto the emotional reaction as it would cause similar people to feel under attack.
Prior findings indicate that war and terrorism disrupt communities and cause strong emotional
reactions to the violence (Hutchinson and Bleiker 2008). Additionally, major attacks, like Pearl
Harbor and 9/11, have been found to inspire higher levels of community solidarity (Collins
2004). Increases in altruism, kindness and solidarity were evident following the 9/11 attacks
(Abrams, Albright & Panofsky 2004; Etzioni 2002; Steinert 2003). Terrorist events have led to
large amounts of donations to the victims in their aftermaths (Glynn et al. 2003). Therefore:
o Hypothesis 2a: Terrorist events will cause more demonstrations of solidarity than
other event types.
❖ Demonstrations of Solidarity=β0+β1TerroristEvents+βx+u
Victim Type

The last event specific trait that could influence demonstrations of solidarity is the type of
victim. Vulnerable groups often become victim by chance, such as when a school bus crashed in
Chattanooga, Tennessee in 2016 that killed 6. Other mass casualty events strike at random
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victims or groups that may not be perceived as vulnerable or sympathetic. For example, 10
people from the Hendricks Motorsports organization were killed in a private plane crash in 2004.
This victim group represented a specific group; however, they were not perceived to be a
vulnerable group. Demonstrations in these cases are likely stronger within those certain groups,
but without a vulnerable perception, demonstrations would not be higher across a community or
population. In other cases, people who plan mass casualty events intentionally target specific,
vulnerable victim groups such as school children in Newton, Connecticut or the LGBT
community in Orlando, Florida.
There are two types of victim vulnerability that could affect demonstrations of solidarity.
The first are traditionally vulnerable groups (Wisner and Adams 2002). Traditionally vulnerable
people are vulnerable due to age, illness, etc. Examples of traditionally vulnerable people include
children, the elderly or disabled groups of people. Traditionally vulnerable victims are
sympathetic to many people as they are relatable to the general population as these
vulnerabilities do not discriminate across social class, ethnic or religious lines. Traditionally
vulnerable people are common and often have a physical component in explaining their
vulnerabilities. For example, children and the elderly often have physical limitations that prevent
them from being resilient to trauma. Therefore, sympathetic people respond with more
demonstrations of solidarity to compensate for those inabilities traditionally vulnerable groups
have.
The second are socially vulnerable groups. Socially vulnerable groups include those who
have a documented history of marginalization and victimization. Examples of victims of this
type of vulnerability include the LGBT community, religious, gender and racial groups.
Additionally, people who are victimized perceive themselves and people similar to be more
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vulnerable than nonvictims (Perloff and Fetzer 1986). People who are sympathetic with socially
vulnerable groups may respond with more intense demonstrations as a response to the
victimization the group had experienced. People who are not a part of the victim identity group
must be aware of past treatment of the victim identity group and sympathize with them for that
group to be perceived as vulnerable. Socially vulnerable groups often have limitations that
prevent them from being resilient to trauma. These limitations exist due to victimization and
marginalization that is common within a socially vulnerable group. While most people will trust
traditionally vulnerable groups, some members of the public may not perceive socially
vulnerable groups as vulnerable or sympathetic. Perception of the vulnerability of these groups
is dependent on the population knowing and being concerned about past victimization and
marginalization of these groups. All people will not respond the same to traditionally and
socially vulnerable groups.10
Victim Type Effects on Demonstrations of Solidarity

There are two reasons that explain why a vulnerable victim type would motivate a
community to demonstrate solidarity following a mass casualty event. First, the identifiability11
of victims of disasters has been suggested to be influential in determining donation behavior
(Cryder, Loewenstein and Scheines 2013). Rosenfeld et al. (2005) proposed that people who
identify with, or see themselves as similar to the victims, are in closer social proximity to the
victims and will be more sympathetic and respond stronger. Media coverage of an event that is

10

A traditionally vulnerable group is used as an independent variable in the experiment while a socially vulnerable
group is used as an independent variable in the qualitative section.
11
Identifiability occurs when more information is relayed to the public, such as pictures of victims, individual
backgrounds and specific information.
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inclusive of victim characteristics allows for that traumatic event to transform from an event
whose effects are limited to those immediately affected, to a collective trauma amongst those
that identify with the victims. Characterization of victims as vulnerable is important as it elicits
an emotional response. Perception of vulnerability is dependent on the individual, however, the
media or community leadership may frame certain groups as vulnerable. However, once those
victims are perceived to be vulnerable then demonstrations of solidarity will be higher. After
some mass casualty events the media may consistently cover a small portion of the victim
population that may be vulnerable. Media consumers will then perceive the victim group to be
vulnerable based on these messages, even though the majority of the victims may not be
vulnerable. For example, after the 2011 tornadoes in Joplin, Missouri, media coverage focused
on destruction of the schools in the area, however, of the 158 victims, only seven were students
from area schools (NPR 2011).
Second, once the victims are identified and perceived to be vulnerable by the general
public then people within the community will attempt to help by demonstrating solidarity with
them. The perception of victims as vulnerable causes a strong emotional reaction amongst people
similar or sympathetic to the victims. Empathy12 and compassion with victims may help to
generate social activities conducive to attempted healing of trauma, what is referred to as
demonstrations of solidarity in this dissertation (Gobodo-Madikizela 2002; Halpern and
Weinsten 2004; Schaap 2006). Once the characterization of the victims takes place, then the
event becomes more of a collective trauma as non-involved individuals begin sympathizing with
the victims. Individuals may sympathize with the group or know someone within that vulnerable

12

Empathy generally involves the ability to identify with the situations or experiences of others (Hutchinson &
Bleiker 2008).
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victim group, which may compel them to demonstrate solidarity with the victims. These factors
suggest that:
•

Hypothesis 3: Events that harm victims who are perceived as vulnerable will generate more
demonstrations of solidarity.
❖ Demonstrations of Solidarity=β0+β1VictimType+βx+u
Institutionalization of Community
Beyond the facts of an event, institutions play a key role in generating demonstrations of

solidarity. Institutional response to a mass casualty event could be perceived as a demonstration
of solidarity itself. However, for the purpose of this dissertation the response is an independent
variable (x), and what they actually do is the dependent variable (y). The roles institutions play in
organizing and coordinating demonstrations of solidarity can lead to more demonstrations of
solidarity as more individuals become involved. Prior research has identified institutions like
local governments, private businesses, and nonprofit organizations as crucial partners in all
phases of emergency management; this includes building capacity, social capital and more
resilient communities (Edwards 2013; Kapucu 2006; Waugh 2003). Institutions play an
important role in building community resilience to disasters and resilient communities are the
ones able to demonstrate solidarity to their potential (Langeland et al. 2016; Chandra et al. 2011).
This dissertation classifies institutions in four ways: (1) government, (2) business/economic, (3)
non-profit, and (4) specific institutions.
Government institutions include elected leaders, their offices and agencies. Government
institutions often have considerable resources to devote to the first response and short-term
responses to traumatic events that occur within their community. Governments have a convening
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authority and a responsibility to respond to mass casualty events. Specifically, local government
institutions have been found to have higher levels of public trust than federal and state level
institutions (McCarthy 2018). Therefore, when local government institutions become involved in
demonstrations, community members trust them. Elements of government institutions like
emergency managers and emergency services are often the most prepared to provide initial
responses to traumatic events within a community as they are often part of emergency response
and preparedness plans. These individuals then often coordinate with other institutions as
demonstrations of solidarity commence.
Business/economic institutions are locally located establishments that are a part of the
area’s economic makeup. Some of which have a vested interest in the wellbeing of their
community. Businesses are likely to support demonstrations of solidarity but rarely conduct them
on their own. Findings show that areas with locally active companies received help quicker and
recovered faster from disasters than communities without strong local businesses or who relied
on traditional relief (Ballesteros, Useem and Wry 2017). Additionally, businesses have been
found to play an important role in long term disaster recovery (Chikoto, Sadiq and Fordyce
2013). For example, the casinos and entertainment businesses were active in demonstrations
following the Las Vegas shooting in October of 2017 (Raz 2017).
Non-profit institutions are organizations that are not directly affiliated with governments
or oriented to profit. These organizations often provide community services and routinely
respond to community trauma. Some of these organizations are nation or worldwide but have
local chapters or affiliations. Many of these institutions serve the general community and often
respond to events regardless of event type or victim type. These institutions often take leading
roles in organizing demonstrations that help local residents respond to and recover from disasters
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(Gazley 2013; Kapucu, Yuldashev and Feldheim 2011). Examples of these institutions that
respond to mass casualty events include the United Way, Red Cross, or blood donation
organizations.
Specific institutions are defined as non-governmental institutions that were founded by
and primarily serve a specific community nested within a larger community.13 These groups are
often considered a sub-section of non-profit institutions (Cammett and MacLean 2014; Sledge
and Thomas 2019). Some specific institutions exist to represent, organize or serve socially
vulnerable groups based on ethnicity or race, sexual orientation, gender, religious beliefs etc.
Examples of such institutions include the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People, The Center (LGBT), and various religious groups. Some specific institutions respond to
community trauma as part of their core mission, regardless of the victim involvement with their
institutions. These institutions would still be considered specific institutions because they were
founded to or mostly serve a specific population. For example, the Salvation Army is a
Protestant-Christian denomination, however, disaster response, aid and charity are core values
the group holds and they respond to disasters regardless of victim type. In some cases, specific
institutions may also not respond because they are not representative of the victim group and
they are not sympathetic to the victims. When a specific group is afflicted by such an event, new
institutions may form in order to fill a void that becomes apparent after a traumatic event
happens. Essentially, the creation of these new institutions in response to such an event become a
demonstration of solidarity themselves.

13

For the purpose of this dissertation no government institutions are considered specific institutions. I recognize
that they exist (ex. Indian Reservations), however they are rare in the U.S.
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A strong response from any one of these categories of institutions may lead to higher
demonstrations of solidarity. Additionally, strong institutional responses in other categories
would increase the likelihood of more demonstrations of solidarity. Though the institutions and
their structures are the main method in which demonstrations of solidarity could be increased, it
is important to recognize that individual representatives of institutions can also influence
demonstrations.
There is an individual leadership aspect to institutionalization. For example, leaders of
institutions are often wealthy, prominent members of a community. They often receive media
coverage and are most often known for their involvement with one form of institution previously
mentioned. The best example of institutional leadership would be the mayor of a community.
The mayor would be looked to for leadership following a mass casualty event. If the mayor
responded with strong leadership by frequently speaking to the media, soliciting for
demonstrations, and working with other groups, etc. then demonstrations of solidarity would be
positively affected. Eldridge (2005) found that availability of information on how to donate, as
communicated by local leaders in this case, is paramount in predicting donation behavior. If
these individuals have a particular investment in a community then they would be likely to
positively influence demonstrations of solidarity either through solicitation of demonstrations or
through a personal contribution. Other individuals, like business leaders, may be personally
invested in an area and donate as a demonstration of solidarity, but due to their personal success
they are able to make a significant contribution. For example, in 2017 Houston native and tech
billionaire Michael Dell pledged $36 million for Hurricane Harvey relief after it devastated the
Gulf Coast of the U.S. (Yurieff 2017). While this is only a single demonstration, it is an intense
demonstration that the majority of other Houston residents would not have been able to conduct.
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Institutional Effects on Demonstrations of Solidarity

Institutions have a direct impact upon demonstrations of solidarity for five reasons. First,
institutional collaboration in humanitarian relief operations are important for effective disaster
relief (Telford and Cosgrave 2007). These partnerships facilitate disaster response by providing a
method to exchange knowledge and skills by participating institutions (Kapucu 2006). Second, a
strong non-profit institutional response can bring experience in organizing effective
demonstrations. Non-profit institutions bring considerable resources and name recognition when
responding to disasters. Sledge and Thomas (2019) found that these institutions critically shaped
disaster response and recovery because they “quickly provide services that may not be provided
by governments, their flexibility, and their unique capacity to reach marginalized populations.” If
community members see the response of one of these groups it could legitimize the
demonstrations of solidarity that are occurring and motivate people to help.
Third, business institutions can bring a considerable amount of resources to
demonstrations of solidarity. If an afflicted area is economically well off, then there is likely to
be strong business involvement in demonstrations of solidarity. These businesses not only
directly provide aid to the area but they can also solicit funds for disaster relief themselves.
Economically weak areas will have limited business involvement in demonstrations, and people
in economically weaker areas would be more financially strained and would be less able to
demonstrate solidarity even if they wanted to. Fourth, communities that are institutionally dense
are likely to have high profile representatives of those institutions that are active members of the
community. These individuals are able to provide essential leadership following a mass casualty
event and they can solicit demonstrations of solidarity or make a significant demonstration
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themselves through their increased institutional capability. Fifth, institutions can act as social
networks and larger social networks have been found to increase demonstrations of solidarity
(Haines et al. 1996; Kaniasty and Norris 1995; Schervish and Havens 1997; Burr et al. 2005;
Music and Wilson 2008; Lee and Brudney 2012).
The individuals in a community may be intent on responding resiliently and
demonstrating solidarity strongly following a mass casualty event, however, without strong
institutions that response can be impeded until people within the community can organize
themselves or they lose interest. Areas with low institutionalization include rural areas where
government reach is minimal and poor areas with low business/economic involvement. Specific
institutions are likely to respond whenever the groups they represent are victimized. Non-profit
institutions are also likely to respond whenever a major event happens. However, in the case of
both specific and non-profit institutions, these groups are likely to respond stronger in more
densely populated areas where they may have an existing influence. Institutions allow for a quick
and organized response and without that existing infrastructure demonstrations would at least be
delayed until the community can organize themselves. The longer organization of
demonstrations take, the quicker people would become no longer interested in participating in
meaningful demonstrations. Without the availability of institutions, community members who
desire to demonstrate solidarity but have no means to do so would respond selectively and in less
meaningful ways, such as a social media response. These factors suggest that:
•

Hypothesis 4: Victim communities that have a higher level of institutionalization will have
more demonstrations of solidarity following a mass casualty event.
❖ Demonstrations of Solidarity=β0+β1Institutionalization+βx+u
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Outside of the traditional first response that is expected from local government agencies,
strong government institutions and their leaders play an important part in how a community
responds to a mass casualty event. A strong governmental response can not only contain a
disaster and limit the damage but also government leadership can actively solicit funds. People
within a community look first to their government when a community trauma occurs. Involved
political leaders are a demonstration in itself, however, there involvement attracts interested
individuals into demonstrating. In some communities elected officials are more involved than in
others. Leaders of government institutions have up to date knowledge of an area and are able to
identify the resources that a community possesses and gaps in community needs (Edwards 2013).
Strong leaders are consistently in the media and they are popular within the areas they govern.
Other elected officials are rarely seen outside of official government businesses and they remain
mostly unknown even within the areas they govern. Government involvement or the
endorsement of political leaders in demonstrations legitimizes the demonstrating process.
Additionally, strong government institution leaders commonly collaborate and work with other
institutions in order to facilitate demonstrations. The agreements government institutions have in
place with other institutions to respond when a disaster strikes makes government institutions
more powerful. Government institutions, the leadership they provide and the relationships they
often have with other institutions make a strong government institutional leadership response
crucial if strong demonstrations of solidarity are to happen. Therefore:
o Hypothesis 4a: A strong response from government institution leaders will lead to
more demonstrations of solidarity.
❖ Demonstrations of Solidarity=β0+β1GovernmentInstitutionalLeadership+βx+u
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When a specific group is the victim of a mass casualty event, that group may have a
higher level of institutionalization than other groups of people. Vulnerable communities often
have existing institutions within their communities that were founded with the purpose of serving
members of that vulnerable population (Cammett and MacLean 2014). The best examples of
specific institutions providing support is for socially vulnerable groups. For example, numerous
LGBT groups participated in demonstrations of solidarity following the Pulse shooting in 2016.
However, traditionally vulnerable groups also receive institutional support. For example, schools
across the nation participated in demonstrations of solidarity following the 2012 Newton
Connecticut shooting that targeted elementary school students. Whenever trauma, such as a mass
casualty event, affects the community in which these specific institutions are active, they are
likely to mobilize, coordinate and participate in demonstrations of solidarity. The coordination
they provide allows for interested individuals to participate in demonstrations of solidarity
through those specific institutions they usually would not have been involved in. These
institutions often have existing members, donors and structures that makes it easier for them to
quickly organize demonstrations. A strong specific institutional response is important due to
increased media coverage, ability to quickly organize and their closeness to specific victim types.
However, a strong specific institutional response is not likely to happen unless a specific victim
group is the victim of a mass casualty event. Therefore:
o Hypothesis 4b: A strong specific institutional response will lead to more
demonstrations of solidarity.
❖ Demonstrations of Solidarity=β0+β1SpecificInstitutionalization+βx+u
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Theoretical Conclusions
This theory attempts to explain how event specific traits and existing institutions can
influence demonstrations of solidarity to occur following a mass casualty event. Examining
demonstrations of solidarity following mass casualty events in these ways reveals limitations.
For example, other event specific traits like extent of property damage and number of injuries are
closely related to some of the independent variables and could logically influence individual
desires to help and thus demonstrations of solidarity. Additionally, community specific traits
could also influence demonstrations of solidarity. For example, the familiarity a community has
with trauma could influence demonstrations of solidarity in two contradictory ways. First, if a
community has experienced prior mass casualty events then they may be more resilient and have
existing institutions to demonstrate solidarity. Gal (2013) found that communities who
experience repeated traumas collectively exhibited signs of resilience through a quick return to
normalization. Alternatively, a community may also feel trauma fatigue if traumatic events strike
their community often. Trauma fatigue and the associated lack of emotional response to motivate
people to participate would lead to less demonstrations of solidarity.
Because of the wide array of variables likely to influence demonstrations of solidarity it
is logical to utilize an experimental approach to test these ideas. However, an experimental
method removes the emotional element that is important in warranting a response to such a
traumatic event. Living in a community where a mass casualty event happened, seeing the event
be covered through media sources and knowing people affected by such an event are two
influential factors that could not be effectively relayed through an experimental approach.
Nonetheless, experiments are an important step in measuring demonstrations of solidarity based
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on event specific traits. The wide array of variables that could influence demonstrations of
solidarity makes a qualitative approach a logical step. A comparative case study approach would
allow for a thorough and more invasive evaluation of communities following a mass casualty
event. However, effectively drawing causal inferences and attributing them to the independent
variables of interest would be challenging as having cases that are similar along all variables of
interest except one would be difficult.
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CHAPTER 4: EXPERIMENTAL APPROACH
This section seeks to answer questions regarding an individual and community’s reaction
to a mass casualty event through the use of survey experiments. A survey experiment is a
purposeful manipulation of key variables within a survey instrument for the purpose of inferring
how the respondent is affected by those variables (McDermott 2002). Random assignment of
respondents into control and treatment groups will allow for causal inferences to be made based
on the comparisons of the decisions made by the individuals in each group (Druckman et al.
2006).
Experimental methods are rarely used to measure the effects of a mass casualty event due
to the unpredictable nature of such events and the traumatic effects they can have on people.
Rasanen et al. (2014) utilized two sets of surveys mailed out in 2008 (before and after a school
shooting) to see if the recurrence of a potential mass casualty event changes the relationship
between solidarity and the perception of different types of risk. They found that once tragedies
became more common the protective functions of social solidarity that help communities reduce
their worry associated with risks (in this case the shooting) tended to diminish.
Measuring a community’s response to a mass casualty event begins at the individual
level, so the use of a survey experiment is a natural fit. However, the use of a survey experiment
to measure demonstrations of solidarity after a mass casualty event has never been undertaken
before so any empirical results will be a first step in better understanding this phenomenon.
Three hypotheses are tested across three experiments. The hypotheses tested are:
1. higher casualty events increase the likelihood of more demonstrations of solidarity

CasualtyNumbers(X )

DemonstrationsOfSolidarity(Y )
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2. violent events will result in more demonstrations of solidarity than nonviolent events

ViolentEvent(X )

DemonstrationsOfSolidarity(Y )

a. terrorist events will cause more demonstrations of solidarity than other event
types.

TerroristEvent(X )

DemonstrationsOfSolidarity(Y )

3. events that harm victims who are perceived as vulnerable will generate more
demonstrations of solidarity.

VictimType(X )

DemonstrationsOfSolidarity(Y )

Results are mixed and appear to support a null hypothesis regarding hypothesis 1 and
hypothesis 2. However, when testing hypothesis 3, results are very supportive. As results are
further analyzed a discussion is provided regarding what constitutes a mass casualty event in
terms of casualty number and the differences between event types.
This chapter consists of five sections. The first begins with an introduction to the
experiments and includes the text each respondent received. The second section connects the
experiments to their appropriate hypotheses and discusses the independent variables. The third
section examines the dependent variables measured across the experiments and the control
variables. The fourth section begins with some descriptive statistics regarding the variables
before the results for each experiment are examined more closely. The fifth and sixth sections
further analyze the findings of the survey experiment and interpret the results.
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Experiment Introduction

The nature of a survey experiment such as this makes the unit of analysis at the individual
level. Therefore, a convenience sample was utilized and this survey was disseminated to UCF
undergraduate students (n=225).14 Each respondent first answered nine demographic, descriptor
and psychometric questions meant to measure basic attributes about each respondent. They then
received their first vignette which tested hypothesis 1, followed by five questions meant to
measure their responses to that event. They then faced a short distractor asking them to rank
presidents in either ascending or descending order. They then faced their second vignette meant
to test hypothesis 2 and five questions meant to test their responses to that event. They then faced
a short distractor asking them to complete a numerical sequence (All distractor tasks available in
Appendix). Respondents then faced their final vignette meant to measure hypothesis 3, followed
by final five questions meant to measure their responses to that event. In order to provide
additional variation across vignettes, hypothesis 2 (violent events will result in more
demonstrations of solidarity than nonviolent events), is tested across all three experiments as
respondents answered either a violent or nonviolent event type in their vignettes in experiment 1
and experiment 3.
Experiment 1

The first experiment manipulated the number of casualties and event type. Respondents
received either a weather or terrorism related event:
Imagine that:

14

IRB Explanation of Research and Approval Letter are provided in the Appendix B
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•

your community was struck by a strong tornado. According to the National Weather
Service winds reached well over 200mph as the tornado tore through the area leaving
[2/6/23] dead and many other injured
OR

•

a large car bomb went off in your community killing [2/6/23] people and leaving many
others injured. The responsible party was apprehended leaving the area and the incident is
currently being investigated by Federal authorities as an act of terrorism

The community is struggling to heal and many organizations are on scene to assist and relief
efforts are underway.
Experiment 1 tests hypothesis 1; higher casualty events increase the likelihood of more
demonstrations of solidarity and hypothesis 2/2a that violent event types (terrorist in this case)
will result in more demonstrations of solidarity. The independent variable values were selected
because the first option (2) is below the five threshold that is often referred to as the minimum
for a mass casualty event. The second option (6) is near that threshold while the third option (23)
is significantly higher. Each respondent received either of the event types and victim counts at
random.
Experiment 2
The second experiment only manipulates the type of event and respondents randomly
received either a weather, terrorism, accident or criminal event.
Imagine that:
•
•
•
•

your community was struck by a powerful tornado. According to the National Weather
Service winds reached well over 200mph as the tornado tore through the area.
a large car bomb went off in your community. The responsible party was apprehended
leaving the area and the incident is being investigated by Federal authorities as an act of
terrorism
a four-lane bridge lost structural integrity during local rush hour and collapsed within
your community
a mass murder occurred in your county. An individual shot and killed several people
during an attempted bank robbery which turned into a hostage situation. The responsible
49

individual was later taken into custody by local law enforcement and charged with the
attempted robbery and numerous murder charges for the deaths he caused.
The area is devastated and the incident is being treated as a mass casualty event due to the
number dead. The community is struggling to heal and many organizations are on scene to assist
and relief efforts are underway
•

The second experiment tests hypothesis 2; violent events will result in more demonstrations
of solidarity than nonviolent events and hypothesis 2a; terrorist events will cause more
demonstrations of solidarity than other event types.
Each vignette is framed in a way that does not specify the number or type of casualties

and they are only referred to as a mass casualty event in order to attribute any responses to the
variation provided (event type).
Experiment 3

The third experiment manipulates the type of victims for each event along with event
type. Respondents received either a crime or accident related event.
Imagine that:
•

•

a mass murder occurred in your county. An individual shot and killed several people
during an attempted bank robbery which turned into a hostage situation. The responsible
individual was later taken into custody by local law enforcement and charged with the
attempted robbery and numerous murder charges for the deaths he caused.
a four-lane bridge lost structural integrity during local rush hour and collapsed within
your community

Victims are mainly:
•
•

school age children who were on several different school buses
seemingly random commuters

The area is devastated and the incident is being treated as a mass casualty event due to the
number dead. The community is struggling to heal and many organizations are on scene to assist
and relief efforts are underway.
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Experiment 3 tests hypothesis 3; events that harm victims who are perceived as
vulnerable will generate more demonstrations of solidarity and hypothesis 2; violent events will
result in more demonstrations of solidarity than nonviolent events. The first value for the
independent variable (school age children) was selected because children are a traditionally
vulnerable victim group that spans across cultures. According to the World Health Organization
(WHO), children, elderly, malnourished and ill people are the most vulnerable when a disaster
strikes (Wisner and Adams 2002). The second value (random commuters) is included to account
for events where random or non-vulnerable groups make up the majority of victims. Respondents
received at random either event type and either victim type.
Dependent Variables

The dependent variables measured across all the experiments is the propensity of
respondents to participate (or not) in a variety of different types of demonstrations of solidarity
following a mass casualty incident. The demonstrations of solidarity measured are social media
response, volunteering of time, donation of blood, monetary donation and event participation. A
factor analysis is then conducted with the demonstrations of solidarity for each experiment.
Those factors that are created are then used as a dependent variable. These demonstrations of
solidarity were chosen because they cover the spectrum of possible demonstrations (including
symbolic and actual demonstrations) available to members of a community after a mass casualty
event.
The first response available to respondents is how they will respond via social media and
is measured dichotomously based on whether or not their social media activity would reflect the
event that occurred. Though social media is used more by younger generations, it is often the
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first line of access individuals have to respond to an event that happens within the community.
For example, many community organizations utilize social media to organize and coordinate
events. The logic behind the inclusion of this variable is based on the notion that social media is
incredibly widespread, so when a mass casualty event happens, people will look to their profiles
for information regarding the event. Social media is also a means of communication with other
community members to check on their wellbeing and to notify other individuals of their
wellbeing, often through a marking of “safe” or a changing of their profile pictures. Individuals
who only possess minimal desires to demonstrate or who may not have the means to respond in
other ways may respond “slacktively” through social media. This variable is represented in the
following results tables as SocialMediaResponse and respondents received the following
question:
•

Question 1: In the week following the mass casualty event, would any of your social
media activity (Facebook, Twitter, Instagram etc.) be in response to the event? (ex.
Posts/hashtags related to event, marking yourself as “safe,” changing pictures etc.)
Answer 1: Option 1- Yes. Option 2- No. Option 3- Not involved with social media
The second demonstration of solidarity measured is how much free time (out of 2

hours/120 minutes) a respondent would devote to relief efforts. The inclusion of this variable is
based on the notion that the individuals will respond to the mass casualty events that occurred
within their community by volunteering their time to relief efforts. Relief efforts often take the
form of physical cleanup (such as after a weather incident), providing voluntary victim services
or other time-consuming acts done in response to an event. This variable is represented in the
following results tables as VolunteerTime and respondents received the following question:
•

Question 2: Out of two hours of free time in the week following a mass casualty event,
how much of that time would you devote to relief efforts?
Answer 2: Out of 120 minutes
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The third demonstration of solidarity measure is dichotomous and asks whether or not an
individual would donate blood following a mass casualty. The inclusion of this variable is based
on the notion that individuals will often look to donate blood as a means to assist their fellow
community members who may have been injured during a mass casualty incident. Violent events
more often cause an increase in blood donations as community members find this is their best
way to help. While recent empirical findings confirm that an increase does occur, very rarely do
those blood donations provide actual assistance (Lozada et al. 2019). This variable is represented
in the following results tables as BloodDonations and respondents received the following
question:
•

Question 3: Would you donate blood in the week following the mass casualty event?
Answer 3: Option 1- Yes. Option 2- No
The fourth demonstration of solidarity is how much money (out of $100) would a

respondent donate towards relief efforts. The inclusion of this variable is based on the notion that
individuals will be more likely to donate money to victim’s relief funds, charities etc. that are
working in the affected areas. These donations are often useful in restoring and reconstructing
after a disaster and are much better suited than the donations of goods (Heimburger 2018). This
variable is represented in the following results tables as MoneyDonations and respondents
received the following question:
•

Question 4: If you had $100 in the week following an event that you were not using for
anything else, how much (if any) would you donate to a charitable or relief effort related
to the event?
Answer 4: Out of $100
The fifth and final demonstration of solidarity is whether or not an individual would

participate in an incident specific event (ex. vigils) following the mass casualty incident and is
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measured dichotomously. Events often take place to show solidarity with an affected community
and first happen at the local level, though they can often spread worldwide for major mass
casualty incidents. Post et al. (2003) explains “In a general therapeutic context rituals are
recommended as an element in the process of handling grief and other emotions following a
disaster.” The candlelight vigil serves as a reaction and response because it gathers a community
together to stand as one when conditions are difficult. The inclusion of this variable is based on
the notion that individuals will participate in a community event to show solidarity with the
affected communities following an incident. The final question respondents received was
regarding participation in events following a mass casualty event and is represented in the
following results tables as EventParticipation; it is as follows:
•

Question 5: Would you attend a large group event immediately following the mass
casualty event meant to show solidarity with the victims and community? (Ex.
candlelight vigil)
Answer 5: Option 1- Yes. Option 2- No
A factor analysis creates a matrix of intercorrelations amongst a set of variables (in this

case our experiment specific demonstrations of solidarity) in order to determine to what extent
those variables are related.15 If the data analyzed has little to no variation, only one factor can be
derived from the data, if there is more variation more factors will be derived (Rummel 1970).
The dependent variables from the first experiment contain a significant amount of variation so
two factors were created. The dependent variables for the second and third experiments contain
little variation so only a single factor was created for each. Based on those matrices it is apparent
that the variance within the dependent variables of Experiment 1 is much more dispersed. Factor
1 only accounts for 33% of the variance within the variables whereas Factor 1 accounts for 43%

15

See Appendix B.4 for Factor Analysis Matrices
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and 46% of the variance in Experiment 2 and Experiment 3, respectively. Within Experiment 1,
Factor 1 is mostly defined by the variables Money, Blood, and Time, whereas Factor 2 is mostly
defined by variables Social Media and Event. Within Experiment 1, the first Factor Analysis
variable is represented in results tables as X1F1 while the second one is represented as X1F2.
The factors created within both Experiment 2 and 3 are also mostly defined by Money, Blood,
and Time, however, the variance does not reach the levels to where another factor would be
created. Within Experiment 2 the Factor Analysis variable is represented in results tables as X2F
while the Experiment 3 Factor Analysis variable is represented as X3F. Each factor generated is
analyzed using OLS against each of their respective experiment’s independent variables in the
same manner the other demonstrations of solidarity were analyzed.
Control Variables

Other variables of interest to this study include mainly demographic and descriptive
questions along with a single psychometric question designed to provide a better insight into the
characteristics and behaviors of who is participating in this study. Focused on demographics,
there are six characteristics considered. First is the age of the respondent and is included based
on previous findings that indicate an age-based positivity bias exists in regards to charitable
giving (Bjalkebring et al. 2016). The age question respondents received is as follows:
•

Question 1: How old are you?
Answer 1: blank space allowing respondents to input in their year of birth.
Second is the inclusion of a gender variable based on previous findings that indicate that

women tend to provide more charity due to higher empathetic concerns (Mesch et al. 2011).
Individuals who indicated that they did not have a sex where removed from the final analysis
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which allowed a true dichotomous gender variable. The gender question respondents received is
as follows:
•

Question 2: What is your sex?
Answer 2: Option 1- male Option 2-female Option 3-no sex
Third is an eight-point scale asking the highest education an individual has completed.

The inclusion of this variable is based on numerous prior findings that indicate that people who
have higher education will be more altruistic and donate more (Yen 2002; Andreoni et al. 2003;
Bekkers and Wiepking 2011). The question respondents received regarding their education level
is as follows:
•

Question 3: What is the highest level of school you have completed or the highest degree
you have received?
Answer 3: Option 1-less than high school. Option 2- High school graduate or equivalent
(ex. GED). Option 3-Some college but no degree. Option 4- Associates Degree (2 year).
Option 5-Bachelor’s Degree (4 year). Option 6- Master’s Degree. Option 7- Doctoral
Degree. Option 8- Professional Degree (MD, JD etc.)

The fourth variable of interest is the income level of respondents and it is measured on a
seven-point scale (1 = less than $30,000, 7 = $80,000 or more). Higher income status has been
found to directly affect giving behaviors, both amount and frequency (Bracha and Vesterlund
2013). The income level question respondents received is as follows:
•

Question 4: Describe your income (before taxes):
Answer 4: Option 1-less than $30,000. Option 2- $30,000-$39,999. Option 3- $40,000$49,999. Option 4- $50,000-$59,000. Option 5- $60,000-$69,999. Option 6- $70,000$79,999. Option 7- More than $80,000
Fifth is a seven-point scale for political ideology (1 = far left, 7 = far right). The inclusion

of this variable is based on the notion that political ideology affects the types of giving. Previous
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findings indicate that politically conservative individuals reported higher levels of giving
(Paarlberg et al. 2018). The politic question respondents received is as follows:
•

Question 5: On the scale below indicate your political leanings: (0-10)
Answer 5: 0: Far Left. 5: Independent. 10: Far Right
The sixth general demographic question is regarding religiosity and measures

respondents’ levels of religious activity based on a four-point scale (1= not religious, 4= very
religious.) More religious people have been found to have higher life satisfaction and thus, give
more to charity (Sibley and Bulbulia 2014). The religious question respondents received is as
follows:
•

Question 6: How often do you attend religious services per week (4-point scale).
Answer 6: Option 1- None. Option 2- 1. Option 3- 2-3. Option 4- More than 3.
The final three control variables are believed to directly affect how an individual would

react following a mass casualty event and falls in line with the aforementioned theory. The first
is a four-point measure of group membership and asks respondents how many social, civic or
organizational groups they are personally a member of (1 = none, 4 = more than 3). Individuals
who are members of groups theoretically have more accessibility to demonstrations. It is as
follows:
•

Question 7: How many social, civic or organizational groups are you a member of? (ex.
Alumni associations, charitable/neighborhood groups, fraternities/sororities etc.)
Answer 7: Option 1- None. Option 2-1. Option 3-2-3. Option 4- More than 3
The next is a five-point psychometric measure of altruism and asks respondents how

often they would go out of their way to do something nice for a stranger (1 = never, 5 = very
often). The altruistic measure respondents received is as follows:
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•

Question 8: Would you go out of your way to do something nice for a stranger?
Answer 8: Option 1- Very often. Option 2- Often. Option 3- Occasionally. Option 4- Not
Often. Option 5- Never.
The final control variable is four-point scale meant to measure an individual experience

with a mass casualty event (1 = no experience, 4 = experienced firsthand). This variable is based
on the idea that individuals who have experienced a mass casualty event before and survived will
be more likely to participate in demonstrations of solidarity because they have a greater
understanding of mass casualty events and how they affect the community.
•

Question 9: Have you ever experienced an event where a large number of people were
killed in a single incident? (including military service)
Answer 9: Option 1- No. Option 2- Knew someone who was a victim of an event and
survived. Option 3- Knew someone who was killed during an event. Option 4Experienced firsthand
Sample Characteristics

Table 2 displays the descriptive statistics for all control variables across the sample. The
standard deviations in the table represent a selection based on the ranges provided through the
questioning. The minimums and maximums listed also represent selections based on the
questioning range, with the exception of age, which represents a true value. A sample restricted
to college students is fairly limiting as only about a third of Americans have any sort of college
degree (Census 2017). However, scholars argue that results from a survey using a convenience
sample of college students is valid and reliable and results are generalizable to other populations
when the survey is reliant on basic psychological processes as opposed to general demographics
Kardes (1996) and Lucas (2003).
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As expected with such a sample, the majority of respondents were young (See Figure 3),
and not very religious (See Figure 6). In addition to age and religiosity, the limitations of the
sample are also evident in that the majority of respondents had an Associates Degree (See Figure
4) and little income (See Figure 5).
Table 2: Sample Descriptive Statistics
Variable
Age
Sex
Education
Income
Politics
Religion
Group Membership
Altruism
MCE Familiarity

Mean
24.03
0.55 (Slightly More Female)
3.75 (Just Below Some College)
1.76 (Just Below $30,000-$39,999)
4.62 (Slightly More Liberal Than Independent)
1.34 (Slightly Above None)
2.03 (Slightly More than One)
2.41 (Between Often and Occassionally)
1.48 (No Experience)

SD
8.31
0.49
0.89
1.7
2.37
0.70
0.94
0.83
0.93

Min Max
18 79
0
1
1
7
1
7
0 10
1
4
1
4
1
5
1
4

N
225
225
225
225
225
225
225
225
225

While the sample limitations are evident, it is important to note that the population is still
very heterogeneic. For example, the slightly female dominant gender distribution is positive in
that recent U.S. census data has indicated that there are more females than males within the
country (See Figure 2). The political breakdown of the sample is also a good sign mainly
because no one group represents more than half of the sample. 40% of respondents were
moderates (those who indicated 4-6 on the question) followed by 35% liberal (0-3) and 25%
conservative (7-10) (See Figure 7).
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Figure 2: Sample Sex Characteristics

Figure 3: Sample Age Characteristics
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Figure 4: Sample Education Characteristics

Figure 5: Sample Income Characteristics
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Figure 6: Sample Religion Characteristics

Figure 7: Sample Political Characteristics
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Figure 8: Sample Group Membership Characteristics

Figure 9: Sample Altruism Characteristics
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Figure 10: Sample Prior MCE Characteristics

Figure 11: Altruism & Group Membership
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Theoretically, the measures of group membership, altruism, and prior mass casualty
experience are all important measures and distributions of these traits amongst the general public
are not well established. The majority of respondents were involved in groups and behaved
altruistically, even at minimum levels (See Figure 8 & 9). As expected, the more altruistic
someone is the more it appears they are involved with groups (See Figure 11). More than 75%
of respondents had no experience with mass casualty events (See Figure 10). While the
occurrence of such events is on the rise, most of those responses are likely military service. In
conclusion, while the sample is not, ideal the results will be valid and reliable because of the
size, heterogeneic (albeit limited) nature of the sample and the context of the surveys.
Analytical Methods

The first (social media), third (blood donation) and fifth (event participation) variables
have binary outcomes, therefore logistic modeling (logit) was utilized. The second (volunteer
time) and fourth (monetary donation) and sixth (factor analysis) variables have an integer range,
therefore they were run as linear regression (OLS). All tests are two tailed and robust standard
errors were used for all modelling. As with any regression based empirical study, it is important
to test for collinearity before any models are run. A Pearson’s correlation table of descriptive
variables revealed that none are collinear enough to warrant an exclusion from the models (See
Appendix B.3).
Casualty Number & Demonstrations of Solidarity Results

Based on hypothesis one, respondents who are exposed to higher numbers of fatalities
will be more likely to respond with higher levels of demonstrations of solidarity.
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Table 3: Casualty Numbers & Demonstrations of Solidarity
SocialMediaResponse (Logit)

VolunteerTime (OLS)

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Age

-0.122(0.053)**

-0.122(0.053)**

-0.123(0.053)**

0.784(0.583)

0.787(0.583)

0.785(0.583)

Sex

-0.273(0.393)

-0.273(0.394)

-0.273(0.393)

-14.268(6.457)**

-14.210(6.463)**

-14.240(6.458)**

Education

0.358(0.279)

0.359(0.279)

0.360(0.280)

3.521(4.396)

3.501(4.295)

3.509(4.396)

Income

0.071(0.125)

0.071(0.125)

0.070(0.125)

-1.002(2.380)

-0.968(2.380)

-0.985(2.380)

Politics

0.225(0.071)***

0.225(0.071)***

0.225(0.071)***

0.094(1.355)

0.090(1.355)

0.090(1.355)

0.012(0.333)

0.012(0.334)

0.011(0.333)

-5.599(4.606)

-5.558(4.608)

-5.580(4.605)

Social Capital

-0.422(0.230)*

-0.423(0.230)*

-0.423(0.231)*

9.757(3.393)***

9.757(3.392)***

9.754(3.392)***

Altruism

-0.427(0.254)*

-0.428(0.254)*

-0.429(0.254)*

11.823(3.827)***

11.828(3.825)***

11.820(3.825)***

Religion

Prior MCE

0.038(0.253)

0.038(0.253)

0.039(0.253)

-0.328(3.434)

-0.366(3.437)

-0.339(3.430)

Weather

-0.119(0.391)

-0.120(0.391)

-0.122(0.390)

10.320(6.228)

10.270(6.226)

10.235(6.226)

Casualty 2:

-0.646(0.455)

-0.300(0.501)

3.116(7.375)

-3.308(7.659)

Casualty 6:

0.345(0.485)

Casualty 23:

-0.352(0.482)

Cons

2.018(1.667)

Pseudo R 2
Log PseudoLikelihood
ꭓ2
R2
F
N

1.680(1.674)

0.640(0.458)

-6.618(7.654)

-3.354(7.458)

-14.526(24.631)

-8.198(25.010)

-11.333(25.307)

186

0.12
0.0004
222

0.12
0.0004
222

0.12
0.0004
222

0.288(0.500)

6.354(7.543)

1.397(1.739)

0.13

0.13

0.13

-86.11
0.006

-86.12
0.006

-86.13
0.006

186

186

3.170(7.633)

*p<.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
BloodDonation (Logit)

MoneyDonations (OLS)

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Age

0.875(0.449)*

0.880(0.448)*

0.879(0.449)*

0.875(0.449)*

0.880(0.448)*

0.879(0.449)*

Sex

-6.170(4.946)

-6.196(4.953)

-6.147(4.954)

-6.170(4.946)

-6.196(4.953)

-6.147(4.954)

Education

-1.137(3.877)

-1.160(3.880)

-1.144(3.879)

-1.137(3.877)

-1.160(3.880)

-1.144(3.879)

Income

0.666(2.061)

0.697(2.053)

0.692(2.060)

0.666(2.061)

0.697(2.053)

0.692(2.060)

Politics

0.270(1.008)

0.270(1.008)

0.275(1.008)

0.270(1.008)

0.270(1.008)

0.275(1.008)

Religion

-4.043(3.703)

-4.026(3.707)

-4.011(3.707)

-4.043(3.703)

-4.026(3.707)

-4.011(3.707)

Social Capital
Altruism

-2.788(2.640)

-2.776(2.641)

-2.773(2.640)

-2.788(2.640)

-2.776(2.641)

-2.773(2.640)

11.247(3.250)***

11.288(3.249)***

11.283(3.250)***

11.247(3.250)***

11.288(3.249)***

11.283(3.250)***

Prior MCE

2.489(2.812)

2.481(2.819)

2.438(2.805)

2.489(2.812)

2.481(2.819)

2.438(2.805)

Weather

-5.343(4.909)

-5.264(4.908)

-5.280(4.903)

-5.343(4.909)

-5.264(4.908)

-5.280(4.903)

Casualty 2:

5.273(5.828)

-1.013(5.841)

5.273(5.828)

-1.013(5.841)

Casualty 6:
Casualty 23:
Cons
2

Pseudo R
Log PseudoLikelihood
ꭓ2

-6.133(6.044)
6.611(5.920)

-4.803(5.924)
1.660(5.817)

6.611(5.920)
-0.685(18.579)

-0.685(18.579)

5.410(19.513)

4.023(19.382)

0.05
-132.53
0.32

0.05
-132.55
0.33

0.05
-132.51
0.32

R2
F
N

222

222

222

*p<.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
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-6.133(6.044)

-4.803(5.924)

5.410(19.513)

4.023(19.382)

1.660(5.817)

0.13

0.13

0.13

0.0001

0.0001

0.0001

222

222

222

EventParticipation (Logit)

X1F1 (OLS)

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Age

0.028(0.026)

0.028(0.026)

0.028(0.026)

0.028(0.014)**

0.028(0.014)**

0.028(0.014)**

Sex

-0.442(0.325)

-0.442(0.325)

-0.444(0.325)

-0.252(0.148)*

-0.251(0.149)*

-0.253(0.149)*

Education

0.243(0.215)

0.245(0.215)

0.245(0.215)

-0.070(0.100)

-0.071(0.100)

-0.070(0.100)

Income

-0.224(0.114)**

-0.227(0.114)**

-0.227(0.114)**

0.006(0.054)

0.008(0.054)

0.006(0.054)

Politics

0.059(0.061)

0.059(0.061)

0.059(0.061)

0.017(0.031)

0.017(0.031)

0.017(0.031)

Religion

0.303(0.222)

0.301(0.222)

0.300(0.222)

-0.068(0.115)

-0.067(0.115)

-0.068(0.115)

Social Capital

-0.499(0.165)***

-0.499(0.165)***

-0.500(0.165)***

0.004(0.077)

0.005(0.077)

0.005(0.077)

Altruism

-0.454(0.188)**

-0.456(0.188)**

-0.456(0.188)**

0.380(0.092)***

0.382(0.092)***

0.381(0.091)***

Prior MCE

-0.022(0.170)

-0.022(0.170)

-0.019(0.170)

-0.046(0.081)

-0.048(0.081)

-0.046(0.080)

Weather

0.330(0.305)

0.325(0.304)

0.325(0.304)

0.044(0.142)

0.048(0.142)

0.044(0.142)

Casualty 2:

-0.514(0.365)

0.078(0.384)

-0.019(0.168)

-0.282(0.176)

Casualty 6:

0.588(0.390)

Casualty 23:

-0.610(0.383)

Cons

1.145(1.198)
0.11
-130.74
0.0036

Pseudo R 2
Log PseudoLikelihood
ꭓ2
R2
F
N

222

0.491(0.369)

-0.262(0.181)

0.027(0.170)

-0.115(0.381)

0.270(0.177)

0.563(1.242)

0.662(1.228)

-1.401(0.601)**

-1.151(0.614)*

-1.427(0.624)**

0.11

0.11

-130.86
0.0037

-130.84
0.0038
0.15
0.0002
186

0.15
0.0002
186

0.15
0.0002
186

222

222

0.293(0.174)*

*p<.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
X1F2 (OLS)
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Age

-0.013(0.014)

-0.013(0.014)

-0.013(0.014)

Sex

-0.043(0.149)

-0.044(0.150)

-0.045(0.149)

Education

0.106(0.101)

0.107(0.101)

0.107(0.101)

Income

-0.015(0.055)

-0.017(0.055)

-0.017(0.055)

Politics

0.090(0.031)***

0.090(0.031)***

0.090(0.031)***

Religion

-0.002(0.116)

-0.002(0.116)

Social Capital

-0.212(0.078)***

-0.213(0.078)***

-0.212(0.078)***

Altruism

-0.186(0.092)**

-0.185(0.092)**

-0.186(0.092)**

Prior MCE

0.059(0.081)

0.060(0.081)

0.061(0.081)

Weather

-0.021(0.143)

-0.024(0.143)

-0.025(0.143)

Casualty 2:

-0.266(0.169)

-0.013(0.177)

Casualty 6:

0.255(0.182)

Casualty 23:

-0.257(0.178)

Cons

0.787(0.604)

0.263(0.171)
0.002(0.175)

0.545(0.617)

0.540(0.628)

2

Pseudo R
Log PseudoLikelihood
ꭓ2
R2
F
N

0.16

0.16

0.16

0.000

0.000

0.000

186

186

186

*p<.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

While these results do not support the hypothesis there are some observations to take
away. The only instance of a casualty number being significant is in Model 3 of X1F1 where
individuals who received a mass casualty event where 23 people were killed responded with
higher demonstrations of solidarity than those who received an event where 6 people were killed.

67

Model 1 and Model 2 within the X1F1 modeling indicates that those who received an event
where 23 people were killed responded with higher demonstrations of solidarity, however, it is
not at a significant level. The relationships between casualty numbers and dependent variables
are insignificant across all other demonstrations of solidarity, however some of the results are in
a positive and theoretically supported direction, but not at the 90% confidence interval level. For
example, the relationship between high casualty count and volunteer time, blood donation and
money donation are in a positive direction, however, not at the minimum 90% confidence
interval level needed to claim a significant relationship. The relationship between casualty 23
and volunteer time, blood donation, money donations and X1F1 is more positive than the
relationship between those dependent variables and lesser casualty counts, however, it does not
reach the minimum levels for significance. As stated, the directionality of the relationship is not
incorrect, however, without a significant relationship of at least at the 90% confidence interval,
we are forced to accept the null hypothesis that casualty number does not affect the
demonstrations of solidarity that follow a mass casualty event.
Results indicate that younger people are more likely to use social media to respond to a
mass casualty event as well as more politically conservative individuals. Older individuals were
found to be more likely to donate blood and money. Male respondents were more likely to
respond by volunteering their time. The relationships between the dependent variables and social
capital and altruism are significant across multiple demonstrations of solidarity.
The relationship between group membership and social media, time donations, event
participation and X1F2 variables is significant. That significant relationship is in a negative
direction across social media, event participation and X1F2 and positive with time. Group
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membership relationship with social media is something that has not been explored but the
nature of group membership is civic participation so the negative relationship with event
participation is puzzling. The positive significant relationship with time is confirmatory with the
aforementioned theory as individuals who are involved in more groups will be more likely to
participate in demonstrations of solidarity, in this case by volunteering time.
The relationship between altruism is significant across all seven of the dependent
variables; in a positive direction with time, blood, money and X1F1 and in a negative direction
with social media, event participation and X1F2. The rationale of altruistic individuals not
responding via social media and through event participation is understandable because our
altruistic measure (and survey based altruistic measures in general) gets at more actual helping
behaviors and not symbolic ones as in these variables. The positive and significant relationship
between altruism and volunteering time, blood and money donation are in line with the
aforementioned theory stating that altruistic individuals would be more likely to participate in
demonstrations of solidarity.
Event Type & Demonstrations of Solidarity Results

According to hypothesis two, respondents who are exposed to nonviolent events are more
likely to respond in lower levels of solidarity while respondents to violent events are more likely
to answer with higher levels of solidarity. Additionally, hypothesis 2a suggests that demonstrations
of solidarity will be stronger following terrorist events than any other event type.
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Table 4: Event Type & Demonstrations of Solidarity
SocialMediaResponse (Logit)

VolunteerTime (OLS)

BloodDonations (Logit)

Model 1

Model 2

Model 1

Model 2

Model 1

Model 2

Age

-0.034(0.040)

-0.034(0.040)

0.522(0.604)

0.522(0.604)

0.073(0.036)**

0.073(0.036)**

Sex

-0.383(0.365)

-0.383(0.365)

-9.543(6.177)

-9.543(6.177)

0.062(0.315)

0.062(0.315)

Education

0.026(0.256)

0.026(0.256)

0.242(3.910)

0.242(3.910)

-0.541(0.228)**

-0.541(0.228)**
0.083(0.123)

Income

-0.078(0.143)

-0.078(0.143)

-1.745(2.749)

-1.745(2.749)

0.083(0.123)

Politics

0.127(0.077)*

0.127(0.077)*

-0.543(1.327)

-0.543(1.327)

0.061(0.067)

0.061(0.067)

Religion

0.001(0.269)

0.001(0.269)

-6.336(3.688)*

-6.336(3.688)*

-0.304(0.220)

-0.304(0.220)

Social Capital

-0.199(0.193)

-0.199(0.193)

9.781(3.306)***

9.781(3.306)***

-0.203(0.165)

-0.203(0.165)

Altruism

-0.257(0.224)

-0.257(0.224)

7.807(3.467)**

7.807(3.467)**

0.476(0.192)**

0.476(0.192)**

Prior MCE

-0.037(0.203)

-0.037(0.203)

4.879(3.053)

4.879(3.053)

-0.060(0.171)

-0.060(0.171)

Weather

-0.978(0.519)*

Terrorism

-0.459(0.486)

27.928(8.517)***
0.520(0.532)

Accident

13.623(8.960)

0.978(0.519)*

1.049(0.425)**
-14.305(8.766)

1.295(0.432)***

-27.928(8.517)***

0.246(0.434)
-1.049(0.425)**

Crime

-0.047(0.461)

0.932(0.516)*

-6.696(8.179)

-34.625(7.975)***

0.682(0.418)

-0.367(0.424)

Cons

1.516(1.599)

0.538(1.602)

0.700(24.128)

28.628(25.042)

-1.223(1.291)

-0.174(1.299)

0.06

0.06

0.10

0.10

-101.05

-101.05

-131.08

-131.08

0.13

0.13

0.002

0.002

222

222

Pseudo R

2

Log PseudoLikelihood
ꭓ2
R

2

F
N

187

187

0.12

0.12

0.000

0.000

222

222

*p<.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
MoneyDonations (OLS)

EventParticipation (Logit)

X2F (OLS)

Model 1

Model 2

Model 1

Model 2

Model 1

Model 2

Age

0.493(0.452)

0.493(0.452)

0.033(0.029)

0.033(0.029)

0.014(0.013)

0.014(0.013)

Sex

-9.903(4.983)**

-9.903(4.983)**

-0.425(0.314)

-0.425(0.314)

-0.099(0.146)

-0.099(0.146)

Education

1.368(3.877)

1.368(3.877)

0.094(0.215)

0.094(0.215)

-0.066(0.099)

-0.066(0.099)

Income

1.554(2.040)

1.554(2.040)

-0.091(0.122)

-0.091(0.122)

0.025(0.051)

0.025(0.051)

Politics

-0.748(1.015)

-0.748(1.015)

0.127(0.068)*

0.127(0.068)*

-0.061(0.030)**

-0.061(0.030)**

Religion

-6.180(3.187)*

-6.180(3.187)*

0.171(0.217)

0.171(0.217)

-0.069(0.109)

-0.069(0.109)

Social Capital

-1.479(2.634)

-1.479(2.634)

-0.476(0.171)***

-0.476(0.171)***

0.106(0.075)

0.106(0.075)

9.343(3.102)***

9.343(3.102)***

-0.540(0.192)***

-0.540(0.192)***

0.293(0.088)***

0.293(0.088)***

Prior MCE

5.044(2.671)*

5.044(2.671)*

-0.077(0.171)

-0.077(0.171)

0.048(0.077)

0.048(0.077)

Weather

6.109(6.855)

Terrorism

3.620(6.972)

Altruism

-0.410(0.426)
-2.489(6.675)

Accident

-0.743(0.434)*

-6.109(6.855)

0.526(0.193)***
-0.332(0.435)

0.459(0.197)**

0.410(0.426)

-0.067(0.194)
-0.526(0.193)***

Crime

-6.592(6.767)

-12.701(6.579)*

-0.151(0.420)

0.259(0.422)

0.059(0.194)

-0.467(0.192)**

Cons

8.788(19.118)

14.897(19.321)

1.669(1.233)

1.258(1.241)

-1.209(0.612)**

-0.683(0.607)

0.11

0.11

Log PseudoLikelihood

-130.73

-130.73

ꭓ2

0.0004

0.0004

Pseudo R 2

R2

0.13

0.13

0.13

0.13

F

0.000

0.000

0.0001

0.0001

222

222

189

189

N

222

222

*p<.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Again results are not strongly supported, however, different event types are drawing
different reactions. The relationship between terrorism and blood donations and the X2F
variables is positive and significant. The relationship between criminal events and social media
responses is also positive and significant, however, accidents have a stronger significance. The
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relationship between terrorism and monetary and time donations is positive, but the relationship
between these variables is more significant with weather events. The relationship between crime
is also positive but at an insignificant level.
An important observation from this experiment is that weather events tend to draw the
strongest reaction from respondents and their tendencies to participate in demonstrations. A
reason behind that may be that weather events are the most common and are the most
unavoidable. For example, Americans have been found to fear natural disasters significantly
more than other types of disasters (YouGov 2019). In parallel, terrorist events also drew a strong
reaction from the community. This may be due to the rarity of such events, along with the
shocking nature and publicity that surrounds terrorist events when they do occur. The
perceptions and facts regarding crime in the United States is often very different. For example, in
a late 2016 survey, 57% of respondents claimed that crime had gotten worse since 2008, though
data shows that both violent and property crimes have decreased significantly since the mid1990s (Gramlich 2016). Crime (or at least its perceptions) are also often relegated to certain
lower socio-economic areas and people. Additionally, many people do not believe that crime will
happen to them, let alone a violent criminal event. Another observation is that each type of mass
casualty event draws a different response from the community in which they occur and
generalizing and classifying events (such as violent and nonviolent events) could lead to
confusing and misinterpreted results. It would be more empirically beneficial to study each event
type within in its own context in order to better understand the processes that occur within a
community after such an event occurs.
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Politically conservative respondents were found to be more likely to use social media to
respond to a mass casualty event as well as participate in events related to a mass casualty event.
Less religious respondents were also found to be more likely to donate both money and time.
Older people were again more likely to donate blood, as well as the less educated. Altruism and
social capital are again significant with many of the variables.
The relationship between group membership and time donations is significant in a
positive direction and insignificant in regards to event participation (same as the Experiment 1
results). The relationship between altruism is again positive and significant in terms of
volunteering time, donating blood, donating money and with the factor analysis while negatively
significant with the event participation variable (synonymous with the Experiment 1 results).
Victim Type & Demonstrations of Solidarity Results

Hypothesis 3 suggests that when vulnerable groups are the victims of mass casualty
events, then more demonstrations of solidarity will happen.
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Table 5: Victim Type & Demonstrations of Solidarity
Social MediaResponse
VolunteerTime (OLS)
(Logit)

BloodDonations
(Logit)

MoneyDonations
(OLS)

EventParticipation
(Logit)

X3F (OLS)

Age

-0.055(0.037)

0.372(0.613)

0.089(0.036)**

0.799(0.512)

0.036(0.029)

0.018(0.013)

Sex

0.021(0.339)

-12.734(6.512)*

-0.119(0.315)

-7.475(5.157)

-0.051(0.310)

-0.203(0.147)

Education

0.075(0.237)

0.302(4.225)

-0.547(0.233)**

1.640(3.957)

-0.041(0.213)

-0.068(0.100)

Income

0.021(0.126)

-0.361(3.055)

-0.040(0.122)

1.258(2.311)

0.001(0.117)

-0.001(0.052)

Politics

0.155(0.072)**

0.945(1.402)

0.054(0.067)

-0.009(1.102)

0.144(0.067)**

-0.056(0.030)*

Religion

0.075(0.253)

-6.919(4.150)*

-0.270(0.232)

-9.935(3.395)***

0.019(0.223)

-0.086(0.111)

Social Capital

-0.076(0.179)

4.622(3.475)

-0.358(0.168)**

-2.697(2.885)

-0.476(0.169)***

0.027(0.076)

-0.430(0.209)**

9.868(3.932)**

0.704(0.200)***

9.300(3.258)***

-0.590(0.191)***

0.330(0.089)***
-0.018(0.078)

Altruism
Prior MCE

0.032(0.187)

1.716(3.539)

-0.158(0.169)

4.603(2.991)

-0.032(0.169)

Crime

-0.112(0.327)

-10.943(6.338)*

-0.252(0.309)

-9.270(5.081)**

0.446(0.302)

-0.220(0.141)

Vulnerable

-0.459(0.335)

10.824(6.067)*

0.347(0.309)

14.077(5.014)***

-0.216(0.305)

0.345(0.143)**

Cons

1.411(1.423)

11.858(26.244)

-0.679(1.273)

2.389(19.208)

1.261(1.180)

-0.756(0.598)

Pseudo R 2
Log PseudoLikelihood
ꭓ2

0.07

0.10

0.11

-114.56

-130.34

-132.97

0.13

0.002

R2
F
N

189

0.0003

0.09

0.17

0.16

0.0022

0.000

0.000

222

222

222

222

189

*p<.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Results from Experiment 3 are supported in three of the demonstrations of solidarity as
the presence of a vulnerable victim population has a positive and significant relationship with
time and money donations and with the X3F variables. That relationship between vulnerable
victim populations and time donations is at the 90% confidence interval, 99% confidence interval
with the money variable and at the 95% confidence interval for the factor analysis variable.
However, the presence of a vulnerable victim group has no effect on other demonstrations of
solidarity measured and is negatively associated in terms of social media response as well as
event participation.
Politically conservative respondents are again more likely to respond to a mass casualty
event using social media and by participating in events related to the mass casualty incident. Less
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religious people are again more likely to demonstrate solidarity by volunteering their time or
money. Older people are again more likely to donate blood, as well as the less educated.
The relationships between group membership and altruism and the dependent variable are
again significant. The relationship between social capital and blood donations and event
participation is negative and significant, synonymous with results from the previous experiments
conducted. Altruism is again negatively associated with social media response and event
participation while it has a positive and significant relationship with both the time, money and
Factor Analysis variables.
Analysis

While none of these results unanimously support the hypotheses proposed, there are some
important conclusions that can be made. The first conclusion is that the consistency of the results
regarding the first nine variables, that are common amongst all three experiments, adds to the
validity and reliability of the results. Results table 5 shows the significance of some of the
consistent findings across the different experiments, all at the minimum 90% confidence interval
level or higher.
Table 6: Cross Experiment Consistency Test

Age
Sex
Education
Income
Politics
Religion
Group Membership
Altruism
Prior MCE

SocialMediaResponse
X1
X2
X3
-

X1

VolunteerTime
X2
X3

-

X1
+

BloodDonations
X2
X3
+
+

-

-

MoneyDonations
X1
X2
X3
+
-

EventParticipation
X1
X2
X3

-

+
-

+

+

-

+
+

+
+

-

-

-

+
+

+

+

+
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+

+

-

+

+

-

-

The significance and direction of some of these relationships also adds to the discussion.
For example, the finding that older people are more likely to give blood makes logical sense as
older individuals often are physically unable to participate in other demonstrations of solidarity.
Older people are also less involved in social media (which is consistent with H1 results) and
often have the means to contribute financially to different charitable causes (consistent with H1
results). Gender related findings are contrary to previous findings that found that women were
more likely to participate in voluntary charity (Helms and McKenzie 2013; Mesch et al. 2006;
Andreoni and Vesterlund 2001). Though previous empirical findings have found that politically
conservative people report higher levels of charitable giving, politically conservative indicators
were only significant in social media and event participation. This a considerably different
method of demonstrating solidarity than traditional giving like volunteering or donating money
(Paarlberg et al. 2018). Findings regarding religion are in line with previous findings that
religiously affiliated individuals gave more (both time and money) than nonreligious individuals
(Hagood 2016), but only when those causes were religious in nature (Wang and Graddy 2008).
The response to a mass casualty event is not likely to satisfy that need for a religious person,
unless, the victim group is religious in nature (which is in line with Hypothesis 3).
The rationale for group membership and altruistic behavior positively affecting
demonstrations of solidarity has already been discussed within this paper. The clearest results in
support of those previous findings is the positive and significant relationship between volunteer
time, group membership and altruism. The positive and significant relationship between
volunteer time and group membership makes logical sense as individuals who have institutional
involvement will have more of an opportunity to volunteer their time. These findings are in line
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with previous findings that demonstrate a relationship between formal volunteering and informal
helping through social networks (Gallagher 1994; Wilson and Musick 1997). Volunteering time
is perhaps the most altruistic of all the demonstrations of solidarity measured so it is to no
surprise that a positive and significant relationship exists between altruism and volunteering
time. Altruism is a strong positive indicator in blood donations, consistent with previous findings
(Steele et al. 2008). Monetary donation is also significant while group membership has an
insignificant relationship with these variables. Volunteering and monetary donations garnered
similar responses, akin to previous findings (Lee, Piliavin, Call 1999).
The negative but significant relationship between altruism, group membership and social
media usage is a relatively unexplored topic, but rationale for a negative relationship exists. A
negative relationship exists between social media response and group participation across all
experiments (though only significant in Experiment 1). These findings are supportive of the
“slacktivist” concept in that social media usage does not require group participation (though
many civic groups exist on social media). Altruistic behavior deals more with actual helping
behaviors and not necessarily symbolic ones, like a social media response would be. The
significant negative relationship between group membership, altruism and event participation is
contrary to logic, but can be explained. For example, those involved in groups would logically
participate in events, however, the event participation variable does not consider who is
organizing the event. If that event organization was controlled for (and the respondent’s
affiliations were organizing) then the negative relationship currently showing for group
membership would likely flip to a positive one. Again, altruistic behavior deals mostly with
actual helping behaviors captured by the significant positive relationships captured for time,
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blood and money. Though demonstrating solidarity through event participation requires more
effort than a social media response, these demonstrations are still largely symbolic.
Event Type Examination

The only hypothesis tested across all the experiments was regarding violent event types
vs. nonviolent ones and tested specifically through Experiment 2. Event type is completely
insignificant in Experiment 1 where respondents received either a weather or terrorism event.
Event type is significant in Experiment 3 where accidents had a stronger relationship with
demonstrations of solidarity than criminal events. As mentioned before, the mixed results from
the testing of this hypothesis suggests that violent events do garner strong demonstrations of
solidarity, but under certain circumstances. Those circumstances remain unknown though
variables such as blame, frequency of each event type (ala Rasanen et al. 2014 results) and media
coverage of other events are likely to impact individuals within a community where a mass
casualty event had just occurred. Theoretically terrorist and criminal events were assumed to be
similar, but results suggest that they are very different. For example, previous experimental
results found that extremity and severity of violence was important, along with the motivation
for the incident and social categorization of the actor (Huff and Kertzer 2016). Importantly, they
specifically highlighted the language used to described violent incidents as an important factor in
how the public classifies an event as terrorism or not. However, such inconsistent results forces
acceptance of the null hypothesis regarding hypothesis 2/2a must be accepted. Further empirical
research into each event type and how they affect individuals at both the individual and
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community levels is something that is needed before any logical claim regarding event type
could be made.
Conclusion

An important lesson taken from these results is the mostly unexplored differences
between different types of demonstrations of solidarity. Previous research suggests that blood
and money donors receive greater anonymity, while time donors participate in person with those
in need and requires more initiative (Lee, Piliavin and Call 1999). Additionally, which
demonstrations are related? For example, social gatherings to commemorate victims reinforces
compassion and sympathy for victims and the gravity of an event and positively affects
volunteering to relief efforts (Jasper 1997, 1998; Wuthnow 1991). More empirical research is
needed to examine how a mass casualty event affects psychological factors behind giving
behaviors as a demonstration of solidarity. A larger and more representative sample would be
able to better explore the relationships between demographics and demonstrations of solidarity as
the limited college student sample is unable to elaborate on these relationships. Though younger
people make up an important part of a community, college students often have limited life
experiences. However these results are intriguing and empirically promising.
Results from Experiment 1 (testing Hypothesis 1) support the null hypothesis as casualty
count does not seem to affect the demonstrations of solidarity that follow. However, the results
using the X1F1 variable suggest that a higher casualty count has a somewhat positive and
significant relationship with volunteering time and blood and monetary donations (though not
individually). As the definition of a mass casualty event is usually vague and abstract in nature
(as previously discussed), perhaps these results can be interpreted to suggest that psychologically
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a mass casualty event requires a much higher number of casualties to signal a need within the
community, which would draw a response (in the form of demonstrations of solidarity).
Violent events (specifically terrorism) is a significant indicator of whether an individual
will donate blood or not, however, the mixed responses across all the dependent variables
suggest that each event type is truly unique regardless of violence or not. Therefore, a further
examination into how different event types are perceived by individuals is needed along with
how they impact a community. However, this is support for hypothesis 2a that terrorist events
will lead to more demonstrations of solidarity.
Results from Experiment 3 (testing Hypothesis 3) suggest that the presence of
traditionally vulnerable victim groups was a significant and positive indicator of both time and
money donations along with the X3F variables. These results suggest that the presence of a
vulnerable victim group will indeed cause more demonstrations of solidarity. However, it is
important to recognize that psychologically deciding whether a victim is vulnerable or not occurs
at the individual level, though traditionally vulnerable groups (children, elderly etc.) are
interpreted by the majority of people as being vulnerable. Other, socially vulnerable groups may
be interpreted as vulnerable by individuals who share common traits with that group (or who are
merely sympathetic) and thus more demonstrations of solidarity will occur. For example, the
2016 terrorist attack at the gay nightclub Pulse likely caused more demonstrations of solidarity
by LGBT individuals and those sympathetic to the LGBT community. In contrast, individuals
who are not sympathetic would behave normally in their post-event demonstrations while
individuals who carried an anti-LGBT mindset likely did not demonstrate or participated in
victim blaming. For example, Kogut (2011) found that if an individual is believed to be
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responsible for their plight then people are less likely to offer help. These results regarding
vulnerable victim groups is intriguing and suggests that framing mass casualty event victims to
be more sympathetically appealing (more so than simply being a victim) could lead to stronger
demonstrations of solidarity.
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CHAPTER 5: QUALITATIVE APPROACH

This section seeks to examine how casualty numbers, the presence of a vulnerable victim
group and institutional presence affects the demonstrations of solidarity that follow a mass
casualty event. Three hypotheses are tested across two case studies. The hypotheses tested are:
1.

higher casualty events increase the likelihood of more demonstrations of solidarity

3.

events that harm victims who are perceived as vulnerable will generate more
demonstrations of solidarity.

4.

victim communities that have a higher level of institutionalization will have more
demonstrations of solidarity following a mass casualty event.
a. A strong response from government institution leaders will lead to more
demonstrations of solidarity.
b. A strong specific institutional response will lead to more demonstrations of
solidarity.

Case study methods like those used here are useful because they can be exceptionally
detailed on variables of interest and allow process tracing. The use of case studies is essential for
description and is fundamental to social science (King, Keohane and Verba 1993). The use of
qualitative methods is common in previous studies involving the reactions to mass casualty
events. Gal (2014) used a single case study of Israel during the Second Intifada (September 2000
to early 2004) to show that Israeli reaction became normative in the sense that the public reacted
immediately to the event (terrorist in this instance), took measures to protect itself, and then
returned quickly to its normal routines. Carroll et al. (2005) used case studies on three separate
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towns in Arizona affected by fires in 2002 to show that cohesion and conflict was evident based
on the individual perceptions of those that did not evacuate.
This chapter consists of seven different sections. The first section discusses case selection
and data. The second section primarily discusses the independent and control variables of
interest. These variables are measured through the use of primary source material regarding the
casualty number for each event, the victim group and community institutionalization. The fourth
section operationalizes the demonstrations of solidarity examined within the case studies. The
fifth and six sections are the case studies; the Pulse terrorist attack in Orlando, Florida in the
Summer of 2016 and the San Bernardino terrorist attack in the Winter of 2015. The seventh
section is an analysis of the findings from both case studies. Within this final section is also an
application of the findings and a discussion of other unaccounted for variables that could play an
impact.
Case Selection

Ideally, a most similar case method where variation only existed on the variable of
interest would be used. However, since the unit of analysis is the community in which the event
occurred, a true most similar method would be difficult to execute because of the wide range of
independent variable values and the limited number of cases to choose from. Therefore, there is
variation on the number of casualties (to test Hypothesis 1), victim type (to test Hypothesis 3)
and institutionalization of the victim community (to test Hypothesis 4/4a/4b).
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Table 7: Case Comparisons
Community Traits

Facts of the Event

Post Event Response

Similarities
Ethnic Makeup

Mass Casualty Events
Terrorism
Attackers Pledged Allegiance to ISIS
Use of Firearms
Most Casualties since 9/11 at time
Events Lasted about 3 Hours
Suspects Killed by Local Law Enforcement
Few Related Prosecutions
Consulted Kenneth Feinberg
Federal Response for Terrorism Investigation

Differences
Economic Makeup
Poverty
Unemployment
Median Household Income
GDP/Capita
Crime Levels
Number of Dead (49/14)*
Type of Victims (LGBT/Govt.)*
Institutionalization of Victim Community*
Number of Shooters

Amount of Money Raised**
Gatherings/Vigils**
Donations**
*Denotes Independent Variables
**Denotes Dependent Variables

These cases are similar in that they were acts of terrorism carried out by radicalized
extremists who were apparently sympathetic to the Islamic State. Each incident qualifies as a
mass casualty event based on the total number of dead; 49 in Orlando and 14 in San Bernardino.
Each incident was the largest terrorism-based mass casualty event since the September 11th
terrorist attacks when they occurred. Each incident lasted a short amount of time and individuals
associated with the suspects in both cases were later prosecuted. In both cases, the perpetrators
were killed on site by local law enforcement and the FBI became involved later to investigate
these acts of terrorism.
Every community and every mass casualty event are unique and though event types or
casualty numbers may be similar there are likely other factors that exist within a community that
impact the response to such a traumatic event. The three main differences between these cases
are in line with the aforementioned hypotheses. First, the casualty numbers differ; Orlando had
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49 fatalities while San Bernardino had 14. Second, is the extent to which the victims were
perceived as vulnerable. The victims in the Orlando case are generally associated with the LGBT
community, a group many people see as vulnerable. The victims in the San Bernardino case were
local government workers, a group not generally seen as vulnerable. Third, is the level of
institutionalization within those victim groups. Institutionalization includes governmental
support of demonstrations, the involvement of non-profit groups and local businesses and
specific institutions (related to the victim group) in demonstrations of solidarity.
There are strong differences between Orlando and San Bernardino and both areas have
different histories and economies. Orlando’s economy is reliant on tourism and hospitality in
addition to a growing technology sector, and as a result the area is economically better off than
San Bernardino. Economically, poverty and unemployment are lower and median household
income and gross domestic product per capita are higher in Orlando than San Bernardino (US
Census Bureau 2019). Crime is higher in San Bernardino than Orlando (FBI UCR 2019). While
both events had an initially strong media response, the victim type inclusion was most prominent
in the narrative in the Orlando case. The added variation makes it more complicated to draw
inferences in examining these two cases. The two communities responded differently to the mass
casualty events that occurred. The Orlando community responded strongly with large and
frequent demonstrations of solidarity with the victims, whereas the San Bernardino community
response was limited.
Methodology

Hypothesis 2 is not tested because both events where violent, terrorist events. One key
source of information used in both cases are after action reports from the Community Oriented
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Policing office within the National Institute of Justice.16 Media sources, preferably local news
sources were used because they were much more thorough and consistent in their reporting.
Though national news sources were used, local news sources were able to cover smaller
demonstrations that are often overlooked by after action reports and national media sources, such
as material (non-monetary) donations.
Case Structure

Each case is broken down into six sections. First, the cases begin with the facts of each
event, drawn mainly from after action reports. Second, the area in which the event occurred is
described using publicly available information describing the economy and other aspects of each
community. The third section discusses the independent variables for each case; casualty
number, victim vulnerability (using primarily historical, legal and survey data) and community
institutionalization. The fourth section discusses the media’s role in each event is described,
including how the victim group and casualty number is included or not in coverage. The fifth
section covers the demonstrations of solidarity (dependent variable) that occurred following each
event, supported by the interviews. The sixth and final section is concluding thoughts regarding
each case, including which hypotheses there is supportive evidence for.
Author Bias
I have lived in the Central Florida area for more than twenty years. Within that time, I
earned both Bachelor’s and Masters’ degrees in Criminal Justice from the University of Central
Florida. I have been trained in qualitative methods, including the use of interviews in providing
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NIJ/COPS after action reports include hundreds of hours of interviews with numerous individuals involved with
each case, including first responders and community leaders.
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empirical evidence. Additionally, I have been a sworn Deputy Sheriff with the Orange County
Sheriff’s Office for more than five years. In that position, I regularly interview people from a
variety of different diverse backgrounds. The fact that I am a law enforcement officer was not
provided to anybody that I interviewed prior to interview. I acknowledge any subliminal bias I
may have as a white male approaching these topics from an academic background, but no bias
was intentional.
As a law enforcement officer, I responded to the Pulse shooting on the morning of June
12th and observed the aftermath of such a traumatic event upon the community. That event, in
many ways, inspired this project. This project and the interviews I conducted added into a greater
understanding of how individual communities respond to mass casualty events. Results have
suggested that the motivations to demonstrate solidarity depend on the individual and the types
of demonstrations available. Communities respond differently based on a variety of different
factors, most importantly the institutional response they receive.
A triangulation method was used on the data in order to eliminate potential biases. Data
came from many different sources including interviews, primary sources including local and
national media, and secondary sources including academic and government data. While I was
familiar with the general community response to Pulse, I did not have any substantial
interactions with any of the organizations whose members I interviewed. Therefore, I relied
heavily on media sources in guiding who was contacted for an interview for both cases.
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Interviews

A total of 28 individuals who were active in either the Orlando or San Bernardino
communities following the mass casualty events were contacted via email for an interview.17 I
contacted 19 different individuals related to the San Bernardino case. I was only able to
interview 6 people related to that case as the response rate was low. I contacted 9 individuals
related to the Orlando case and was able to interview 7 people. I also interviewed a
representative from the law offices of Ken Feinberg, a victim fund expert. Mr. Feinberg is a
well-known compensation attorney who provided similar services to affected communities
following the Boston bombing, Virginia Tech shooting, Aurora theater shooting and the BP oil
spill in addition to the September 11th attacks (Barkan 2016). Every person interviewed was with
their respective organization when the mass casualty event occurred.
Of those contacted, 14 total interviews were completed for a response rate of 50%.
Contact information for interviewees was readily available through internet-based sources.
Interviews were conducted either face to face or over the phone between April 23 and June 24
2019. Each interview lasted approximately 40 minutes and was semi-structured with open ended
questioning. Initial questioning followed the “grand tour” model to understand the organizations
typical role within the community (Spradley 1979). Immediately after, a follow up question was
posed along the “specific” grand tour model in order to focus specifically on the event (Spradley
1979). The interview questions focused upon the role the organization has within the community,
the impact the event had upon the community, and the role the organization had following the
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See Appendix C.1 and C.2 for Qualitative IRB documents
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event.18 Additional questions were focused on inter-institutional collaborations, the participants
personal experiences and perceptions following the event. Semi-structured interviews allow
participants to speak freely and for the interviewer to modify questioning based on the direction
the interview is going.
Detailed notes were taken for each interview. Those interviews were crucial in providing
an “on the ground” perspective as all the interviewees played important roles in the community
following the mass casualty events. Additionally, participants were able to provide information
on demonstrations of solidarity that occurred. They provided contextual information on the roles
the victim type, community institutions, and casualty numbers played along with other control
variables that they believe influenced the community response.
Data Analysis
As a theory was already in place to describe community behavior following a mass
casualty event, the method used was more akin to an inductive/scientific method. Once cases
were selected, data points began to be gathered and verified through different sources. Due to the
expected limited interview response, contact was attempted with as many different people
involved in the community response as possible. Analysis of the interviews focused on phrases
and ideas being conveyed that refer to organizational response specific to the individual being
interviewed. Additionally, the perceptions of other institutional and community involvement in
demonstrations of solidarity, perceptions of how facts of an event motivated community
response, and how response to the event could have been improved were all topics covered
throughout the interviews. Analysis of demonstrations of solidarity, both from interviews and

18

See Appendix C.3 for Interview Questions.
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other sources, were coded in context of the community in which the event occurred.19 When
possible, claims made during interviews were corroborated through neutral media sources. Any
claims made during the interviews that were contradictory with media sources were confronted
during the interviews.
Independent Variable: Casualties
In order to test hypothesis 1, the casualty number for each case was compared across an
original database covering all mass casualty events that occurred in the United States from 20002016 (See Appendix A). In order to code each event, the average was taken of all violent events
prior to the event being examined. If the average is lower than the casualty number for the event
being examined, then the event is coded as high and if the average is higher than the event being
examined then the event is coded as low. Additionally, the casualty number was specifically
focused upon in media reports and when conducting interviews with those involved with
demonstrations within each community. Everyone who was interviewed was asked if they
believed the number of fatalities affected the community’s response. Though both cases qualify
as mass casualty events, there is a significant difference in the 49 deaths in the Orlando case to
the 14 deaths in the San Bernardino case.
Independent Variable: Victim Type

In order to test hypothesis 3, that vulnerable victims elicit more support than victims who
are not perceived as vulnerable, primary sources were used to gather information about the
nature of the victim class. While traditionally vulnerable victims were used in the experiment,

19

Inductive and deductive approaches were used to code interview responses. Both open and axial coding was
used (Corbin and Strauss 1990).
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this instance of testing hypothesis 3 is focused on socially vulnerable victims. In order for a
group to be considered socially vulnerable they must have a history of marginalization and be
perceived by others as vulnerable. These groups must be common and identifiable enough of a
victim type to be sympathetic to rest of the community. Identity group factors such as general
legal protections, anti-discrimination policies and the targeting of each group in crimes provide
insight into whether a group may be perceived as vulnerable or not. Non-vulnerable victim
groups may not have legal protections in place because there is not a need and these groups often
do not have a history of marginalization. They are not sympathetic enough to warrant an increase
in concern if they are targeted and there are no societal protections in place to protect groups that
are not seen as vulnerable. Non-vulnerable groups may have a weak institutional structure and
rely on other institutions for support. In addition to primary source material, leaders within the
LGBT community in Orlando and the representatives of the workers in San Bernardino were
interviewed in order to ascertain how the roles each sub-community played in demonstrations of
solidarity.
Independent Variable: Institutionalization

In order to test hypothesis 4, 4a and 4b, each case is analyzed regarding government
leadership and institutional involvement in demonstrations of solidarity. This information comes
from primary sources and from community leaders who were interviewed. Representatives from
government, non-profit, business/economic and specific institutions within the communities
were interviewed in order to ascertain the effects of institutional involvement in demonstrations
of solidarity. Government institutions are coded as such if they are a part of the government.
Strong government institutional leadership is coded as such if members of the local or state
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government appear frequently in media related to the event. These appearances are most often
because government leadership is involved with demonstrations of solidarity either directly (ex.
speaking to a crowd during a memorialization) or indirectly (speaking to the media regarding
community needs). Non-profit institutions are coded as such if they are a non-government
institution that does not make money from its actions. Examples of non-profit institutions that
were interviewed are blood donation organizations. Specific institutions are coded as such if they
were founded to serve a specific community. Examples of specific institutions interviewed
include LGBT organizations in Orlando and the workers union in San Bernardino. High
institutionalization of a victim community is characterized by multiple institutions being active
within the victim community. Additionally, high institutionalization is characterized by
numerous and effective collaborations between institutional types. These active institutions must
be able to organize demonstrations of solidarity for the general community not just the specific
community that was struck. Low institutionalization is characterized by either primarily
individual involvement with organization of demonstrations or an institutional response by a few
groups. Institutions that are unwilling (or unable) to organize demonstrations of solidarity, or
who are unwilling to work with the general community, would also lessen the effectiveness of
institutions in affecting demonstrations.
Controls

Other than the primary independent variables of interest, other community specific
factors, like the economy in an area, can influence demonstrations of solidarity. Information on
the economies of each area was gathered from the U.S. Census Bureau and Bureau of Labor
Statistics. This economic data is supported through publications that discuss economic growth
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within each area. Additionally, data on the ethnicity of each area is provided in order to clarify
the ethnic makeup of an area.
Dependent Variable: Demonstrations of Solidarity

Though the articulation of the dependent variable will appear similar to how it was
measured through the experiment (social media activity, volunteering, blood donations,
monetary donations, event participation) it will not be restricted to those five things. For
example, collaboration between groups and creation of groups are two unique types of
demonstrations of solidarity that were able to be measured qualitatively. The dependent variable
is measured through examination of primary source material that provided information on any
kind of demonstration of solidarity. Primary sources captured many different demonstrations of
solidarity, like the size and frequency of vigils and other gatherings along with how much money
was donated to official relief funds. Data on demonstrations was also gathered through the
interviews. Questioning was framed to gather information on post event demonstrations and the
effects of the independent variables.
Orlando, Florida

Just before 2:00AM Omar Mateen parked a rental vehicle north of the LGBT oriented
Pulse nightclub and entered with a Sig Sauer MCX semiautomatic .223 rifle and a 9mm Glock
17 handgun. Almost immediately after entering he shot a patron, while Orlando Police
Department Detective Adam Gruler sent out the initial emergency call for assistance. Detective
Gruler shot at Mateen several times as he targeted clubgoers through the club. Around 2:03AM
other OPD units arrived and began assisting. They formed a contact team and moved through the
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club, shooting at Mateen several times. Around 2:10AM it became apparent that Mateen had
barricaded himself inside the north restroom inside the club, which changed the situation from an
active shooter to a barricaded gunman. Mateen had several conversations with crisis negotiators
before the OPD SWAT team made entry into the bathroom where he had hostages. At 5:14 while
the entry point was being widened Mateen opened fire on the SWAT team members, striking one
in his ballistic helmet. At 5:15AM OPD reported that Mateen had been killed after exchanging
gunfire with the SWAT team members. Surviving hostages were extricated from the area and
directed to medical treatment. At 11:15AM a joint statement from responding agencies
announced that Pulse and the surrounding area was safe.
Forty-nine club patrons were dead and 53 more were wounded. At the time, the Pulse
nightclub attack was the highest single casualty terrorist attack in the United States since
September 11. The Pulse nightclub was a well-known LGBT establishment and the majority of
the victims were Hispanic in descent and under the age of 40. Many of the victims were active in
the LGBT community in that they were publicly known as gay, lesbian, bisexual or
transgendered. Additionally, victims were students, parents, soldiers, and involved in a diverse
range of professions (Bloch et al. 2016).
Area Descriptors

The Pulse nightclub is in the southeastern portion of the city of Orlando in Orange
County, Florida. In 2016, Orlando had approximately 271,000 people and unincorporated
Orange County had an additional 1.28 million people (. Orlando is best known as a tourism
mecca and for its world class attractions such as Walt Disney World and Universal Studios.
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More than 150 international companies representing 20 nations have facilities in Orlando
(Orlando Economic Partnership 2018). In addition to tourism and hospitality, the Orlando area is
a hub of defense contract driven technology as Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Raytheon, Northrop
Grumman and others all have large offices in the area. Patrick Air Force Base, Cape Canaveral
Air Force Station and the Kennedy Space Center are all within 60 miles. Hospitality and tourism
remain the main backbone of Orlando/Orange County as nearly 20% of the population works in
leisure or hospitality and 68 million people visited Orlando in 2016 (Stratton 2014; Russon
2018). Those tourists contribute greatly to the economy of Orange County, and visitors pay more
than 5 billion dollars a year in state and local taxes (Orlando Economic Partnership 2018). In
2018, the Milken Institute ranked the Metro Orlando area 7th as a best performing city
economically. Between 2014 and 2018 the Central Florida region was ranked the top region for
job growth (Shanklin 2018). Between 2015 and 2018, the City of Orlando was ranked #1 in the
U.S. for job growth (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2018). GDP per capita is significantly higher in
Orange County than the rest of Florida and United States (SSTI 2018; Bureau of Economic
Analysis 2016). Poverty rates were slightly higher than the rest of the state and national average
while the median household income was higher than the rest of the state, but not the nation (U.S.
Census Bureau).
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Table 8: Case #1 Descriptors
2016
Population
White Only
Poverty
Unemployment
Educational Attainment
Gross Domestic Product per Capita
Median Household Income
Violent Crime (per 100,000)
Property Crime (per 100,000)

Orange County
1,314,267
64.7%
16.6%
4.4%
31.9%
$69,518
$51,335
635.2
3,686.1

Florida
20,612,439
75.9%
14.7%
4.9%
27.9%
$38,398
$50,860
430.0
2,686

U.S.
323,127,515
73.3%
14%
4.9%
30.3%
$49,253
$57,617
386.3
2,450.7

Casualties
The majority of violent mass casualty events result in a lesser amount dead than 49.20 At
the time, 49 dead as a result of a violent mass casualty event was the highest since the September
11th attacks. The average number of casualties for a violent mass casualty event between 2000
and this event is 11.23. Therefore, this event’s casualty number is coded as high because it is
much higher than the average.
LGBT Community as a Vulnerable Group

The Pulse nightclub was a well-known, primarily LGBT establishment (Tunstall &
Tunstall 2012; Cook 2011). Many of the victims identified with that community. Since the
LGBT community may be considered a vulnerable group, demonstrations of solidarity may be
higher following any trauma to that group. In objective terms, the LGBT community is a

20

Of the 132 mass casualty events accounted for, the mean number of casualties is 51.35. Excluding the outliers of
the 9/11 terrorist attack and Hurricane Katrina, the mean number of casualties drops to 19.94. There were 52
violent events during this time with a mean number of 11.23 casualties for each event.
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vulnerable community and that vulnerability seems to be perceived by the rest of the nation.
First, in some places there is still a strong social stigma that comes with being LGBT. This
stigmatization is a driving factor into why LGBT people are seen as vulnerable because it can
affect access to education, employment etc. This stigmatization causes LGBT people to become
concerned about being victimized. Second, we are only several generations away from a time
when LGBT individuals had virtually no rights or recognitions regarding their sexual orientation
and violence was much more common against LGBT individuals. Third is the lack of uniform
and consistent laws protecting LGBT people across the nation. Finally, LGBT people are
perceived as vulnerable from those minimally or not involved with the LGBT community
mostly. This is most evident through the high support for LGBT related legislation by nonLGBT people. Though LGBT individuals are becoming much more a part of mainstream society,
there is still much of the U.S. and world where LGBT individuals are treated as outcasts and
punished for their behaviors. As the number of publicly out LGBT individuals increases, the
perceptions of vulnerability are likely to decrease because the LGBT lifestyle will become more
of a social norm.
Treatment of LGBT People

Homosexuality is still illegal in 76 countries and is punishable by death in six (UNAIDS
2014). Historically within the U.S. and many western nations, LGBT individuals were often
treated as mental health patients. Throughout LGBT history, people have been often tormented
by those with a religious fundamentalist ideology, which was found to be a strong predictor of
negative implicit evaluations (Rowatt et al. 2006).
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Many people recognize the discrimination that LGBT people face and support for LGBT
people and policies is reasonably high. Nearly 70% of surveyed Americans are in favor of laws
that specifically provided discrimination protections for LGBT people and 35% that strongly
favor them (Vanermaas-Peeler et al. 2018). Media coverage of LGBT people and issues had been
historically negative. However, since the 1990s LGBT people and culture began to receive more
positive coverage. This more positive framing of the LGBT community through the mainstream
media has served to not only increase acceptance and support for the LGBT community but also
to highlight current injustices that still plague the community (Fejes and Petrich 1993).
Discrimination and social exclusion against LGBT people can have serious consequences
such as exclusion, harassment and marginalization that lead to relatively low education levels in
LGBT teenagers (Williams and Ritch 1994; D’Augelli et al. 2002). Previous empirical findings
suggest that stigmatization, discrimination, criminalization and harassment of LGBT people
combined with low access to education, employment and health services illustrate systematic
disadvantages LGBT people face which makes them a vulnerable population (Ekmekci 2017).
Public opinion has become more supportive of LGBT rights. For example, public support
for gay and lesbians has doubled in the last thirty years, significantly higher than any other
marginalized groups (Flores 2014). The replacement of older less supportive generations with
younger, more supportive people is important. However, Flores (2014) also noted that the
increases in LGBT people being “out”, the growing numbers of LGBT characters in media and
the active national discussion on LGBT rights as likely reasons for the increase in support. While
evidence seems to indicate that the younger generations are bringing much more LGBT support
with them, there is growing support across all age groups (Fetner 2016). The most positive
indicator of having positive feelings towards the LGBT community is knowing someone who
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identifies as a member of that community. As it becomes more common and easier to “come
out”, the support for LGBT issues is likely to continue to rise as more people will know someone
within the LGBT community (Fetner 2016).
While acceptance of LGBT people has risen, it is important to recognize that a portion of
the population is still unaccepting and unsympathetic to the LGBT lifestyle. For example, in
2015, the year before Pulse, nearly 30% of respondents believed same sex relations between
consenting adults should be illegal (Gallup 2019). As part of that same survey, Gallup (2019),
found that nearly 40% of respondents believed that same sex marriages should not be recognized
by law with the same rights as traditional marriage. Gallup (2019), also found that approximately
35% of respondents believed that gay and lesbian relations was “morally wrong”.
Targeting of LGBT People

Whether sexual orientation belongs as a protected class under the Civil Rights Act of
1964 is something that is frequently contested in state and federal court. The U.S. Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) ruled that sexual orientation is a protected class,
though that decision is only selectively binding (Wilson 2015). There are limited national
protections for LGBT individuals and the majority of protections provided by the government for
LGBT individuals falls at the state level.
Sexual orientation consistently ranks as the third highest motivator for hate crimes,
following race and religion (Marzullo and Libman 2009). In 2009 the definition of a hate crime
expanded when President Barack Obama signed the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd Jr. Hate
Crimes Prevention Act to include sexual orientation, gender identity, disability and gender in the
definition and allowed the FBI to begin investigating those crimes.
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Violent hate crimes perpetrated due to a victim’s sexual orientation were more severe
than both racial and religious victims (Dunbar 2006). Further research has suggested that LGBT
individuals are more likely to be targeted than any other minority for a hate crime (Park and
Mykhyalshyn 2016). Fear of being victimized is also high in the LGBT community and a Harris
Interactive (2006) poll found that well over 50% of LGBT individuals surveyed were concerned
over victimization due to their sexual orientation; a sharp contrast to only about 6-7% of nonLGBT individuals who fear about being the victim of a violent crime (Gallup 2006; Gallup
2007). In 2016, there were 1,076 hate crimes in the U.S. where someone was targeted due to
their sexual orientation, including 32 in Florida and 2 in Orange County. In 2016, Orange County
was not a particularly dangerous place for LGBT people. While these numbers seem to be low
and according to Table 11 the numbers of LGBT hate crime incidents are decreasing. However,
they do still exist, whereas non-LGBT individuals fear crime, but there is a lack of this
enhancement that being a member of a protected group brings.
Table 9: LGBT Incidents

LGBT Reported Incidents Orange County Florida U.S.
2016
2
32 1076
2015
1
14 1053
2014
4
12 1017
2013
5
20 1233
2012
6
42 1135
2011
6
25 1293
2010
4
29 1277
Many LGBT individuals also do not feel comfortable coming forward to law enforcement
as a victim and many LGBT victims are reticent with law enforcement. Criminal justice
curriculum often seems to be focused on race and gender more than sexual orientation and
LGBT issues have not been taught prominently in criminal justice institutions even though
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crimes based on sexual orientation are still present and increasing in some situations (Cannon
and Dirks-Linhorst 2006). Dunbar (2006) found that 28% of sexual orientation-based hate crimes
were not reported to police after comparing hate crime statistics and statistics provided by a
community level LGBT organization in California.
In 2014, the ban on same sex marriage in Florida was ruled unconstitutional and same sex
marriage was legal in every state by 2015 (Brenner v. Scott). At the state level Florida does not
offer many protections for LGBT individuals. According to the Human Rights Campaign, the
state of Florida has failed to act on 8 of the 10 most pressing issues affecting the LGBT
community (HRC 2019). For example, Florida does not have laws prohibiting the discrimination
of individuals based on their sexual orientation regarding housing, employment or public
accommodations. Florida also does not have a law addressing school anti-bullying or education
discrimination based on sexual orientation. Florida does however, support marriage equality and
other relationship recognition and supports a state level law that addresses hate and bias crimes
based on sexual orientation, education, transgender healthcare, gender updates on identification
documents and conversion therapy. Orange county prohibits discrimination in employment based
on sexual orientation and gender identity in both the private and public sector (Equality Florida
2010). The City of Orlando has had a non-discrimination ordinance since 1973, created a
domestic partnership registry in 2011 and actively continues to support LGBT causes in the
private and public domains (City of Orlando 2019).
Institutions

Government institutions in both Orlando and Orange County are strongly mayoral in
nature. These mayors are prominent members of the community and exert a significant amount
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of control over their respective areas and constituents. Mayor Dyer was a prominent member of
the community following Pulse and he appeared often participating in demonstrations of
solidarity and speaking with the media about the event. Additionally, Governor Scott came to
Orlando following Pulse and was involved in demonstrations of solidarity. Economic institutions
in Central Florida are driven primarily by the tourist/hospitality industry. Walt Disney World and
Universal Orlando are very influential in both the political and public spheres. Nonprofit
institutions are also active throughout Central Florida and many of them have existing
partnerships with the local government or businesses to provide services. For example,
OneBlood provides blood products to all hospitals throughout Central Florida. The Red Cross
has a strong presence in Orlando and responded to Pulse.
Institutionalism is strong within many sub-communities that exist along personal identity
lines and the LGBT sub-community is no different. Many LGBT focused organizations were
founded to provide safe spaces for LGBT people and, though acceptance has risen, those
organizations are still around to provide support for LGBT people within the communities in
which they serve. National LGBT specific institutions like GLAAD are active in the LGBT
community today and other local specific institutions like Equality Florida serve smaller subcommunities. There is likely going to always be a strong sub-community of LGBT individuals
akin to certain races or ethnicities. The Center and The Zebra Coalition are two LGBT
institutions that existed within the Orlando community prior to Pulse.
The victims in this event were not only viewed as members of the LGBT community, but
also as members of the larger Orlando community. As such, they benefited from the institutional
response from government and non-government general institutions in addition to those specific
LGBT institutions.
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Media Coverage

On June 16, 2016, during a visit to Orlando, President Obama described the incident as
an “attack on the LGBT community” and vowed to “end discrimination and violence against our
brothers and sisters who are in the LGBT community” (Obama 2016). President Obama’s
comments regarding this attack were covered extensively by both local and national media.
Other press coverage described the incident as an attack on the LGBT community. In a June 12th
interview with CNN, Florida Senator Marco Rubio condemned the attack and stated that the
shooter’s radical Islamic beliefs compelled him to specifically target the gay community
(Bradner 2016). For example, on June 13th CNN’s developing coverage of the event noted Pulse
as a “gay nightclub” (Ellis et al. 2016). A 2019 study examining online media sources and their
publications following Pulse found that the victims were primarily identified as LGBT and the
Hispanic nature of the victims was often neglected in coverage (Meyer 2019).
The entire front page of the Monday, June 13th edition of the Orlando Sentinel was a
memorial to the victims. In that memorial it was noted that Pulse was an LGBT themed
nightclub and that the suspect was potentially driven by a hatred for homosexuals (Cutter 2019).
Local television stations were quick to report and many sent reporters near the scene and they
had a continued presence from the moment they became aware of the incident. Pulse related
stories focused on the terrorism aspect, the high victim count and the identity group of the
victims. For example, the New York Times coverage of the incident included the LGBT nature
of the victims, terrorism and high casualty number (Alvarez and Perez-Pena 2016; Santora
2016). New York Times coverage was very focused on the attack being at a gay establishment
and extensively covered other LGBT violence in their Pulse stories. Washington Post coverage
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was very focused on the terrorism aspect of the event and the high casualty number. However,
their coverage did include that the victims were LGBT and even mentioned how ISIS executes
LGBT people in areas they control (Tsukayama, Berman and Markon 2016; Goldman 2016).
Many of the Pulse related stories focused on remembrance of the victims and Orlando stations
WESH-Channel 2, WFTV-Channel 9 and News 13 each won Emmy awards for their coverage of
the Pulse nightclub attack (Boedeker 2016). Throughout the Central Florida area many
memorialization’s of the incident were focused on the 49 victims and wording like “Remember
the 49” was common in headlines.
Media coverage regarding Pulse continued well on several fronts. The first was regarding
Mateen’s wife, Noor Salman, who was later charged with obstruction of justice and aiding and
abetting her husband in providing financial and material support to a terrorist organization. In
March of 2018 she was acquitted of those charges. Her role in the attack and subsequent trial
kept the Pulse attack in the media spotlight and investigative information was released regarding
the attack through her trial. Second was that Omar was a person of interest in a terrorism related
investigation in 2013 and into 2014, though that investigation was later abandoned due to lack of
evidence of wrongdoing. His father Seddique Matten had also been an FBI informant
sporadically from the early 2000s up to 2016 and question even arose over Omar’s sexuality due
to the LGBT club being targeted. These additional stories related to Pulse kept the event in the
media well after it occurred.
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Dependent Variable: Orlando Strong

The mission for the City of Orlando Emergency Operations Center (EOC) was to provide
operational coordination and support for the command post and on-scene operations.21 The EOC
began supporting victims and those immediately affected through the emergency information
center and help line, the Family Reunification Center22 and Family Assistance Center.23
Community support was also provided by assisting in dignitary visits, funerals, memorial
services and vigils, the Orlando United Assistance Center and the OneOrlando Fund.
Once news of the event spread people were attempting to make donations through the
EOC. The EOC worked closely with other government institutions (FBI, Department of Justice,
City, County Staff and Medical Examiner’s Office) and non-government general institutions
(Red Cross, Goodwill, Salvation Army) to provide relief services to those affected by the tragedy
(Smith 2016). Donations made through EOC were directed to the appropriate organizations as
the EOC is not intended to be a donations center.24

21

Based on Author’s interview with an official from the City of Orlando Emergency Operations Center on May 9,
2019. The EOC was notified of the event around 3:30AM on the morning of June 12th. They recommended and
received a full activation status (Level 1) by Mayor Dyer from June 12 th to June 22nd.
22
Author’s interview with an official from the City of Orlando’s Emergency Operations Center on May 9, 2019. The
FRC was located at the Beardall Senior Center and ran from June 12th to June 14th with the purpose of notifying
next of kin and victims’ identification and it was staffed with FBI Crisis Team, FEMORS and the FDLE.
23
Author’s interview with an official from the City of Orlando’s Emergency Operations Center on May 9, 2019. The
FAC was located at Camping World Stadium and ran from June 15 th to June 22nd with the purpose of establishing
support for the immediate needs of families, friends and victims. Services provided there included assistance with
air travel/lodging, child and family services, consulate services, funeral services, legal aid etc. They served over 900
individuals and 255 families in the time they were operational.
24
Author’s interview with an official from the City of Orlando’s Emergency Operations Center on May 9, 2019. The
EOC mentioned that donations were directed to the GoodWill or the RedCross,
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In the morning hours of June 12th, Mayor Dyer
began posting updates, such as the victim list, on what
had occurred within his city.25 In one of these messages
he notified the public that he had declared a state of
emergency for the city of Orlando by Florida Governor
Rick Scott, which allowed for further resources to be

“June 12, 2016, was the most horrific
day in the history of the City of
Orlando. In the days since the
tragedy, the members of our
community have stood up and stood
together to show the world the best
humanity has to offer. Together we
will remain Orlando United.” – Mayor
Buddy Dyer

brought in (Dyer 2016). He also included a hotline for family members and a link to grief
counselors through Aspire Health and the Zebra Coalition (Dyer 2016). Mayor Dyer also asked
people to leave memorial items at the nearby Dr. Phillips center and to delay more vigils until
public resources could be allocated to them. In the month that followed the City of Orlando
tweeted 190 times and received 3.8 million impressions, 19,200 clicks and 7,877 new followers
while Mayor Dyer’s account tweeted 145 times in that month and received 9,100 clicks and
3,909 new followers (Taylor and DeVault 2017). Through Facebook, the City of Orlando posted
159 times, received 2.6 million impressions, 23,919 clicks and 8,340 new followers while Mayor
Dyer’s Facebook account posted 119 times, received 1.8 million impressions, 7,023 clicks and
received 4,549 new followers (Taylor and DeVault 2017). The Twitter and Facebook activity
from the City of Orlando in the month following Pulse are drastic increases from normal activity.
On July 11, 2016 the Orlando United Assistance Center (OUAC) was founded to assist
the individuals individuals directly impacted by the Pulse tragedy. The OUAC was a partnership
between the City of Orlando, Orange County government and the Heart of Florida United Way

25

Author’s interview with an official from the City of Orlando’s Emergency Operations Center on May 9, 2019. That
official credits the strength of the Mayor’s Office and his strong leadership and commitment to public safety for
much of the success of the post Pulse operations.
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and continued the work that had been done by the Family Assistance Center.26 The OUAC began
with a mission to provide “long term healing through targeted mental health services, community
building and awareness” and became a resilience center for anyone Pulse affected (OUAC
2019).27 The OUAC provides a tailored approach to the LGBT and Hispanic communities
through its use of case managers and the general approach is based upon the most effective
healing processes from similar events. The OUAC primarily receives federal funding as they
continue to actively assist individuals on a case by case basis with approximately 11 full time
employees and approximately 300 active clients at any given time.28
The institutional response by the City of Orlando government included both direct and
indirect approaches in order to assist survivors and the community. Mayor Dyer’s personal
leadership and willingness to work with other institutions further enhances the governmental
institution responses that occurred following Pulse. Indirectly, the government collaborated
closely with non-governmental institutions to provide services to the victim and community.
They also worked closely with businesses and specific LGBT and Hispanic institutions through
the OneOrlando Fund.
Fundraising Efforts
Within several weeks of the shooting, Mayor Dyer’s general counsel reached out to Ken
Feinberg for his guidance in how to respond to such an event.29 Mr. Feinberg suggested to

26

Author’s interview with an official from the OUAC on May 14, 2019.
Author’s interview with an official from the OUAC on May 14, 2019.
28
Author’s interview with an official from the OUAC on May 14, 2019. The majority of those employees are case
managers, though they do have 2 counselors on staff.
29
Author’s interview with an official from The Law Offices of Ken Feinberg on May 14, 2019. The city came to an
agreement with Mr. Feinberg so that he would provide administrative services, hold two townhall meetings,
design plans and eligibility criteria for recipients of the funds raised.
27
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consolidate all of the funds that had been set up to raise money for the victims and affected
families.30 Mayor Dyer responded by announcing the OneOrlando Fund near the end of June
2016. The OneOrlando Fund represents the diversity within Orlando, including those in the
Hispanic and LGBT communities (OneOrlando 2016). Orlando Magic President Alex Martins
was the chair of the board and the remaining members represent diverse groups including the
Hispanic and LGBT communities (Dyer 2016; City of Orlando 2016; OneOrlando 2016). Table
10 shows OneOrlando Fund board members (Broffman 2016). Equality Florida, the GLBT
Community Center of Central Florida (The Center) and the National Compassion Fund
announced a partnership with the OneOrlando Fund to better ensure that all collected funds were
disseminated in a timely, unified and transparent manner (OneOrlando 2016). Economic
powerhouses in the area contributed strongly to the fund. Prominent donors included Disney ($1
million), Darden restaurants ($500,000) the DeVos family ($400,000), and $100,000 each from
the Orlando Magic, Orlando City Soccer Club and JetBlue airlines (Santich, Jacobson and
Arnold 2016). By December of 2016 the OneOrlando Fund had distributed $27,410,000 for 299
claims of the 333 submitted, representing 98% of all eligible claims (Bednarz 2016). The fund
closed on January 1, 2017 and any remaining funds were distributed accordingly.31

30

Author’s interview with an official from The Law Offices of Ken Feinberg on May 14, 2019. That official further
suggested that a publicly operated, custodial fund would be the most beneficial.
31
Author’s interview with an official on the OneOrlando Fund Board on May 14, 2019. That official stated that
donations came in from 127 different countries and characterized the fund as very much a short-term oriented
entity while other groups were looked to provide support in the longer term.
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Table 10: OneOrlando Fund Board
Name
Position
Company
Rena Langley
Senior V.P.
Walt Disney World
Diane O'Dell
V.P. of Community Relations
Universal Orlando Resort
Stephanie Ghertner
Director
Darden Foundation & Community Affairs
Mark Meyer
Industry Manager
JP Morgan Chase
Paul F. Bryan
Chief Executive Officer
Grover Bryan, Inc.
Jennifer Foster
Owner and Executive Producer
Foster Productions
Diana Bolivar
President
Hispanic Chamber of Commerce of Metro Orlando
Carlos Carbonell
Chief Executive Officer
Echo Interaction Group
Ken Robinson
President and Chief Executive Officer
Dr. Phillips Inc. and The Dr. P. Phillips Foundation
Mark Shamley
President and Chief Executive Officer
Association of Corporate Contributions Professionals (ACCP)
Michael Farmer Statewide Deputy Director of Development
Equality Florida
Tim Vargas
Board President
The Center
Chris McCullion
Chief Financial Officer
City of Orlando
Walter G. Hawkins
Director of Urban Development
City of Orlando Downtown Development Board

Vigils and Gatherings of Solidarity
Smaller vigils occurred throughout Orlando on the night of June 12th, including at a
downtown bar and a high school (Hayes et al. 2016). On June 13th Mayor Dyer and other
community leaders spoke at a makeshift memorial at the Dr. Phillips center that thousands
attended (Burch and Harris 2016). On June 14th, the nearby University of Central Florida hosted
its own vigil to honor the victims, including a current student and alumnus who were killed
(UCF Today 2016). On June 19th, “hundreds” attended a vigil that took place at Magic Kingdom
after being organized by an online Walt Disney World related blog (Mauney 2016). A week after
the attack a better organized vigil occurred at Lake Eola in downtown Orlando, which
approximately 50,000 people attended to show solidarity with the afflicted LGBT and Hispanic
communities (Bevil and Stennet 2016). Vigils and signs of solidarity were not restricted to the
Central Florida area following the Pulse attack. Vigils to show solidarity with Pulse victims
occurred in Alaska, California, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Louisiana, Michigan, Nevada, New
Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont and Washington D.C.
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(Taylor 2016; CBS 2016). International vigils of solidarity also occurred in London, Hong Kong,
Mumbai, Sydney, Paris, Berlin and Seoul (Taylor 2016).32 Nearly 4% of the Orange County
population attended the main vigil in downtown Orlando and numerous other vigils and
gatherings occurred, both in the Central Florida area and out of the state and nation.
Blood Supply Reaction

In the first 24 hours following the shooting, 372 pints of blood were used to help shooting
victims (Brinkmann 2016). Blood and other blood products are one of the most important
resources tapped following a violent mass casualty event as the number of dead can increase if
medical resources are unprepared. The supplier of blood and blood products to Central Florida
and the Orlando Regional Medical Center (ORMC), where a majority of the victims were taken,
is OneBlood.33 Once victims began arriving at ORMC, lifesaving medical procedures were
beginning and the blood at ORMC was being used. This caused the medical staff at ORMC to
begin placing orders for more blood.34 Once it became apparent that a violent mass casualty
event had occurred, OneBlood activated their Business Continuity Plan (BCP).35 Over the next
two weeks, 109 pints of blood products were used for shooting victims and the hospital never
had a shortage of any products. No victim experienced any delays according to OneBlood

32

A prominent official within the LGBT community credits the worldwide diaspora of LGBT individuals and groups
for the strong international reaction.
33
Author’s interview with an official from OneBlood on May 8, 2019. OneBlood was created in 2012 after 3
regional blood banks merged together to provide better services to the hospitals and medical facilities within the
southeast.
34
Author’s interview with an official from OneBlood on May 8, 2019. Hundreds of orders were placed throughout
the night as blood began to be used.
35
Author’s interview with an official from OneBlood on May 8, 2019. The BCP was created in 2015/2016 to
formalize how to respond to such events. The BCP has been used numerous times and activated whenever an
event occurs within their service area that more blood is likely to be needed. That official stated that is has been
used for shootings, storms and bridge collapses in the past.
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(Brinkmann 2016).36 The Orlando area was able to provide the majority of the blood, though Onegative and O-positive was in high demand so several other cities within the region transferred
blood products. What often goes unnoticed is the fact that blood donations require between 24
and 48 hours to be processed before they can be disseminated to medical facilities for use. The
blood previously donated is what saves lives in the immediate aftermath of a violent mass
casualty event. The increases in blood donations that follows an event help in that blood products
continue to be needed in the days and weeks following an event.
OneBlood reported that 5,300 pints were donated on June 12th, three times what it usually
receives per day (Brinkmann 2016).37 The week following the attack saw the biggest response
since the September 11th terrorist attacks as OneBlood received 28,000 points of blood, well
above the average weekly volume of 18,000 pints (Brinkmann 2016).38 By June 28th, 85 percent
of the blood collected in the week after the shooting had been distributed within the OneBlood
region of hospitals (Brinkmann 2016). The American Association of Blood Banks (AABB), of
which OneBlood is a part of, has a task force on domestic disasters and terrorism that helps
affected regions tap into a larger array of resources in order to assist, but local blood banks
stepped up quickly so the task force was not formally activated (Brinkmann 2016). Whenever an
event where blood is likely going to be needed, OneBlood proactively reaches out to those
affiliates to offer assistance and following Pulse, the Orlando area affiliates received dozens of

36

Author’s interview with an official from OneBlood on May 8, 2019.
Author’s interview with an official from OneBlood on May 8, 2019. During a press conference following Pulse a
trauma doctor at ORMC asked people to donate blood and the official interviewed believes that provided an added
motivation to donate. Many blood centers were taking donations until 4AM and OneBlood had no issue with filling
the staffing requirements that such a huge surge brings, in either workers to take donations or technicians to
prepare the blood for distribution.
38
Author’s interview with an official from OneBlood on May 8, 2019. 80% of blood was donated through their
mobile donation vehicles “Big Red Buses” and the remaining amount was taken in at designated blood donation
facilities, of which there are 90 through their service area.
37
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blood products from their service area.39 Following Pulse, OneBlood stressed that consistent
blood donations are what saves lives. Approximately 30% of donors following Pulse were first
time donors and 25% of donors had donated multiple times a year after Pulse occurred.
OneBlood abides by Federal Drug Administration guidelines regarding blood donations which
caused some minor strains following Pulse. Though some of the LGBT community were unable
to donate due to FDA mandated guidelines, many of those individual still tried to help in the best
ways they could, often through soliciting others to donate.40
Established LGBT Groups Respond
Within the first 9 hours of the attack Equality Florida41, a statewide LGBT civil rights
advocacy group, had raised $767,000 through a GoFundMe page dedicated to aid the victims and
survivors (Shapiro 2016; WTVR 2016; Chillag and Wattles 2016). Some of the earliest large
donors were Cricket Wireless ($25,000), Executive Pride ($30,000), singer songwriter Jeffree
Star ($20,000) and even GoFundMe themselves who donated $100,000 and waived their
transaction fees for any donations (Star 2016; Cricket Wirless 2016; Chillag and Wattles 2016).
By June 16th, the goal of 5 million dollars had been met, breaking the previous record of 2
million dollars (Pfeiffer 2016; Maxwell 2016; Kraft 2016; Chillag and Wattles 2016). Equality
Florida partnered with the National Center for the Victims of Crimes (NCVC) to distribute the
raised funds. NCVC is a non-profit that has helped distribute funds from other violent mass

39

Author’s interview with an official from OneBlood on May 8, 2019
Author’s interview with an official from OneBlood on May 8, 2019. That official noted that the guideline barring
men who have had sex with another man from giving blood changed from a lifetime ban to only a one-year
deferral soon before Pulse occurred. That official also cited guidelines barring or temporarily barring people with
tattoos, piercings and certain travel and lifestyle restrictions from giving blood as a reason for why some were
turned away.
41
I attempted to interview a representative from Equality Florida but did not receive a response to my inquiry.
40
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casualty events, most notably the Fort Hood shooting in 2009 and a shooting in Chattanooga,
Tennessee in 2015 (Chillag and Wattles 2016). By September of 2016 the fund had raised
$7,854,920 from 119,523 people (GoFundMe 2016). Equality Florida made two promises
following Pulse; the first was to help victims and their families recover and the second was to
ensure that Pulse never happened again (GoFundMe 2016; Evans 2016). Of the millions of
dollars donated through the GoFundMe account set up, Equality Florida claimed that they kept
none of it for administrative purposes and that all of it was appropriately disseminated
(GoFundMe 2016). Since Pulse, Equality Florida has vowed to better protect LGBT individuals
by passing legislation aimed at banning anti-LGBT discrimination and gun violence prevention
policies (GoFundMe2016). Equality Florida also continues to accept money through a new
GoFundMe page set up titled the “Honor Them with Action Fund” set up in memory of those
killed during Pulse (GoFundMe 2016).
The Center opened in Orlando in 1978 and is one of the oldest organizations in the U.S.
operating to promote the well-being of the Central Florida LGBT community while
simultaneously serving non LGBT people of Central Florida. The Center advertises itself as a
“sanctuary/safe space for all LGBTQ people in Central Florida” while also providing programs
and services that empower, educate and entertain the LGBT community. They also are building
strategic alliances for the purpose of increasing the influence and relationships between the
LGBT community and the broader public. The Center in Orlando is the second oldest in the
nation after the location in Southern California. That location was opened as a response to the
Stonewall Riots in 1969 in order to provide safe gathering locations for LGBT individuals.42 The
42

Author interview with an official from The Center on April 25, 2019. The official, who identified himself as a
member of the LGBT community, stated that the LGBT community felt alienated and as if it lacked safe spaces
following the Stonewall riots in 1969 where LGBT establishments were targeted by law enforcement.
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morning following Pulse, The Center opened at 7am, operated for longer hours and immediately
became a rallying point for the LGBT and greater Orlando community.43 Individuals would leave
water and food donations with the organization and they would then disseminate those donations.
The Center was so busy immediately following Pulse that they paused their STI testing in order
to focus on mental health counseling.44 The Center received approximately 750 thousand dollars
via donations within the month following Pulse, which they donated to the GoFundMe account
set up by Equality Florida.45 The Center also donated approximately $31,000 in small business
grants to the businesses in South Orlando that were affected by Pulse.46 The Center became a
meeting point for many resiliency related activities following Pulse. For example, The Center
received significant media coverage following the event. The Center corresponded with family
members of victims that were out of state in order to bring them to Orlando and closer to their
loved ones.47 As the oldest LGBT organization in the area, The Center worked closely with other
LGBT organizations in order to better provide resources to those afflicted by the event.48
The increase in foot traffic to The Center following Pulse continued for a long while
before diminishing.49 In 2015 The Center received $324,765 in total revenue (GLBT 2015). In
2016 The Center had a 412% increase in total revenue as they received $1,664,613 (GLBT
2016). The Pulse event put Orlando and the LGBT community in the spotlight and donations
43

Author interview with an official from The Center on April 25, 2019. That official noted that the long hours for
the workers of The Center came naturally as the believed they had a duty to their community to provide services.
44
Author interview with an official from The Center on April 25, 2019. That official further explained that local
counselors Adam Miller and Kristen Wieck provided mental health counseling on behalf of The Center.
45
Author interview with an official from The Center on April 25, 2019.
46
Author interview with an official from The Center on April 25, 2019. That official specifically noted several
businesses near Pulse that were effectively shut down while the investigation was ongoing.
47
Author interview with an official from The Center on April 25, 2019.
48
Author interview with an official from The Center on April 25, 2019. The Center worked closely with Equality
Florida and Zebra Coalition before working with the Orlando United Assistance Center.
49
Author interview with an official from The Center on April 25, 2019. That official stated that while foot traffic had
eventually decreased The Center was still busier than before Pulse occurred.
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were not restricted to the immediate and afflicted area.50 In 2017, their total revenue decreased
back down to $426,696 (GLBT 2017). The amount of total revenue in 2018 decreased even
further down to around $200,000 which was attributed to trauma fatigue.51 The Center continues
to provide mental health counseling and whenever another mass casualty event occurs that
receives a significant amount of media attention, they see an increase in counseling needs.52
In an effort to provide the appropriate resources for the victimized community, Mayor
Dyer directed people to the local mental health center Aspire and its sub-organization
specifically targeted for the LGBT youth, the Zebra Coalition.53 The Zebra Coalition’s primary
focus is on housing issues for LGBT youth (13-24 year olds) while they also deal with trauma
reduction and gender issues.54 The Zebra Coalition is funded primarily through grants and after
Pulse happened they received two new opportunities; one to expand into Osceola County and the
other to offer more services for the 6 months after the attack happened.55 As with many of the
other organizations within the area, they saw an influx of donations following Pulse. They
carefully accepted monetary donations while distributing out material donations to those who

50

Author interview with an official from The Center on April 25, 2019. That official could not provide official
numbers but believed a significant portion of the donations they received that year were from out of state.
51
Author interview with an official from The Center on April 25, 2019.
52
Author interview with an official from The Center on April 25, 2019. That official believed that Pulse had such an
effect on the community that many psychological issues in victims, witnesses and family members are still ongoing
which causes an increase in the need for mental health counseling whenever another violent mass casualty event
occurs.
53
Author interview with an official from the Zebra Coalition on May 13, 2019. The Zebra Coalition was formed in
2010 and bought a building in 2013 in which they currently operate out of directly across from The Center. The city
of Orlando has always had a good working relationship with the Zebra Coalition and as of 2019, the treasurer of
the city is on the Zebra Coalition board of directors. In 2019 the Zebra Coalition separated from Aspire, mainly for
financial funding reasons and they continue to share many board members and overlap in many services offered.
54
Author interview with an official from the Zebra Coalition on May 13, 2019. The Zebra Coalition has two mental
health counselors and upwards of four interns at any given time that specialize in mental health counseling.
55
Author interview with an official from the Zebra Coalition on May 13, 2019. The Zebra Coalition is primarily
funded through a DFC grant from the federal government for $125,000 a year. After Pulse happened, they received
a $50,000 grant from Humana to expand on their services and another grant through the Contigo Fund to expand
into Osceola County in order to better serve the Hispanic residents there.
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sought them out for help.56 For approximately two weeks following Pulse, the Zebra Coalition
set up a help line to provide the appropriate resources for those that needed them and to make it
easier for mental health practitioners to sign up and volunteer.57 Approximately 200 different
mental health practitioners had volunteered their time and that same list is still in use.58 The
Zebra Coalition believes that the community is now more accepting of LGBT people, though
there is a bigger security concern now.59 As a member of CenterLink, the Zebra Coalition
continues to share their experiences with other LGBT organizations across the country regarding
how their organization and others responded to Pulse.60
Demonstrations Continue and New Groups Form

In the aftermath of the tragedy, numerous groups were formed in order to provide
services to the community. One month after the attack, Pulse owner Barbara Poma founded the
onePulse Foundation in order to memorialize the now closed club and honor the victims.61 The
organization continues to fund community grants and offers 49 educational scholarships to honor

56

Author interview with an official from the Zebra Coalition on May 13, 2019. That official emphasized that they
only accepted monetary donations when the intent was specifically help out the organization. Donations such as
hygiene products, gift cards and food and water are examples of some of the things donated to them following
Pulse.
57
Author interview with an official from the Zebra Coalition on May 13, 2019. That number was through 211 and
the responsibilities went to the OUAC after that time. Mental health practitioners who wanted to help signed up
on a document electronically shared across other organizations offering similar assistance.
58
Author interview with an official from the OUAC on May 14, 2019.
59
Author interview with an official from the Zebra Coalition on May 13, 2019. That official stated that issues with
sexual orientation discrimination seemingly decreased in number following Pulse and believes that transgender
issues have taken more focus.
60
Author interview with an official from the Zebra Coalition on May 13, 2019. CenterLink is an LGBT organization
affiliation that spans the United States and Canada and is a means mainly for communication amongst these
groups. That official stated that they routinely still receive questions and participate in discussions regarding Pulse
and their organizational response to the incident.
61
Author interview with an official from OnePulse on May 8, 2019. OnePulse was informally organized
immediately after the incident occurred but slowly evolved and on May 4, 2017 the organization went public.
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each of the victims.62 Immediately following the attack, onePulse directed most of the monetary
donations to the OneOrlando Fund, which operated independently from onePulse.63 Donations to
onePulse have slowed since the attack occurred, however, they continue to receive
correspondence from across the nation and world.64 Since its inception, the foundation has
accepted 32 donations of $10,000 or more, ranging from well-known international businesses to
private individuals (onePulse 2019). The Orange County Government donated 10 million dollars
of the tourism development tax revenue to onePulse. In June 2019 PVH Foundation joined
Orlando Health as a 1-million-dollar donor to onePulse and Walt Disney World Parks and
Resorts donated $250,000.
OnePulse currently has seven full time staff members, a 20-member board of trustees
that includes businessmen and celebrities and an ambassador’s council that includes Mayor Dyer
and representatives from across the nation including individuals from the 9/11 Memorial and
Museum and the Oklahoma City Memorial and Museum.65 Barbara and several early board
members of onePulse travelled to the 9/11 memorials in New York City and Shanksville,
Pennsylvania along with the memorial of the Oklahoma City bombing and other memorials
across the nation for similar events.66 OnePulse has always had a good working relationship with

62

Author interview with an official from OnePulse on May 8, 2019. That official stated that those scholarships are
in the names of each of the victims, in topics the victims were involved or interested in. Each victim family
maintains discretion over who receives the scholarships and each scholarship receives $10,000 a year.
63
Author interview with an official from OnePulse on May 8, 2019. That official stated that they did accept
monetary donations for the organization when applicable.
64
Author interview with an official from OnePulse on May 8, 2019. That official noted that simple demonstrations
of solidarity often occurred near the club that nobody ever claimed and gave an example of a water cooler that
would appear at the temporary club memorial. That official also stated that nontraditional donations include
letters, poems, drawings and sculptures which they continue to receive.
65
Author interview with an official from OnePulse on May 8, 2019. That official stated that a well-rounded and
professionally diverse board was intentional by the founders of OnePulse. Board members were initially appointed
but now interested individuals reach out to OnePulse about board membership.
66
Author interview with an official from OnePulse on May 8, 2019. That official emphasized that very early on
Barbara sought out guidance in appropriately memorializing the events that happened at Pulse as similar events
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the media and the organization believes that social media in particular has been their best method
to reach people.67 OnePulse continues to organize and participate in events, such as 5ks and art
shows, meant to raise awareness and donations and the organization is crucial in planning
anniversary events on June 12th of every year. They also work with OUAC to coordinate with
victims and affected families and they organize activities for those individuals twice a year. After
the attack, Pulse was permanently shut down and the City of Orlando and Pulse owners grappled
with how to memorialize the incident (Weiner & Tziperman 2016).68 OnePulse continues to
strive for the construction of a permanent memorial and museum.69
OnePulse partnered with the Orange County government to officially declare June 12th as
“Orlando United Day-A Day of Love and Kindness” to annually honor the victims of the attack
(Orange County Government 2016). The One Orlando Collection was later created by a
partnership between the Orange County government, City of Orlando, the Orange County
Regional History Museum and community partners to permanently and methodically preserve
the event and the memories of the deceased (OneOrlando Collection 2019).70 More than 5,000
artifacts were gathered from the Pulse nightclub, the Dr. Phillips Center and Lake Eola where
vigils occurred and the Orlando Regional Medical Center where many victims were treated
(OneOrlando Collection 2019).

very rarely ever occurred within private businesses and she knew she would be strongly influencing how Pulse was
remembered. OnePulse continues to work closely with the officials involved in memorials across the nation.
67
Author interview with an official from OnePulse on May 8, 2019. That official credits the Rubenstein public
relations firm out of New York for much of their consistent and positive relationship with the media and public
alike.
68
Based on the Author’s interview with both representatives from the City of Orlando and the Pulse nightclub
owners, both stated that they have always had a good working relationship despite differences in how the event
should be memorialized.
69
Author interview with an official from OnePulse on May 8, 2019. That official stated that they are seeking a
permanent memorial at the nightclub and a museum in the vicinity.
70
Author interview with an official from OnePulse on May 8, 2019. That official noted that they loaned notable
items from Pulse that included chandeliers, disco balls and other decorative items from inside the club.
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On June 16, 2016, future founding members of The OneOrlando Alliance successfully
contacted 18 other LGBT organizations asking for communication and collaboration between
these likeminded groups.71 It began as a unified alliance of likeminded LGBT centered
organizations before it grew to include nearly 30 different organizations, including Equality
Florida, The Center, OnePulse Foundation, OUAC, QLatinX and the Zebra Coalition. The
OneOrlando Alliance was formed to work in a “collaborative and transparent way to serve those
affected-including victim’s families, survivors, Pulse employees, and the larger community also
struggling with trauma, grief and fear” (OneOrlando Alliance 2019). As the OneOrlando
Alliance was forming, the amplified communication they offered between member groups
allowed for much easier assistance to be given to those in need following Pulse.72 In September
of 2016 the newfound collaboration extended to the Orange County government after a meeting
with Mayor Teresa Jacobs where she pledged support.73 The OneOrlando Alliance is funded
completely by local grants and often raises money for the OUAC.74 The alliance and their
coalition of member groups tackle important issues within the LGBT community. For example,
the alliance organized a community forum on LGBT issues within the homeless population in
Orlando and continues to work with different programs and services in Central Florida to ensure
that they are LGBT inclusive (Santich 2019). The OneOrlando Alliance continues to raise money

71

Several officials I spoke too stated that an alliance was attempted in 2012 between likeminded LGBT groups
throughout Central Florida but it quickly became too difficult to organize.
72
Author interview with an official from the OneOrlando Alliance on May 14, 2019. That official stated that they
initially set up a Facebook page where different groups could communicate their needs. Examples of some of the
needs they assisted in include the need for hospital space, wheelchairs, food for family members, transportation,
immigration attorneys and airline tickets.
73
Author’s interview with an official from the OneOrlando Alliance on May 14, 2019. That official stated that the
government had been frequently involved from very early on but that Mayor Jacobs became emotional during the
meeting they had and pledged much more support.
74
Author’s interview with an official from the OUAC on May 14, 2019. That official stated that they receive about
$155,000 in grants a year.

118

and awareness for LGBT issues through their Act.Love.Give campaign around the anniversary of
the Pulse attack every year. Through that campaign they have seen directed over 10,000
volunteer hours over the last two years.75 The OneOrlando Alliance was briefly consulted
following the Las Vegas shooting in October of 2017 and other community leaders have reached
out to them. 76
QLatinX was a group formed by individuals directly connected to Pulse in July of 2016
to account for the cultural challenges many Pulse survivors face.77 As previously noted, the
majority of victims were Hispanic and many of the resilience programs and assistance measures
provided to the victims and their families did not take these cultural differences into account.78
QLatinX was founded to specifically provide services to the LGBT victims and their families
where English was not the primary language of communication and where concerns over
immigration inquiries were present. QLatinX was specifically formed to provide safe spaces to
these individuals who did not feel comfortable relying on the other, more well-known attempts to
help Pulse victims.79 Though QLatinX was founded to serve the communities of color within the

75

Author’s interview with an official from the OneOrlando Alliance on May 14, 2019. The majority of those
volunteer hours go to non LGBT causes at locations such as food banks and environmental cleanup.
76
Author’s interview with an official from the OneOrlando Alliance on May 14, 2019. That official stated that no
tangible work was done in cooperation with Las Vegas officials.
77
Author interview with an official from QLatinX on April 25, 2019. QLatinX was founded by 12 volunteers, all with
connections to Pulse and is still predominantly volunteer led, though it does have a 200+ volunteer base.
78
Author interview with an official from QLatinX on April 25, 2019. That official cited a historical displacement of
LGBT people of color and claimed that Pulse was very much a “tipping point” that forced many underlying issues to
be brought to the forefront within the LGBT community.
79
Author interview with an official from QLatinX on April 25, 2019. That official believed that programs provided
through programs such as Aspire and the Zebra coalition did not provide adequate considerations to the Hispanic
communities primarily afflicted by Pulse.
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LGBT community, they have been sought out by organizations across the nation to bridge the
gap between the Hispanic community and the LGBT community.80
Nontraditional demonstrations of solidarity are evident in institutional behaviors
following the Pulse attack. For example, many new groups formed in order to memorialize the
event and provide services to victims and their families. New collaboration between groups
continues to the present day. This collaboration is not only between specific institutions but
between government, and non-profit institutions and specific institutions. For example, the One
Orlando Alliance advertises itself as an LGBT alliance, however, they partner with non-profit
institutions like the United Way and both local governments. These new groups and
collaborations between groups makes demonstrating solidarity easier and many demonstrations
continue to this day.
Analysis

In conclusion the data collected through this case study is supportive of hypothesis 3 that
when mass casualty events strike vulnerable victim groups, higher demonstrations of solidarity
will result. Additionally, data collected is supportive of hypothesis 4, 4a, and 4b that strong
institutional presence (particularly government leadership and specific institutions) led to higher
demonstrations of solidarity. Results also indicated that the casualty number influenced
demonstrations, but to a much lesser extent. Figure 12 represents how the facts of the event
transferred through the media and onto the community. This figure shows how the perception of

80

Author interview with an official from QLatinX on April 25, 2019. QLatinX deals not only with LGBT issues within
the Hispanic community, but also immigration and other cultural issues as part of other coalitions, such as the
Trust Orlando Coalition.
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the vulnerable victim group affected demonstrations of solidarity while simultaneously showing
other variables that still affected the community response to the Pulse event.

Individual Helping Behaviors
Altruism & Helping Behaviors
Common, LGBT Perceived as
Vulnerable

Orlando Facts of the Event
•

•

49 Dead
• 53 Injuries
• Terrorism
Minimal Property Damage
• LGBT Victims

Media Coverage
Coverage emphasized
LGBT victims & Terrorism

Social Capital
Networks common, Trust in
organizations & institutions
high.

Demonstrations of
Solidarity
•

High

Institutions
Strong Response primarily from
LGBT organizations but also
Government & Economic

Figure 12: Case #1 Mechanism

The Effect of the Casualty Number

The number of victims and the type of event both seem to have had an effect upon
demonstrations of solidarity through the media’s attraction to violent and high casualty events.
At the time, the Pulse massacre was the highest loss of life in a terrorist attack in the U.S. since
9/11, which brought increased media coverage on its own.81 Direct influence of the effects of
casualty numbers is evident in increased media coverage which meticulously documented the
event and its aftermath. Strong media coverage is a positive indicator of demonstrations of
solidarity because without that consistent focus on the event, individuals tend to move on from
the stressful event. Additional event related narratives, such as gun control, political response

81

Author’s interview with an official from The Law Offices of Ken Feinberg on May 14, 2019. That official credits
how violent an act is and the loss of life as the crucial factors when determining charitable giving following a mass
casualty event.
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and related prosecutions attracted the media and kept the Pulse event in the media cycle. This led
to more people learning about the event themselves (and of the vulnerable victim group) which
would increase demonstrations of solidarity. Whether or not casualty numbers influence people
to demonstrate solidarity is more suited to be empirically studied at the individual level, such as
through the experiment and not qualitatively. Casualty numbers were mentioned rarely
throughout interviews with members of the community. As the number of injured and property
damage was relatively low, it appears that neither of these factors affected demonstrations of
solidarity and neither were mentioned prominently when looking through archival sources or
through interviews with community organization leaders.
The Effect of the Vulnerable Victim Group

The high demonstrations of solidarity that occurred after Pulse seem to have been directly
impacted by the presence of the vulnerable victim group and the effects that victim group had on
demonstrations are undeniable. For example, following a 2017 shooting in Las Vegas which
resulted in 58 deaths and 851 injuries just over 31 million dollars was raised, while the
OneOrlando Fund raised just below 30 million dollars with 49 deaths and 53 injuries (TorresCortez 2018; Blake 2018). Many of the same factors discussed impacted the response to the Las
Vegas event. However, the victims were at a county music concert, a group of victims not likely
to be considered especially traditionally or socially vulnerable.
The presence of the vulnerable victim group increased demonstrations of solidarity
mainly through the increased media coverage that followed the event (which informed people of
the vulnerable nature of the victims) and through community level LGBT organizations (which
facilitated demonstrations from the general public).
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Figure 13 below shows Google search trends for Pulse, Orlando Nightclub Shooting
Victims, LGBT and Best LGBT Charity from June 2015 to June 2019. Pulse and Orlando
Nightclub Shooting Victims have obvious peaks when the event occurred and small increases
over the next three years. LGBT has a consistent search pattern with a noticeable increase on the
date of the attack. Best LGBT Charity is flat with moments of sharp peaks, one of these being
around June 12, 2016 when the attack occurred. The purpose of this figure is to show how people
searching for information regarding the incident identified the victim type and searched for
related charitable causes. In Pulse and Orlando Nightclub Shooting Victims search records there
is an increase when the Las Vegas mass shooting occurred on October 1, 2017. Searches of each
of these topics increases again at the anniversary of the event, however, those increases are
smaller as more time passes.
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PULSE

June 12-18, 2016

Las Vegas Shooting

Orlando Nightclub
Shooting Victims

1st Anniversary
of Event

LGBT

2nd Anniversary
of Event

3rd Anniversary
of Event

Best LGBT Charity

Figure 13: Case #1 Related Search Results
Source: Google Trends
https://trends.google.com/trends/?geo=US

Though the attacker scouted other possible locations for his attack, his wife later stated
that he showed the Pulse website to her several days before the attack and stated that “this is my
target” (Ortiz 2018). Though it appears that Pulse was targeted for being an LGBT
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establishment, without a media narrative that included the vulnerable nature of the victims the
level of demonstrations of solidarity would likely not have been as high.82 However, other
factors such as the terrorist nature of the event and casualty number would have brought media
attention themselves. President Obama’s statement on Pulse and any other media that reflected
the victims as being a part of the LGBT community was helpful as it reinforced the narrative that
this was an attack on the LGBT community. The public then responded with increased
demonstrations of solidarity due to the fact that LGBT people are perceived as a vulnerable
group and that sympathy compelled people to demonstrate solidarity with the victims. A unique
feature of the LGBT community is that LGBT individuals exist in every subsection of society
regardless of race, ethnicity, gender or age which makes them easier to identify and sympathize
with across not only Central Florida, but also the remaining U.S. and the world. Previous
arguments have blamed the heteronormative nature of media coverage as a reason the LGBT
victims weren’t featured more and claimed that the media was more fixated on gun control and
the political response to the Pulse event (Hancock and Haldeman 2017). Though other narratives
were covered, it is important to recognize that these narratives kept the event in the media cycle
and the inclusion of the nature of the victims, even minimally, reached more people.
Due to the vulnerable nature of the victims, community level organizations originating
from that vulnerable community mobilized and played a major role in organizing and
participating in demonstrations of solidarity. LGBT organizations continue to demonstrate
solidarity with the victims and, without a specifically vulnerable victim group, the organizing
and solicitation processes involved in demonstrating solidarity would have remained in
82

An official I spoke with claimed that the original media narrative following Pulse was not accurate and did not
specify that the majority of the victims were LGBT or Hispanic but the narrative was soon corrected.
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traditional channels (government and non-profit groups). The LGBT organizations that existed
prior to Pulse were heavily involved in the acts of solidarity that occurred following Pulse; the
groups that formed due to Pulse continue to be involved in not only LGBT activities but general
community activities. For example, as The Center was founded in response to the Stonewall riots
in 1969 to provide a safe space for gay men, QLatinX was founded in response to Pulse in order
to provide services for the LGBT individuals specifically within the Hispanic community. The
formation of these new groups as a result of a perceived need is a phenomenon that occurs
following a traumatic event within a community.
The Effect of the Institutions

The strong institutional response to this mass casualty event is supportive of hypothesis 4.
Demonstrations of solidarity after this event benefited from strong institutions in three ways.
First, the role government institutions undertook following the event and the leadership projected
by the City of Orlando and Orange County. Government institutions effectively responded to the
event and then collaborated with other institutions from very early on. For example, the FAC and
FRC were both staffed with the assistance of numerous agencies including other local
government institutions (Orange County Health Services, District Nine Medical Examiner’s
Office, Victims Service Center of Central Florida etc.) and state government institutions (Florida
Department of Law Enforcement, Florida Department of Health). Non-profit institutions like the
Red Cross also assisted at the FAC and FRC. Local government leadership relayed a strong and
consistent message following the attack which set the stage for demonstrations of solidarity to
occur untethered by bureaucratic red-tape. Elected officials in Central Florida consistently
solicited funds which people within the community became aware of through media coverage.
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That leadership was often front and center in the aftermath of Pulse and they expressed a
willingness to work with community level institutions (non-profit & specific/LGBT) to show
solidarity with the victims and their families. Florida Governor Rick Scott also seemed to
respond strongly and promised stronger protections of LGBT people throughout Florida, though
that promise was not acted on (Smith 2018). Governor Scott later declared June 12th as “Pulse
Remembrance Day” (Wine 2018). The strong governmental institutional leadership response to
this mass casualty event and resulting high levels of demonstrations of solidarity is supportive of
hypothesis 4a.
Second, non-profit institutions in the greater Central Florida area played a part as well.
OneBlood accepted blood product donations with the purpose of providing the best services
possible, regardless of the victim type or not. Numerous other organizations such as the
RedCross, GoodWill and other general community level institutions responded and provided
opportunities for the general public to demonstrate solidarity if they chose to do so. Many of the
victims were treated at ORMC and Florida Hospital and neither hospital chose to charge the
victims for the services they provided (Domonske 2016). Business institutions in the Orlando
area responded strongly and contributed to the recovery process. Both Disney and Sea World
released statements condemning the attack and supporting the victims (Farber 2016). Prominent
business institutions donated strongly to the OneOrlando fund. Individual institutional
representatives demonstrated solidarity with victims on their own. For example, Walt Disney
World President George Kalogridis individually donated $25,000 and continues to serve on the
onePulse Foundation Executive Council (onePulse 2019). Other prominent individuals in Central
Florida also serve on the onePulse Foundation. Victim type did not impact the response of any of
these groups. Many of these organizations collaborated with the LGBT groups and greatly
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assisted in demonstrations of solidarity that followed (Geary 2017). Other institutions praised the
attack due to the LGBT nature of the victims and did not demonstrate (CBS News 2016; Stack
2019).
Third, the Orlando area had existing LGBT oriented groups that were able to immediately
respond to the event. These existing specific institutions became the focal point for many within
the community and they allowed for people to demonstrate solidarity easier as they were willing
to work with non-LGBT individuals. These specific institutions were already well known within
the community and they organized and participated in numerous demonstrations following the
event. Fourth, new institutions that were created following the attack are in their own way a
demonstration of solidarity. These new groups were formed for a specific purpose and they
continue to memorialize the event, accept donations, and assist survivors of the event. The strong
specific institutional response to this mass casualty event and resulting strong demonstrations of
solidarity is supportive of hypothesis 4b.
Other Effects Upon Demonstrations of Solidarity

The final factor to consider when examining the response to the Pulse event is Orlando’s
economy. Orlando is one of the most popular tourist destinations in the world and has a higher
gross domestic product per capita as compared to the rest of the state and nation. Prosperous
economies have successful businesses who become involved in community causes, such as the
response to a mass casualty event. For example, six of the OneOrlando Fund board members
represented successful businesses in the Orlando area.
Many tourists were probably unaware of Pulse before the incident; however, they had a
positive association with the Orlando area due to tourism, entertainment or hospitality which
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may have led to a positive association with the area. Once these people became aware of the
Pulse shooting, they would demonstrate solidarity with the victims due to that positive
association. However, concerns over the Pulse incident, along with the Zika virus and hurricanes,
are cited as difficulties for the tourism industry in 2016 (Pedicini 2017). The successful economy
in Orlando also made it easier for individuals to demonstrate their solidarity as people had more
disposable income (Bracha and Vesterlund 2017).
All these factors impacted the community response to the Pulse event in some way but
the role the victim group and institutions had in positively affecting demonstrations of solidarity
is undeniable. Though demonstrations of solidarity following a mass casualty event can be strong
without a vulnerable victim group, a vulnerable victim group can enhance demonstrations. A
crucial aspect in examining this effect is whether or not a group is considered vulnerable. People
that are considered traditionally vulnerable (ex. children, elderly etc), and socially
disenfranchised or discriminated against groups are likely to be considered vulnerable by society,
thus increasing demonstrations of solidarity if they represent the majority of victims of a mass
casualty event. For strong demonstrations of solidarity to occur when a vulnerable victim group
has been targeted there are two things that must take place. First, the media must characterize the
victims and provide information on the victim group. Second, existing specific institutions must
participate and organize demonstrations that are open to the general public, not just the
vulnerable victim group. A mass casualty event that strikes an area with strong institutions would
be likely to have high levels of demonstrations of solidarity. Additionally, a strong government
leadership response and specific institution response would lead to high levels of demonstrations.
Strong institutions consistently solicit for demonstrations, have strong collaborations across the
community and provide methods for anyone who wants to demonstrate solidarity. Findings
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similar to these would be likely whenever a mass casualty event strikes a socially vulnerable
victim group as the same causal factors would come into play.
San Bernardino, California

Around 8AM on December 2, 2015 approximately 80 employees from the San
Bernardino County Environmental Health Department were meeting at the Inland Regional
Center for a training seminar. An employee of the department, Syed Rizwan Farook, was present
for the majority of the training until around 10:30AM when he got up and left. Coworkers noted
that Farook had left his bag on the table so they thought he would be back to retrieve it. Just
before 11AM the group took an unscheduled break due to technical issues. Without notice a door
opened and an individual dressed in black tactical gear and a mask covering his face stepped
inside and opened fire. Workers sprinted for an exit door while others attempted to take cover
under tables. A second shooter, also dressed in black tactical gear, entered behind the first and
began shooting as well. Between two and three minutes after they first entered, they fled to a
black SUV they had waiting outside.
During the initial investigation, a San Bernardino Police Department (SBPD) officer was
interviewing a county employee who advised that they seemed to recognize the shooter based on
his body language and composition and provided the name Rizwan Farook to authorities.
Farook’s name and the tag of a suspicious rental black SUV was provided to an SBPD narcotics
team and analysts got to work. An analyst found an address in nearby Redlands that the narcotics
team went to. As they did, they saw the SUV leaving back towards San Bernardino and they
began surveillance in unmarked police vehicles. As Redlands officers converged on the area the
occupants of the vehicle began shooting at the officers. Soon after, the vehicle came to a full stop
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and both occupants began shooting at the officers with AR-15 style rifles. Farook was killed after
being shot multiple times as he tried to flank officers. The other occupant of the vehicle, later
identified as his wife, Tafsheen Malik, was killed after a barrage of gunfire struck her and the
vehicle.
14 people were dead and 26 more were wounded. 13 of those killed were employees of
San Bernardino County. At the time, this shooting was the highest casualty terrorist attack in the
United States since September 11. Though many of the victims shared an occupation, they came
from a diverse range of backgrounds and they ranged in age from 26 to 60 (Karimi 2015).
Area Descriptors

The Inland Regional Center is located in the southern portion of the city of San
Bernardino in San Bernardino County, California. In 2015, the city of San Bernardino had
approximately 216,000 people and San Bernardino County had an additional 2 million people.
Economically, San Bernardino had been through tumultuous times. The San Bernardino
economy is tied to transportation; the economic agency devoted to San Bernardino county boasts
of connectivity to the rest of the Southern California markets via three railroads, three airports
and three major interstates (San Bernardino County Economic Development Agency 2019).
Economic growth in the area is also sensitive to the wider technology markets. The three most
common industries in the county are retail/trade, healthcare/social and
manufacturing/transportation (San Bernardino County Economic Development Agency 2019).
Amazon and General Electric have a limited presence in the area. In June 2009, the city’s
economic development agency undertook plans to revitalize the downtown areas into a hub of
culture and art.
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Poverty rates and unemployment were higher in San Bernardino than the state and nation.
GDP per capita and median household income in San Bernardino are significantly lower than the
rest of the state and nation (U.S. Census Bureau). Table 13 shows how both San Bernardino
County and California are much more racially diverse than the rest of the United States (U.S.
Census Bureau). Educational attainment is significantly lower than the rest of the state and
nation and crime rates are significantly higher.
In 2012, the city filed for Chapter 9 bankruptcy after it was facing a $45 million-dollar
budget shortfall (Esquivel 2017). After the bankruptcy filing, the city outsourced many of its
services and cut staff. Violent crime increased in the city within that time which was attributed to
an understaffed police department (Esquivel 2017). Poverty also rose to nearly 33% in this time,
again attributed to a lack of public services. This case became the second largest city bankruptcy
case ever. In June of 2017, a plan was approved for San Bernardino to emerge from bankruptcy.

Table 11: Case #2 Descriptors
2015
San Bernardino County California
Population
2,128,133
39,144,818
White Only
62.2%
61.8%
Poverty
19.0%
15.3%
Unemployment
6.4%
6.2%
Educational Attainment
19.0%
31.4%
Gross Domestic Product per Capita
$35,108
$53,855
Median Household Income
$53,803
$64,500
Violent Crime (per 100,000)
920.0
426.3
Property Crime (per 100,000)
5,527.0
2,618.0
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U.S.
321,418,821
73.6%
14.7%
5.3%
29.8%
$48,538
$55,775
372.6
2,487.0

Casualties
The majority of violent mass casualty events result in a lesser amount dead than 14.83 At
the time, 14 dead as a result of a violent mass casualty event was the highest since the September
11th attacks. The average number of casualties for a violent mass casualty event between 2000
and this event is 11.4. Therefore, this event’s casualty number is coded as high because it is
higher than the average.
Violence Against Non-Vulnerable Victims

Thirteen of the fourteen victims were county employees and ten of those were
environmental health specialists (Karimi 2015; OHS 2015). Most of the victims were known to
Farook and worked closely with him.
Certain occupations can be viewed as vulnerable or sympathetic. County government
employees such as these are not coded as vulnerable. Occupations are not listed in the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 as a protected class alongside traditionally accepted vulnerable groups such
as race, color, religion, sex or national origin (Civil Rights Act of 1964). Occupation is also not a
protected class in other definitions of discrimination that cover ethnicity, handicaps, sexual
orientation or identity. Public services jobs, such as police and fire, do carry increased penalties
for crimes committed upon them in the performance of their duties. While inclusion in
definitions does not definitively decide whether a group is vulnerable or not, it is a good example
of how vulnerable groups are perceived and protected within the United States.
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Of the 129 mass casualty events that occurred prior to this one, the mean number of casualties is 52.03.
Excluding the outliers of the 9/11 terrorist attack and Hurricane Katrina, the mean number of casualties drops to
19.89. There were 49 violent events within the database prior to this event with a mean number of 11.4 casualties.
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County government employees were not perceived as vulnerable in this case for two
reasons. First, it became known quickly that Farook worked with the victims so it did not appear
that they were specifically targeted because they were government employees. While most of the
victims of this attack were county government employees, the victims do not appear to have been
selected as part of a political statement about the county government, but out of convenience as
the perpetrators of this attack knew there would be a large group of people in an easily attackable
place. As part of the FBI’s investigation, evidence was uncovered showing that both suspects
discussed elements of radical Islam which included jihad and martyrdom (Mozingo 2016). After
the attack was over, the Islamic State and Levant (ISIL) claimed that both suspects were
“soldiers of the caliphate” (Callimachi 2015). As both attackers were inspired by Islamic
extremism, it appears indiscriminate mass murder was the objective regardless of who the
victims were.
Second, county government employees were not perceived as vulnerable because they do
not have a documented history of marginalization and victimization seen in other socially
vulnerable groups. Without that documented history of injustices against the victim group,
sympathy with the victims was not high. In order to clarify on the vulnerability (or not) of
government employees it is important to understand under what circumstances they are
specifically targeted and what the usual reactions are when a mass casualty event strikes a group
of government employees. The targeting of government employees adds a political dimension to
an act of violence, often leading it to be classified as an act of terrorism. For example, the
bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah building in Oklahoma City in 1995 which killed 168 people
was designed to kill federal employees. The perpetrators, Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols
both expressed that their motive was perceived federal government overreach, which resulted in
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them targeting that building, the home of fourteen federal agencies (Lewis 2000). McVeigh even
went so far as to try and minimize non-governmental casualties (Michel and Herbeck 2001).
Demonstrations of solidarity occurred after the Oklahoma City Bombing, however, the
aforementioned theory suggests that they were mainly the result of the high casualty count and
the fact that it was due to terrorism, as the victim group was not seen as especially vulnerable.
The main difference between the Oklahoma City Bombing victims and this incident is the
fact that the majority of the victims in Oklahoma City were purposefully selected to be Federal
government employees. From 2002 to 2011 almost 96% of violence against government
employees was against state, municipal or county employees (Harrell 2013). Excluding law
enforcement and security related professions, government employees still face violence at a
higher rate than private sector employees (8.7 per 1000 vs. 4.7 per 1000) (Harrell 2013).
However, government employees were less likely than private sector employees to face a serious
violent crime and were less likely to face someone with a weapon during a violent act (Harrell
2013). The victimization of government employees (and media coverage) does not reach levels
to induce a sympathetic reflex amongst common citizens.
In conclusion, it is apparent that the victim group of the San Bernardino terrorist attack is
not perceived to be vulnerable. As is the case with many local government offices, the
employees of the San Bernardino County Environmental Health Department were a diverse
group. Though government employees do appear to be targeted more than others, they are not
viewed as a vulnerable group as they do not have a history of persecution or marginalization as
seen in other groups based on age, race, ethnicity, sexual orientation etc. While any loss of life is
tragic, the demonstrations of solidarity that would follow an incident where a non-vulnerable
group is targeted, such as this one, would not be as strong as when a vulnerable group is targeted.
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Institutions

The City of San Bernardino uses a council-manager type government. The mayor is a
ceremonial position and bureaucratic influence is spread amongst a city council. R. Carey Davis
was the mayor of San Bernardino in 2015. He is a certified public accountant by trade and was
elected in the wake of the city filing for bankruptcy. His statement in response to the shooting
was mainly symbolic and did not mention demonstrations of solidarity of any kind (Davis 2015).
Responses from leaders of government institutions in the San Bernardino area are sparse
following the attack. Prominent institutions in the area include California State University San
Bernardino and numerous non-profit institutions like the Feeding America Food Bank.
Additionally, the San Manuel Band of Mission Indians and the Morongo Band of Mission
Indians operate casinos in the area and are active in the community. Religious institutions
include the Ecclesia Christian Fellowship and several prominent mosques and Muslim
institutions. Businesses like Altura Credit Union are active in the community and Amazon and
General Electric have a limited presence in the area. LifeStream provides blood products for
much of the Inland Empire area. Other nationwide non-profit institutions responded to the
incident such as the Salvation Army, who responded quickly and began providing relief services
in the family reunification area (Fowler 2015).
The victims in this case were members of workers unions that represented them. In 2015,
union membership in California was the fourth highest in the U.S. (BLS 2015). Institutionalism
is high within unionized workers and groups like the AFL-CIO and Teamsters were heavily
involved with the victims of this event. These groups provide actual representation and services
to their members. The victims in this event were both local government workers and members of
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the San Bernardino community. As such, they received the benefits of a wide institutional
response.
Media Coverage

On December 3, 2015 President Obama released a statement offering sympathies with the
victims while also conveying a message of uncertainty regarding whether the event was
terrorism or not (Obama 2015). President Obama’s messages regarding the event consistently
emphasized that the investigation was ongoing but he did ask Congress to prevent people on “no
fly lists” from purchasing firearms (Obama 2015). The president’s message did not include that
the victims were employees of the local government.
The local San Bernardino newspaper The Sun had posted its first story regarding the
shooting on its website by 2:31PM on December 2nd (The Sun 2015). The first story included that
a training session for county employees was ongoing at the Inland Regional Center at the time of
the attack. The article also cited an anonymous San Bernardino County official who stated that
the Department of Public Health was using the facility. Subsequent news coverage of the San
Bernardino attack was highly focused on the terrorism aspect, casualty count and the identities of
the suspects. The fact that victims were primarily local government employees is included in
most of the media regarding this attack. New York Times coverage of the attack includes the
casualty number and terrorism aspect of the event (Nagourney, Lovett and Perez-Pena 2015).
The fact that the majority of the victims were county government employees is only sparingly
mentioned within the New York Times coverage of the event. The Wall Street Journal coverage
includes the casualty number and terrorism aspect. However, Wall Street Journal coverage
includes that the victims were county government employees much more frequently than the
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New York Times (Audi, Barrett and Carlton 2015; Carlton, Barrett and Bustillo 2015; Elinson
and Frosch 2015).
The coverage of this attack has been criticized as “hysterical” and “frantic” by observers.
The media quickly labelled the event as terrorism related and released several pieces of incorrect
information before the last shootout (Carr 2015). Media outlets then gained access to the
shooter’s private residence and many broadcasted from inside the townhouse, raising concerns
over crime scene contamination and releases of private information (Al-Jazeera 2015).
Two notable developments took place that kept the San Bernardino shooting in the
media. The first is the successful prosecution of one of the attacker’s neighbors, Enrique
Marquez Jr. He pled guilty to conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists and making
false statements to obtain firearms as he purchased and provided both rifles used by the attackers
in addition to initially planning the attacks with Farook (Rokos 2017). The second was the legal
battle over gaining access to Farook’s county issued Iphone. The FBI believed more information
regarding the attack within the phone but were initially unable to gain access to it. The federal
courts became involved and ordered Apple to provide access, which they refused. The FBI later
gained access to it independently from Apple (Tanfani 2018).
Dependent Variable: San Bernardino Strong

San Bernardino emergency services initially staged victims and witnesses at the San
Bernardino Golf Course.84 The more than 400 witnesses were then moved to the Rock Church
and World Outreach Center so they could be interviewed (Braziel et al. 2015). They were then
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Author’s interview with an official from the county of San Bernardino on June 21, 2019. The emergency
operations setup utilized was through the California Office of Emergency Services.
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transported to the Ruby C. Hernandez Community Center where they could be reunited with
families (Braziel etl a. 2015). The San Bernardino County Coroner set up a family assistance
center at a nearby hotel for the families of the deceased where they could receive information
and behavioral health assistance (Braziel et al. 2015). Local religious organizations self-deployed
to the Rock Church and the Hernandez Community Center to try and help victims (Braziel et al.
2015).
The developing nature of the incident caused San Bernardino County Sheriff’s
Department and San Bernardino Police Department’s public affairs units to work together
(Braziel et al. 2015). At 11:51AM the San Bernardino County Sheriff’s Office Twitter account
warned of an active shooter in the area of Orange Show Road and Waterman Avenue and asked
people to avoid the area (sbcountysheriff 2015). San Bernardino Police Department Chief Jarrod
Burguan also utilized his personal twitter account to post updates on what was occurring
throughout the day (Burguan 2015). Chief Burguan’s frequent tweeting throughout the day is
credited for diffusing several rumors regarding the shooting (Braziel et al. 2015).
Local elected officials also converged on the command post.85 Many were looking for
information to share with their constituents while others expected to be included in operational
plans (Braziel et al. 2015). The SBCSD employs a legislative liaison in order to work with
elected officials and this employee was able to provide information to these officials while also
informing them of the necessity of confidentiality regarding operational plans. These elected
officials also asked if the media would like to interview them but the liaison suggested they stay
off camera (Braziel et al. 2015). Soon after the event began unfolding SBCSD set up a telephone
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I attempted to interview several members of both the county and city but did not receive a response to my
inquiries.
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hotline for people to call looking for information about the victims but the department did not
man the phones until later due to the speed at which the event was unfolding (Braziel et al.
2015).
The Inland Regional Center was in very close proximity to many other county level
agencies and many of them were on lockdown when the event began to unfold, which slowed
their responses.86 As the majority of the victims were county employees, many of them were
known throughout the local government which amplified the initial trauma.87 The county CEO,
Greg Devereaux, talked to county department heads twice a day for a month after the attack in
order to try and accommodate the trauma of both the community and the government.88 The San
Bernardino County Behavioral Health Department proactively responded to the area even though
their main location was on lockdown due to the attack.89 Approximately 300 clinicians were
deployed by the Behavioral Health Department within the first 48 hours. They mainly assisted
witnesses but also responded throughout the county in order to minimalize the shock and any retraumatization that would happen. The CEO requested that the fallen government employees
were treated similarly to whenever another public service member were killed in that a personal
liaison was designated for each family of the deceased.90 The San Bernardino Behavioral Health
Department provided crisis intervention services related to this event for approximately 2.5 years
after the event. The department stayed with survivors through multiple re-enactments the FBI put
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Author’s interview with an official from the county of San Bernardino on June 21, 2019.
Author’s interview with an official from the county of San Bernardino on June 21, 2019. That official claimed that
the shock of knowing many of the victims made the initial response that much more difficult.
88
Author’s interview with an official from the county of San Bernardino on June 21, 2019.
89
Author’s interview with an official from the San Bernardino County Behavioral Health Department on June 21,
2019.
90
Author’s interview with an official from San Bernardino County Behavioral Health Department on June 21, 2019.
These liaisons assisted family members with numerous issues such as planning funerals, and occupational issues.
87
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them through.91 In response to the incident, local government institutions have undertaken more
efforts to instill resiliency within the community through education and training.92
Due to the fact that an overwhelming number of victims were health inspectors with San
Bernardino County, California Governor Jerry Brown declared a limited state of emergency
(Reuters 2015). In that state of emergency Governor Brown claimed that the attack left the
county with too few of health inspectors in order to carry out “critical” work so his declaration
allows for the state to send in health inspectors as replacements until the county is able to meet
normal staffing. (Reuters 2015). The county later approved a $1.5 million-dollar agreement with
the California Association of Environmental Health Administrators to provide almost thirty
temporary employees due to the burden put on the county public health and environmental health
divisions (Molina 2016). The city of San Bernardino incurred approximately $1 million dollars
in expenses related to the shooting, mainly through added police officer presence and fire
department deployment following the attack (Esquivel and Winton 2015).
Vigils and Gatherings of Solidarity

The day after the attack, approximately 2,000 residents gathered at the San Manuel
Stadium in downtown San Bernardino and heard Mayor R. Carey Davis speak, praising first
responders and claiming that the attack had “forever impacted our community” (Hecht 2015). On
December 7th there were two vigils that took place, the first was attended by several hundred
people and marked when county employees returned to work (Johnson 2015). The second was
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Author’s interview with an official from the San Bernardino County Behavioral Health Department on June 21,
2019. That official emphasized that they expected the FBI to provide clinicians and trauma experts but they failed
to do so.
92
Author’s interview with an official from the San Bernardino County Behavioral Health Department on June 21,
2019.
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when more than a thousand people gathered at nearby California State University San
Bernardino in order to honor the victims, five of whom were alumni of the school (Johnson
2015; Goldstein 2015). Another vigil was held on January 6th, which nearly five thousand people
attended including a local pastor and former New York Mayor Rudy Giuliani who spoke on
resiliency following a terrorist attack (Healy and Kandel 2016; Robinson and Wall 2016). It does
not appear that any international reactions to the shooting warranted media coverage except for
the Pakistani government offering legal assistance to investigators (Phillip et al. 2015). The San
Bernardino Behavioral Health Department deployed clinicians to vigils and gatherings as they
feared re-traumatization of survivors.93 Multiple vigils and gatherings occurred following this
event, however, many were small in size. Therefore, vigils and gatherings are coded as low for
this event.
Fundraising Efforts

Soon after the shooting happened, San Bernardino Mayor Carey Davis set up a
GoFundMe page dedicated to the victims with a goal of raising $100,000 (Lopez 2016).94 After
42 months of being open $137,123 was raised from 1,232 different donors. GoFundMe and the
Ahmadiyya Muslim Community each donated $10,000 (Lopez 2016). GoFundMe also agreed to
waive their service fees for the fund (Shultz 2015). Mayor David claimed these funds would be
distributed to victims and their families but the exact distribution remains unclear (Lopez 2016).
On December 4, 2015 the San Bernardino County Board of Supervisors and the
Arrowhead United Way established the San Bernardino United Relief Fund in order to provide
93

Author’s interview with an official from the San Bernardino County Behavioral Health Department on June 21,
2019.
94
I attempted to interview a representative from the mayor’s office but a response was never received to my
inquiry.
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an avenue to accept donations that would go to a fund to be given to victims and survivors of the
event.95 Arrowhead United Way leaders were initially cautious about partnering with the local
government due to the bureaucratic nature of government business.96 This fund is composed of
members of the community including the non-profit sector, law enforcement, faith-based,
business, county and labor sectors (Arrowhead United Way 2015). Table 13 below shows San
Bernardino United Relief Fund board members (Arrowhead United Way 2015).
Table 12: San Bernardino United Relief Fund Board
Name
Position
Company
Kara Adams
VP of Marketing
Altura Credit Union
Bill Carnegie
President & CEO
Feeding America Food Bank Riverside/San Bernardino
Ray King
Captain
San Bernardino Police Department
Keith Lee
Boardmember
Arrowhead United Way
Vici Nagel
President & CEO
Academy, Go
Laurie Stalnaker
Secretary/Treasurer
AFL-CIO Central Labor Council
Deidre Rodriguez
General Manager
Teamsters Local 1932
CaSonya Thomas
Director
Behavioral Health, San Bernardino County
Dr. Joshua Beckley
Senior Pastor
Ecclesia Christian Fellowship
Taif Kaissi, MD VP & Executive Director
MiNDS
Steve Kovensky
Deputy Chief
San Bernardino County Sheriff's Department
Patrick Morris
Former Mayor, Judge
City of San Bernardino
Dena Smith
Chief Operating Officer
San Bernardino County
Ken Ramirez
Tribal Secretary
San Manuel Band of Mission Indians
James Siva
Tribal Council Member
Morongo Band of Mission Indians

Within several weeks following the shooting, Ken Feinberg was contacted by San
Bernardino officials. He never personally responded to San Bernardino but advised them on how
they should respond.97 One of the main suggestions of Mr. Feinberg was to get money out
quickly to the victims and to conduct townhall meetings in order for the community to feel as
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Author’s interview with an official from the county of San Bernardino on June 21, 2019. This official also stated
that other donated items, such as children’s toys, were sent to the county and were delineated through the relief
fund to the appropriate areas.
96
Author’s interview with an official from the Arrowhead United Way on April 24, 2019. That official credited that
partnership for streamlining many processes and giving the fund some credibility.
97
Author’s interview with an official from The Law Offices of Ken Feinberg on May 14, 2019. That official stated
that Mr. Feinberg engaged in two to three telephone consultations but he did not feel the need to personally
respond due to the delay and because donations were not as prolific as in other cases.
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involved as possible.98 Initially, The San Bernardino United Relief Fund’s goal was to raise
$700,000. However, by the time the fund closed one year later they raised approximately
$2,461,000 dollars for distribution amongst the 75 claimants (Gazzar 2015; Final Protocol 2016).
Donations came in from all 50 states and numerous other countries and the fund credited the
generosity of “businesses, labor unions, foundations, faith communities, tribal councils and
individuals” for the raising of the money (Final Protocol 2016).99 A local Native American tribe,
the San Manuel Band of Mission Indians donated $350,000 and the Morongo Band of Mission
Indians donated $250,000 to the fund (Yarbrough 2015).100 101 More than 1,000 mostly Muslim
donors donated approximately $200,000 through “Your Cause”, an Islam driven method of
raising money for different causes. (Gazzar 2015).102 Another $100,000 was raised through
another mostly Muslim campaign MiNDS, initiated by a local medical doctor (Gazzar 2015).
Other significant donations came from Wells Fargo ($50,000), the Union Pacific Foundation
($25,000), and Arrowhead Credit Union ($25,000).103
Leaders from the Arrowhead United Way were initially cautious of partnering with local
businesses as they believed it could compromise their tax-exempt status.104 The San Bernardino
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Author’s interview with an official from the Arrowhead United Way on April 24, 2019. That official stated that
they conducted townhall meetings and were generally met with support from the community, however, that
official noted that there were hecklers at the events who believed the United Way would keep any money raised.
99
Author’s interview with an official from the Arrowhead United Way on April 24, 2019. That official was certain
that donations had been received from all 50 states but was unsure on exactly which countries donated.
100
Author’s interview with an official from the Arrowhead United Way on April 24, 2019. Both groups operate
successful casinos in the area. That official stated that both groups are very charitable and often donate to the Red
Cross after natural disasters.
101
I attempted to interview both the San Manuel Band of Mission Indians and the Morongo Band of Mission
Indians but never received a response from my inquiries.
102
Author’s interview with an official from the Arrowhead United Way on April 24, 2019. That official was unsure
as to the exact amount but believed it to be near $200,000.
103
Author’s interview with an official from the Arrowhead United Way on April 24, 2019.
104
Author’s interview with an official from the Arrowhead United Way on April 24, 2019. That official credits local
Congressman Peter Aguilar for providing assistance in dealing with the IRS and maintaining their tax-exempt
status.
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United Relief Fund received assistance from the United Way across the nation along with the
leaders from other areas afflicted by violent mass casualty events.105 The United Way had
previously established relief funds in 2003 and 2007 when fires ravaged the Southern California
area. While the expected amount of money to be raised was surpassed, the unorganized methods
and lesser amount per victim leads to a coding of low.
Blood Supply Reaction

The vast majority of the casualties were transported to Lomalinda Medical Center and
Arrowhead Regional Hospital for emergency medical care.106 The main supplier of blood and
blood products to these medical facilities is LifeStream.107 Once it became apparent that a mass
casualty event had occurred within the community, LifeStream attempted to be proactive in
moving products to the correct locations.108 The Inland Regional Center is less than a mile away
from Life Stream’s main business location so employees were simultaneously trying to ensure
their own safety as the location was locked down due to security concerns (Goldberg 2015). 109
After 9/11, LifeStream evaluated their emergency response plans and consistently revisit logistic
issues such as communication and travel after every major event.110 Immediately following the
attack there was a surge of donors with some waiting almost three hours to donate blood.111 In
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Author’s interview with an official from the Arrowhead United Way on April 24, 2019. That official specifically
noted Newton, Connecticut and Aurora, Colorado as communities they consulted with regarding organizing and
distributing funds to victims and survivors.
106
Author’s interview with an official from LifeStream on April 23, 2019.
107
Author’s interview with an official from LifeStream on April 23, 2019. LifeStream covers over 90 hospitals in 6
Southern California counties.
108
Author’s interview with an official from LifeStream on April 23, 2019.
109
Author’s interview with an official from LifeStream on April 23, 2019. That official stated that a “shelter in
place" order was issued to employees at that main facility.
110
Author’s interview with an official from LifeStream on April 23, 2019. That official stated that they did not
believe tabletop exercises were practical for disaster response and did not believe they have the resources
available to train specifically for disasters.
111
Author’s interview with an official from LifeStream on April 23, 2019.

145

the month following the attack, between ten and eleven thousand units of blood were collected
and distributed, a significant increase.112 Demonstrations of solidarity via blood donation
increased following the attack, leading to a coding of high.
Union Response

The most common feature of the victims was that they were local government employees.
The event occurred while they were working which allowed for local unions to be involved.
Additionally, local AFL-CIO113 and Teamsters representatives were on the San Bernardino
United Relief Fund. The Teamsters represent 11,000 public service workers in the San
Bernardino area including many of the victims (Deniz 2015). $250,000 was raised by Teamsters
across the nation and donated to the victims of the attack through an independent fund (Robb
2015).114 Survivors of the attack were forced to go through workman’s compensation procedures
by the San Bernardino county government. This caused a significant amount of stress for
survivors as many claims got denied.115 The Southern California Public Service Workers-Service
Employees International Union (SEIU 721) was newly formed at the time of the shooting and
did not represent any survivors, though they did become more involved in later
demonstrations.116 Local unions had a good working relationship with the county when the
incident occurred, however, the surge of claims and the bureaucratic nature of the county
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Author’s interview with an official from LifeStream on April 23, 2019. That official stated that there was a
significant increase in donations following the shooting.
113
I attempted to interview a representative from the AFL-CIO but did not receive a response to my inquiry.
114
Author’s interview with an official from the Teamsters Local 1932 on May 9, 2019. Teamsters nationwide raise
money in response to many disasters across the nation.
115
Author’s interview with an official from the Teamsters Local 1932 on May 9, 2019. Many denials stemmed from
a change to workman’s comp laws in 2005 that made “stress” claims harder to prove.
116
Author’s interview with an official from the Teamsters Local 1932 on May 9, 2019. I attempted to interview a
representative from SEIU 721 but did not receive a response to my inquiry.
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governments response strained relations.117 Free counseling and other services were offered to
the county for the survivors but those offers were denied in favor of workman’s compensation
options.118 Medications and surgeries were not approved by the counties workman’s comp, likely
out of fear of costs.119 Amanda Gaspard was shot twice during the incident but a year later her
surgery and other treatments were denied as they were too expensive and they would not be
approved under California’s worker’s compensation guidelines (Ross, Christie and Blake 2016).
The Teamsters provided an example of the Sandy Hook shooting where a school was targeted as
an appropriate response by a local government in dealing with a mass casualty event that
occurred in a workplace.120
Memorialization

A makeshift memorial was set up on the corner of Orange Show Road and Waterman
Avenue near where the shooting took place. People left numerous flowers and other personal
memorialization’s of the victims at this site (Luna 2015). Initially SEIU 721 planned to construct
a permanent memorial to the victims outside of the union office in Riverside that was slated to
being construction in June of 2016 (Molina 2016). However, the nearly $2200,000 was raised for
the memorial was distributed to victims and the plans were scrapped due to ballooning costs
(Shultz 2018). The memorial committee met frequently in 2016 but meetings began to dwindle.
Discontent grew with the simple plaque memorial in the Government Center and it was seen as

117

Author’s interview with an official from the Teamsters Local 1932 on May 9, 2019. That official noted that the
meetings the county held were very bureaucratic and not very helpful.
118
Author’s interview with an official from the Teamsters Local 1932 on May 9, 2019.
119
Author’s interview with an official from the Teamsters Local 1932 on May 9, 2019. That official claimed that the
shooting was considered a single incident and anything over $1 million dollars the county would have had to pay
out of pocket as insurance only covered up until that point.
120
Author’s interview with an official from the Teamsters Local 1932 on May 9, 2019
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not enough to honor those who died (Nelson 2017). According to county Supervisor Josie
Gonzales, a memorial to the attack is planned for downtown San Bernardino (Nelson 2017).121
Upland’s Incredible Edible Community Garden has unveiled six memorial groves dedicated to
the victims and has plans for eight more to represent each of the victims (Whitehead 2018).
By January of 2016 the Inland Regional Center had reopened for business (De Atley
2016). At the first anniversary of the event, a moment of silence was held at the Inland Regional
Center for the victims (Dobuzinskis 2016). A commemoration event drew approximately 2,000
people to an arena in San Bernardino while the survivors and other victims held a private
ceremony to mark the occasion (Dobuzinskis 2016). A large gathering occurred at California
State University San Bernardino where a memorial and peace garden was dedicated to the
memory of the victims (Yarbrough and Hagen 2016). By 2017, the room where the shooting
occurred reopened after a brief ceremony (Emerson 2018). Within the Inland Regional Center
there are two murals commemorating the event (Emerson 2018). Multiple memorialization’s of
the event occurred throughout San Bernardino. However, the lack of a large memorialization
supported by the survivors and local institutions is glaring and leads to a minimal
memorialization coding.
Analysis

In conclusion the data collected through this case study indicates that fewer
demonstrations of solidarity occurred following the San Bernardino shooting as a result of the
lack of perceived vulnerabilities of the victim group and weak institutional presence in the area.

121

I attempted to interview a representative from Supervisor Gonzales’ office but I did not receive a response to
my inquiry.
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These results are supportive of hypothesis 3, hypothesis 4, 4a and 4b. The casualty numbers also
impacted demonstrations, but to a lesser extent. Figure 14 shows how the facts of the San
Bernardino case did not transfer to high demonstrations of solidarity. While a specific group of
people were targeted, it was a target of convenience for the attackers and his (government)
coworkers were not considered a vulnerable group by the general public. Additionally, the
institutions in the area failed to respond strongly which limited the ability for the area to
demonstrate solidarity.
Individual Helping Behaviors
Limited Altruism & Helping
Behaviors, Govt. Workers not
Perceived as Vulnerable

San Bernardino Facts of the Event
•

14 Dead
• 24 Injuries
• Terrorism
• Minimal Property Damage
• Govt. Worker Victims

Media Coverage

Social Capital

Coverage emphasized
Terrorism & Govt.
Workers

Networks & organizations
common

Demonstrations of
Solidarity
•

Low

Institutions
Weak Response from Government,
Business and Unions

Figure 14: Case #2 Mechanism

The Effect of the Casualty Number

Demonstrations of solidarity seem to have been driven by the number of victims and the
type of event as these traits of the event were traumatic enough to attract the media’s attention
and shock the community into responding. At the time this shooting was the highest loss of life
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in a terrorist attack in the U.S. since 9/11, which brought increased media coverage on its own.122
Direct influence of the effects of casualty numbers is evident in increased media coverage which
meticulously documented the event and its aftermath. Additional event related narratives, such as
gun control, political response and related prosecutions, attracted the media and kept this event in
the media cycle. This led to more people learning about the event themselves which would
increase demonstrations of solidarity. The media was drawn to this event, like many other mass
casualty events, due to the violent way in which a significant amount of people lost their lives.
As the number of injured and property damage was relatively low, it appears that neither of these
factors affected demonstrations of solidarity and neither were mentioned prominently when
looking through archival sources or through interviews with community organization leaders.
The Effect of the Victim Group

While San Bernardino and the Inland Empire responded very admirably in the immediate
aftermath of the attack, the demonstrations of solidarity seem to have been hampered by several
different factors, one being the type of victim group. The lack of a vulnerable victim group led
demonstrations of solidarity to take place through general institutions and government
bureaucracy. The unions did not organize demonstrations as they provided actual representation
to many of the victims. Without a vulnerable victim group, media narratives were driven by
terrorism, casualty numbers, gun control discussions and political responses to the shooting. The
media narratives that did include victim type were not framed in a way that convinced onlookers
that the victim group was vulnerable. For example, these narratives did not include any
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Author’s interview with an official from The Law Offices of Ken Feinberg on May 14, 2019. That official credits
how violent an act is and the loss of life as the crucial factors when determining charitable giving following a mass
casualty event.
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discussion on the targeting of government workers or history of marginalization for workers that
might convince people that they were vulnerable.
Figure 15 below shows Google search trends for 2015 San Bernardino Attack, San
Bernardino Shooting Victims, San Bernardino County Environmental Health and San
Bernardino Charities. There are obvious peaks for the first three on the date of the attack,
however, there is only a minimal increase for charities. Searches related to charities shows only a
minimal increase and there are many moments over this five-year span that has higher number of
searches related to San Bernardino charities. There is an increase in the first two searches when
the Orlando shooting occurred in June of 2016. Only a minimal increase is registered at the first
anniversary of the event and no anniversary of the event after the first registers in these results.
These results seem to indicate that there was a rush of interest in the event once it occurred, as is
expected. However, it appears that interest wore off fast and did not transfer over onto searching
or donating to charities. Other searches concerning the victim type (ex. union, specific charities)
did not have enough information to register an increase as shown through these visualizations.
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2015 San Bernardino Attack

November 29December 5, 2015

Orlando
Shooting

1st Anniversary
of Event

San Bernardino Shooting Victims

2nd Anniversary
of Event

San Bernardino County Environmental Health

3rd Anniversary
of Event

San Bernardino Charities

Figure 15: Case #2 Related Search Results
Source: Google Trends
https://trends.google.com/trends/?geo=US

The Effect of the Institutions

The institutional response to this event was hampered from very early on. The county fire
chief leads emergency response in the region, however, it is believed that someone from law
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enforcement would have been more effective.123 Government institutions handled the active
shooting aspect appropriately and the incident commander stated that the “first thought was to
get dignity back to the victims” (Braziel et al. 2015). However, due to the sheer number of
witnesses, it took an extended amount of time for everyone to be interviewed. Once they were
taken back to the reunification center, they were forced to walk through a gauntlet of media that
had gathered (Braziel et al. 2015). Though counselors were available at both facilities, victims
stated that they had difficulty identifying counselors or clergy so no significant services were
provided to the victims (Braziel et al. 2015).
Many survivors have complained that the county has failed to provide appropriate
services to a survivor of such a traumatic incident (Ross, Christie and Blake 2016; Purper 2018).
Government leaders had a very limited response. Mayor Davis spoke on several occasions
regarding the incident and personally started the initial GoFundMe effort that raised just over
137 thousand dollars. Local leaders took an appropriate step in contacting Ken Feinberg
regarding how they should respond but only seemed to selectively follow his guidance. For
example, townhalls were conducted and money was distributed quickly, however, multiple funds
existed and the local government only had custody over one.124 Union officials working with
county officials claimed that those officials often seemed preoccupied and the bureaucratic
nature of the government did not assist in dealing with survivors and their needs or
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Author’s interview with an official from the county of San Bernardino on June 21, 2019. County fire chief leads
emergency response because of how common wildfires are. That official credited the fire departments response
but believed a fire chief in an active violent situation such as this was not as effective as someone from law
enforcement would have been.
124
Author’s interview with an official from The Law Offices of Ken Feinberg on May 14, 2019. Mr. Feinberg strongly
recommends consolidation of funds into one effort that the local government has direct custody over.

153

demonstrations of solidarity.125 Five members of the San Bernardino United Relief fund
represented local government bureaucracies.
Non-profit institutions played a part as well. Blood donations were strong following the
event and other general community level institutions responded and provided opportunities for
the public to demonstrate. Due to the lack of successful businesses in the area, few businessrelated institutions responded. For example, only one board member on the San Bernardino
United Relief Board was from a local business.
Though not considered especially vulnerable, it is important to note that specific
institutions relevant to the victim group did respond. For example, the union response would
likely not have been as strong without the victims being government, union covered workers.
Unions were handicapped in responding to this mass casualty event for three reasons. The first is
that union organizations have existed for many years and were created to protect workers and,
though they have a nationwide reach, they did not seem to have as strong of an identity evident
in traditionally vulnerable victim groups. The second is that unions traditionally negotiate with
different bureaucracies and they may not have the organizational structure to allow for
demonstrations of solidarity as seen by specific institutions related to a vulnerable victim group.
The final reason is that unions covering the targeted victims were busy providing services to
those survivors and the victims’ families and organizing and participating in demonstrations of
solidarity following a mass casualty event may not have been one of their priorities. In
conclusion, the poor institutional response including poor government and specific institutional
response is supportive of hypothesis 4, 4a and 4b.

125

Author’s interview with an official from the Teamsters Local 1932 on May 9, 2019.
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Other Effects Upon Demonstrations of Solidarity

The economy of San Bernardino could have had an impact upon demonstrations of
solidarity that followed this event. In 2015 the city was in the midst of bankruptcy and one could
logically argue that the poor state of the city hampered government led demonstrations. In 2015,
California had the highest rate of poverty of any state in the nation. San Bernardino county had a
near20% poverty rate that likely contributed significantly to the lower demonstrations of
solidarity as people would have had less disposable income (Sepulvado 2016). The economy in
the area is driven by low paying jobs like retail, manufacturing and transportation jobs and the
lower gross domestic product per capita compared to the rest of the state and nation reflect
that.126 There are few prominent businesses in the area and only one local business was
represented on the San Bernardino United Relief Fund. Simply put, demonstrations of solidarity
often cost money, either directly or from having to take time off work. This would also explain
why a costless demonstration, such as donating blood, continued to be high in the area. It is
important to recognize that each community is economically very different and these traits affect
each community differently. For example, these economic factors can also be seen as a reason
the area could be more resilient as coping skills are more common.127 Therefore, the incident
itself could be perceived as less traumatic, causing fewer demonstrations of solidarity.
There were some reactions to this event that are unique to this case or only exist rarely.
For example, two groups contributed to demonstrations of solidarity in the area because they are
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Author’s interview with an official from The Law Offices of Ken Feinberg on May 14, 2019. That official strongly
believed that the economic state of San Bernardino and surrounding areas kept demonstrations of solidarity from
being more prevalent.
127
Author’s interview with an official from the county of San Bernardino on June 21, 2019. This official believes the
recent hardship within the area toughened the people of the area to trauma.
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ingrained in society there. First was the San Manuel and Morongo Band of Mission Indians who
operate successful casinos in the area. Second was the Little League baseball association as San
Bernardino is home to the Western Region offices.128 Another seemingly rare phenomena that
occurred after this event was the seemingly strong demonstrations of solidarity by the identity
group of the attackers. It is unknown why the Muslim community responded so strongly after
this attack and no empirical results exist to explain donation behaviors by the suspects identity
group. The final noteworthy occurrence following this event is that a new institution was created
due to this event after the government failed to respond appropriately in assisting survivors with
care. The survivors have banded together, and with legal assistance, have created social
networks, such as San Bernardino Survivors Speak Out. This Facebook group is dedicated to the
survivors and highlighting the issues they have faced in dealing with the county and their
workman’s compensation (San Bernardino Survivors Speak Out 2019).
These factors affected how the San Bernardino community responded to the event and it
appears that a lack of vulnerable victim group and low institutional response both seem to have
affected the lower numbers of demonstrations of solidarity that occurred. A takeaway from this
case study should be that a targeted victim does not necessarily equate to a vulnerable victim
group. Without the increased media coverage and strong social networks that vulnerable groups
bring, the demonstrations of solidarity that followed seemed to be hampered. Weaker institutions
do not solicit for demonstrations, have active collaborations across the community or readily
provide methods for people to demonstrate solidarity. Findings similar to these are likely
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Author’s interview with an official from the Arrowhead United Way on April 24, 2019.
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whenever a mass casualty event strikes either a non-vulnerable or random group of victims or
areas with low institutionalization.
Conclusion

Results from these case studies are supportive of hypothesis 3 that states when a
vulnerable victim group is targeted, higher demonstrations of solidarity will follow. Additionally,
results are supportive of hypothesis 4, 4a and 4b which state that higher institutionalization,
strong government institutional leadership or a strong specific institution response will lead to
more demonstrations of solidarity. These findings are consistent with previous studies that
indicate that local level capacity and institutions often play important roles in community
recovery following a traumatic event. The presence of the vulnerable victim group and the high
levels of institutionalization in the Pulse case study clearly amplified demonstrations of solidarity
that followed while demonstrations of solidarity that followed the San Bernardino shooting did
not have those benefits. Data regarding the effects of casualty numbers was obtained, however,
casualty numbers do not seem to have the same influences on a community as they do
individuals. With the variety of other factors influencing demonstrations of solidarity, a true
most similar case design would be practically impossible to have.
Throughout these case studies it became apparent that one of the biggest differences in
community response to each of these violent mass casualty events is the presence of specific
LGBT institutions in Orlando that greatly assisted in demonstrating solidarity there. Without a
vulnerable victim group, those LGBT groups likely would not have responded nearly as strong
as if a non-vulnerable group were targeted. LGBT people are a historically and recently
marginalized group so these groups were still very active, ingrained within the community and
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had the means to demonstrate solidarity with the victims on short notice after the Pulse attack
occurred. Within San Bernardino, the closest comparison with these specific LGBT groups
would be the unions. The biggest difference here, and what may explain some of the differences
in response, is that the unions were actively representing the victims in San Bernardino while
LGBT groups did not have a direct responsibility to the Pulse victims. These results are strongly
supportive of hypothesis 4b which states that a strong specific institutional response will lead to
high demonstrations of solidarity.
The level of institutionalization in each case was very different. Orlando had the benefit
of not only specific LGBT related institutional response but also a strong general and
government institution response. The institutionalization in Orlando was not only high but also
very organized which allowed for many demonstrations of solidarity to take place. Mayor Dyer
and local government leaders were actively involved in soliciting for demonstrations of solidarity
or directly involved in them. San Bernardino’s government reacted to the event and set up a fund
for victims but their reaction seemed stymied from the beginning. The strong response from
Orlando area government institution leaders and the poor response from the San Bernardino
leadership is supportive of hypothesis 4a.
The state of the economy in each area could also have influenced demonstrations of
solidarity (See Table 8 & Table 11 for statistics). For example, Orlando/Orange County 2016 has
an unemployment rate that is lower than the rest of the state and nation while San Bernardino
2015 has an unemployment rate that is higher than rest of California and more than a percentage
point higher than the rest of the nation. Poverty in San Bernardino is higher than that in
Orlando/Orange County. Gross domestic product per capita is significantly lower in San
Bernardino than the rest of California and the nation while gross domestic per capita is
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significantly higher in Orlando/Orange County than the rest of Florida and nation. Higher
income has been found to directly affect amount and frequency of giving behaviors and a
comparison of these cases seems to be supportive of those findings (Bracha and Vesterlund
2013). Median household income is only slightly higher in Orlando/Orange County than Florida
but less than the nationwide median household income. In San Bernardino median household
income is significantly less than rest of California but still higher than the rest of the nation. The
economy in Orlando/Orange County is rooted in tourism and hospitality which brings a
significant amount of money into the area and a tax revenue that is used to heighten the quality
of life within the area. Additionally, those large companies that operate in Orlando are active
members of the community and many demonstrated solidarity with the victims. Though the
economy of San Bernardino seems to be improving, it is rooted in manufacturing and
transportation which makes economic growth more difficult. The area has a lack of large
businesses as seen in Orlando which contributed to the lack of demonstrations in San
Bernardino.
Another significant difference is that educational attainment (defined as percentage with
a bachelor’s degree or higher) is significantly higher in Orlando/Orange County than in San
Bernardino. This is consistent with findings that indicate that those with higher education will be
more altruistic and donate more (Yen 2002; Andreoni et al. 2003; Bekkers and Wiepking 2011).
The role of trauma fatigue (aka compassion fatigue), defined as the gradual lessening of
compassion over time due to consistent exposure to traumatic events, is something that was
mentioned when researching these cases.129 Again, an important aspect of trauma fatigue is the
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Trauma fatigue was mentioned by several people I interviewed in both cases.
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role the media plays. A higher number of casualties (either dead or injured) will attract the
media’s attention and that consistent coverage can both advise people of an events occurrence
while simultaneously exhausting and desensitizing them to violence. In 2015, there were 335
“mass shootings” defined as when four or more people were shot or injured (Gun Violence
Archive 2015). Based on this definition, there was another mass shooting in San Bernardino in
March of 2015 and 27 other mass shootings throughout California (Gun Violence Archive 2015).
In 2016 there were 382 mass shootings, 29 of which occurred in Florida. In Orlando there were
two mass shootings in February and another in April (Gun Violence Archive 2016). This data
does not seem to indicate that mass shootings articulated in this way cause any kind of trauma
fatigue. The number of injured alone has been previously found to not be an influencing factor in
donations when compared to fatalities (Evangelidis and Van de Bergh 2013). Two events
occurred that could have caused trauma fatigue for San Bernardino. The first was a mass
shooting/terrorist event in October of 2015 that resulted in the deaths of ten students in
Roseburg, Oregon (Vanderhart, Johnson and Turkewitz 2015). The second was another violent
mass casualty event in Isla Vista, California in May 2014 that resulted in the deaths of 6 people
(Lovett and Nagourney 2014). Frequency of shootings do not seem to cause trauma fatigue, but
the recency of another violent mass casualty event could cause trauma fatigue.
The Google search data used in both case studies indicates the existence of a triggering
effect when a mass casualty event occurs. For example, there are visible increases in Orlando
related searches when the Las Vegas shooting occurred and visible increases in San Bernardino
related searches when the Orlando shooting occurred. While trauma fatigue may have played a
role in demonstrations of solidarity, it is important to recognize that demonstrations may have
increased for each case as well based on previous mass casualty events potential demonstrators
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may have been exposed too. Once a new mass casualty event occurred (Orlando and San
Bernardino in this case), these individuals could have been emotionally triggered by the new
violence they saw and demonstrated solidarity for the new event.
The San Bernardino community responded resiliently and within their means. However,
demonstrations of solidarity were less due to the lack of a vulnerable victim group and a lack of
effective institutions. Casualty numbers do however attract media coverage, as it did in both
cases, which is a definite predictor of demonstrations of solidarity (Eisensee and Stromberg
2007; Brown and Minty 2008; Oosterhof, Heuvelman and Peters 2009). While casualty number
seems to have an impact on demonstrations of solidarity, that variable is much more suited to be
examined at the individual level. In conclusion, the biggest difference in explaining the different
levels of demonstrations of solidarity between these two cases is that one area had a much higher
capacity to deal with a traumatic event. Included in this capacity was the presence of specific
institutions that were able to respond when a vulnerable group was targeted. Current emergency
management policy stresses the importance of local government capacity in dealing with
disasters and these results support those findings, along with hypothesis 3, hypothesis 4, 4a and
4b (Birkland 2009).
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION

This dissertation sought to achieve several goals. The first was to apply current social
behavior theories and concepts like social capital, community resilience and altruism to explain
the behaviors of people following a mass casualty event. Furthermore, it was suggested that these
theories and concepts could be used to explain a community’s behavior following a mass
casualty event, regardless of the source of the event. In operationalizing mass casualty events, a
unique typology was provided that divided mass casualty events into four different categories;
terrorism and criminal (violent) and weather and accidental (non-violent).
The second goal was to test three related hypotheses through the use of a survey
experiment in Chapter 4 while the first, third and fourth hypotheses are also tested using a case
study method in Chapter 5:
•

Hypothesis 1: Higher casualty events increase the likelihood of more
demonstrations of solidarity.

•

Hypothesis 2: Violent events will result in more demonstrations of solidarity than
nonviolent events.
o Hypothesis 2a: Terrorist events will cause more demonstrations of
solidarity than other event types.

•

Hypothesis 3: Events that harm victims who are perceived as vulnerable will
generate more demonstrations of solidarity.

•

Hypothesis 4: Victim communities that have a higher level of institutionalization
will have more demonstrations of solidarity following a mass casualty event.
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o Hypothesis 4a: A strong response from government institution leaders will
lead to more demonstrations of solidarity
o Hypothesis 4b: A strong specific institutional response will lead to more
demonstrations of solidarity.
Experimental results loosely suggest that casualty numbers influence demonstrations of
solidarity while there was a minimal relationship between violent event types and
demonstrations. Additionally, results suggest that victim type influences demonstrations much
more. Altruistic behavior was found to be highly correlative with most of the demonstrations of
solidarity tested while group membership was only found to be selectively correlative and often
in a direction contrary to the proposed theory.
Results from the case studies support hypothesis 3 as the vulnerable victim group of the
Pulse incident played a crucial role in the high demonstrations of solidarity that followed. These
in-depth case studies revealed the vulnerability pathways in which vulnerable victim groups
affect demonstrations of solidarity. Furthermore, these case studies revealed the two crucial
factors that explain the manner in which vulnerable victim groups affect demonstrations of
solidarity. First is the role the media plays in covering such events. A media narrative that is
inclusive of the victim type is likely to greatly affect following demonstrations of solidarity,
supporting the “identifiable victim effect” previously established. Second is the role specific
institutions play when a vulnerable victim group is targeted. The mobilization of these identity
groups aligned with the victim typology is crucial for an amplified response whenever a
vulnerable victim group is targeted. These groups often have an existing base of donors and
volunteers that is conducive to demonstrating solidarity in a timely manner and they provide an
avenue for common citizens uninvolved with the vulnerable victim group to demonstrate.
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Hypothesis 4, 4a and 4b is supported through the case studies as well. Institutions played
an important role in the demonstrations of solidarity that followed the Pulse attack in Orlando
and institutional support was lacking following the San Bernardino shooting. Government
institutional leadership is important because they have a traditional authority in the community
and they can solicit for demonstrations of solidarity. Specific institutions are important because
they often represent the diverse nature of many communities. Additionally, prominent businesses
and non-profit organizations within a community have the capital and ability to organize and
participate in large scale demonstrations of solidarity. While some of these results are more
supportive than others, there are both theoretical and policy contributions that can be drawn from
them.
Theoretical Contributions

Though the sample utilized in the survey experiment was restricted to students, the results
suggest that the structure of the experiments are correct and more experiments testing similar
hypotheses is needed. In testing an argument reliant on the amount of loss of life in mass
casualty events, it would be appropriate to provide respondents with more selections covering a
much larger range of loss. Results from this experiment in testing hypothesis one suggests that
higher casualty numbers do have a positive effect on demonstrations of solidarity but it failed to
reach significant levels in these experiments. Would a more serious event (ex. if 50, 100, 200
people killed) signal to the community that more help was needed, causing higher
demonstrations of solidarity? Also, when testing theories related to event type, it appears that
event type is significant under specific circumstances. However, results suggest that weather
events will lead to more demonstrations of solidarity, not violent events. In order to account for
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these changes then different event types need to be examined much more closely. For example,
how common are certain events and do other factors affect demonstrations, such as state of
emergency declarations? Measuring the effects of a mass casualty event through the use of a
survey experiment are inherently difficult as the role of emotion plays an important part in
dictating an individual’s response, and causing an emotional response through the use of a
survey experiment (as opposed to experiencing an event firsthand) is extremely difficult. A
larger and more representative sample (including those who have experienced an event) and
implementing these other changes would likely lead to results more supportive of the hypotheses.
While results for Hypothesis 3 are very supportive it would still be advisable for future
empirical testing with several modifications. Vulnerable groups seem to receive higher
demonstrations of solidarity, however further examination between traditional and socially
vulnerable groups is needed. Different processes seem to be taking place when traditional and
socially vulnerable groups are targeted. The wording of the hypothesis might want to change
from vulnerable to sympathetic as groups may not need to be especially vulnerable in order to
have higher demonstrations of solidarity. For example, arguing that specific groups such as law
enforcement or soldiers are vulnerable in the same manner than traditionally or socially
vulnerable groups is difficult to do. However, these groups are indeed sympathetic and higher
demonstrations of solidarity are likely to follow a mass casualty event where they have been
targeted. The same mechanisms we saw in the case studies would be evident; an increased and
inclusive media coverage and existing networks of social groups based on the identity of the
victim groups.
Throughout the experiments conducted, demonstrations of solidarity were measured in
five different ways; social media response, volunteer time, blood donation, monetary donation
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and event participation. Measurement of demonstrations throughout the case studies were also
similarly aligned but not as restricted. While these demonstrations cover a wide range of
different types of post mass casualty event behaviors, results suggest it would be beneficial to
future researchers to examine each one more closely, particularly psychological motivators
behind each one. What factors motivate someone to donate blood as opposed to donating time or
money? Findings from the case studies indicate that factors such as availability of demonstration
methods and cost are all likely to influence demonstrations. This is most evident in blood
donation behavior. Both Orlando and San Bernardino had strong blood donation reactions and
representative from both organizations interviewed believe it is because of the availability and
low-cost aspect of blood donation.
Experimental results can provide valuable insight into the individual level of decision
making regarding demonstrating solidarity following a mass casualty event and qualitative
results can provide valuable insight into how a community may demonstrate solidarity following
a mass casualty event. A possible future empirical direction in studying this phenomenon is
through the use of a large N quantitative study. The nature of quantitative work is strong in terms
of validity and the larger samples utilized lead to more generalizable results. The main issue with
using a quantitative method to test these theories and concepts is the issue of data availability.
The growing reliance on online donations could potentially lead to an abundance of data in time.
Community level groups that do the majority of demonstrating solidarity often record
inconsistent data regarding those demonstrations. The use of indexes that may not be as closely
related to concepts or events measured also often leads to measurement error (King, Keohane
and Verba 1994). If data issues could be overcome, a systematic analysis of mass casualty events
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using quantitative methods would be able to provide interesting results that would go much
further in providing evidence for the theories offered here.
Another interesting next step in related research would be to examine general community
behavior as opposed to the strict demonstrations of solidarity as examined here. For example,
crime rates were only briefly mentioned in the qualitative chapter of this dissertation. Crime is
something that is existent within every community, but does the insertion of a mass casualty
event affect those crime rates? Previous research has found a positive relationship between social
capital and violent crime (Rosenfeld et al. 2001). Lemieux (2014) found a decline in property
crime following a weather event in Canada. He further theorized that donations increased and
crime decreased closer to the event epicenter. Is a traumatic, shocking event like a mass casualty
event strong enough to affect crime rates within the community they occur in? Theoretically,
lower crime rates should indicate a more stable and resilient community so we would expect a
community with lower crime rates to respond with higher demonstrations of solidarity.
Examining crime and other general community behaviors would help explain if a community
responds resiliently or non-resiliently following a mass casualty event.
Policy Contributions

The Federal Response Plan (FRP) of 1992 was often criticized for its lack of engagement
of state and local governments (Harrald 2012; Kapucu 2009). Historical emergency management
policies did not include the utilization of demonstrations of solidarity that often arise following a
mass casualty event. However, since the terrorist attacks of September 11th, emergency
management throughout the United States has evolved. As policy changed after Hurricane
Katrina and other major events, emergency management has begun to recognize the importance
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of local capacity. The “government-centric approach” has been criticized for not properly
engaging local communities in disaster recovery (FEMA 2011). Newer policies emphasize the
need for collaboration not only across government agencies but also between government
agencies and other community institutions. Local governments have been found to play a key
role in emergency management and they often collaborate with other local institutions to prepare
for and respond to disasters (Kapucu 2012; Waugh 1994). Current emergency management
policy seems to be realizing the importance of local capacity and the findings from this
dissertation further those ideas. However, these policies do not consider the unique factors of
each mass casualty event to tap into the demonstrations of solidarity that could follow. This is
likely due to the fact that these types of events are complex and the major motivators to
demonstrate solidarity are relatively unknown. If these demonstrations were properly utilized, a
great deal of resources could be gathered and put towards the recovery of the community.
Finally, as with any empirical work there is a “why” question. This dissertation and
related research provide several important insights into explaining community response to mass
casualty events that are applicable to policymakers and the real world. First, better understanding
the psychological and organizational behaviors behind demonstrations of solidarity would make
it easier to predict the levels in which demonstrations would occur following an event. Second, if
a community’s response could be predicted then the appropriate resources could be managed
accordingly and a smoother transition back into normalization could take place.
There are several ways in which more supportive and thorough empirical results
regarding demonstrations of solidarity following a mass casualty event could influence policy.
For example, the resilience of small governed areas (like counties or cities) could be measured
preemptively based on different factors. When a mass casualty event impacted that area then
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there would be an idea of how that community would demonstrate solidarity. If it was an area
with low resilience (expected to respond with low demonstrations of solidarity) then more
support could be brought in to help the area become more resilient and demonstrations would
increase. Government institutions could preemptively arrange different agreements and
relationships with other institutions to provide assistance to the community.
Demonstrations of solidarity are an important step in the healing process a community
undergoes following a traumatic event. If assistance could be given to communities to maximize
their demonstrating potential then those communities should return to normalization quicker and
those bonds of solidarity within that community could be strengthened. While these results are
preliminary, they provide important insight into how the facts of a mass casualty event and
community institutionalization could influence demonstrations of solidarity.
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APPENDIX A: DATABASE
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A.1- Database: Accident & Terrorism
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A.2- Database: Crime & Weather
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County
State Month Day Year Type
Method
Saint Bernard
LA
08
31 2005 Weather Hurricane
Harris
TX
09
23 2005 Weather Hurricane
Walker
TX
09
23 2005 Weather Hurricane
Hancock
MS
08
31 2005 Weather Hurricane
Dallas
TX
09
23 2005 Weather Hurricane
Galveston
TX
09
23 2005 Weather Hurricane
Jackson
MS
08
31 2005 Weather Hurricane
Harrisson
MS
08
31 2005 Weather Hurricane
Orleans
LA
08
31 2005 Weather Hurricane
Pearl River
MS
08
31 2005 Weather Hurricane
Jefferson
TX
09
23 2005 Weather Hurricane
Forrest
MS
08
31 2005 Weather Hurricane
Vanderburgh
IN
11
6 2005 Weather Tornado
Jones
MS
08
31 2005 Weather Hurricane
Macon
TN
02
6 2008 Weather Tornado
Harris
TX
09
7 2008 Weather Hurricane
Sumner
TN
02
6 2008 Weather Tornado
Galveston
TX
09
7 2008 Weather Hurricane
Pike
AR
06
10 2010 Weather Flood
Davidson
TN
05
2 2010 Weather Flood
Hale
AL
04
27 2011 Weather Tornado
Catoosa
GA
04
29 2011 Weather Tornado
Faulkner
AR
04
25 2011 Weather Tornado
Dekalb
AL
04
27 2011 Weather Tornado
Newton
MO
05
22 2011 Weather Tornado
Jasper
MO
05
22 2011 Weather Tornado
Monroe
MS
04
27 2011 Weather Tornado
Tuscaloosa
AL
04
27 2011 Weather Tornado
Bertie
NC
04
18 2011 Weather Tornado
Marion
AL
04
27 2011 Weather Tornado
Yavapai
AZ
06
30 2013 Weather Wildfire
Clear Creek/Summit CO
04
20 2013 Weather Avalanche
Canadian
OK
05
31 2013 Weather Tornado
Cleveland
OK
05
21 2013 Weather Tornado
Snohomish
WA
03
22 2014 Weather Mudslide
Jefferson
LA
08
31 2005 Weather Hurricane
Coffee
TN
10
3 2001 Crime
Knife
Montgomery
MD
10
3 2002 Crime
Shooting
Washburn
WI
11
21 2004 Crime
Shooting
Waukesha
WI
03
12 2005 Crime
Shooting
Beltrami
MN
03
21 2005 Crime
Shooting
King
WA
03
25 2006 Crime
Shooting
Lancaster
PA
10
2 2006 Crime
Shooting
Forest
WI
10
7 2007 Crime
Shooting
Salt Lake
UT
02
13 2007 Crime
Shooting
King
WA
12
24 2007 Crime
Shooting
Douglas
NE
12
5 2007 Crime
Shooting
Montgomery
VA
04
16 2007 Crime
Shooting
Los Angeles
CA
12
24 2008 Crime
Arson/Shooting
Dekalb
IL
02
14 2008 Crime
Shooting
St. Louis
MO
02
7 2008 Crime
Shooting
Skagit
WA
09
2 2008 Crime
Shooting
Henderson
KY
06
25 2008 Crime
Shooting
Pierce
WA
11
29 2009 Crime
Shooting
Broome
NY
04
3 2009 Crime
Shooting
Moore
NC
03
23 2009 Crime
Shooting
Coffee
AL
03
10 2009 Crime
Shooting
Geneva
AL
03
10 2009 Crime
Shooting
Hartford
CT
08
3 2010 Crime
Shooting
Orange
CA
10
12 2011 Crime
Shooting
Carson City
NV
09
6 2011 Crime
Shooting
Summit
OH
08
7 2011 Crime
Shooting
Kent
MI
07
7 2011 Crime
Shooting
Pima
AZ
01
8 2011 Crime
Shooting
Arapahoe
CO
07
20 2012 Crime
Shooting
Fairfield
CT
12
14 2012 Crime
Shooting
Alameda
CA
04
2 2012 Crime
Shooting
King
WA
05
30 2012 Crime
Shooting
Hennepin
MN
09
27 2012 Crime
Shooting
Los Angeles
CA
06
7 2013 Crime
Shooting
Miami-Dade
FL
07
26 2013 Crime
Shooting
D.C.
WA
09
16 2013 Crime
Shooting
Snohomish
WA
10
24 2014 Crime
Shooting
Texas
MO
02
26 2015 Crime
Shooting
Douglas
OR
10
1 2015 Crime
Shooting
Skagit
WA
09
23 2016 Crime
Shooting
Santa Barbara
CA
05
23 2014 Crime
Shooting
Kalamazoo
MI
02
20 2016 Crime
Shooting

Casualty Population Poverty UnEmpl Education
35
64,951
17.3 .
10.9
35
3,732,000
17.9
5.7
27.3
5
64,330
22.6
5.6 .
50
46,097
15.5
10.8 .
23
2,317,000
34.9
5.7
27.1
36
274,494
13.3
5.7
26.1
12
134,474
15.4
9.9
17.1
126
195,843
16.1
10.8
19.4
1,464
455,188
25.5 .
31.3
17
51,764
22.5
9.2 .
6
246,063
19.7
7.8
19.6
7
75,726
27.7
6.2
24.1
25
173,521
13.4
5.2
21.4
12
65,915
25.0
5.7
12.6
13
22,007
20.3
8.3
7.4
9
3,981,000
15.3
4.7
27.6
22
155,704
8.7
6.0
22.6
8
288,489
11.9
5.6
26.4
16
11,236
21.2
9.1
12.4
10
628,131
17.3
8.2
34.5
6
15,364
28.5
13.8
10.0
8
64,873
14.4
8.2
18.2
5
116,308
14.7
7.2
24.8
31
71,387
20.3
11.8
9.9
158
58,823
16.1
8.0
18.1
158
117,853
16.8
7.6
21.4
16
36,544
19.3
12.0
12.6
44
91,568
20.2
8.3
26.7
11
20,971
25.1
12.1
10.8
7
3,685
25.6
11.2
8.2
19
215,271
16.4
7.7
24.3
5
18,932
9.2
5.5
43.8
8
6,679
7.3
4.1
24.5
24
3,230
12.7
4.3
29.8
49
759,417
9.9
5.7
29.1
30
451,652
15.5 .
23.0
7
48,544
12.4
4.4 .
5
906,145
4.3
3.5 .
6
16,458
11.4
6.3 .
7
374,989
3.8
3.8
37.2
10
42,653
19.4
5.3 .
7
1,832,000
9.6
3.7
44.6
5
55,169
9.1
3.5
22.9
7
9,751
16.5
7.1 .
5
1,002,000
9.0
2.5
29.3
6
1,832,000
9.9
3.2
44.0
8
497,292
12.0
3.4
35.6
33
89,284
19.9
3.2
42.4
9
9,779,000
15.3
7.6
28.1
6
106,503
15.6
5.8
8.0
8
992,331
9.0
6.0
38.7
6
118,373
11.4
6.1
24.4
5
45,466
11.8
6.1
16.2
5
796,836
12.3
9.7
23.7
14
194,630
16.3
8.2
26.5
8
87,158
13.3
10.1
32.5
6
48,365
15.7
8.5
22.3
5
4,445
19.4
15.3
9.7
8
895,303
11.3
9.5
34.1
8
3,056,000
13.0
9.1
36.7
5
54,756
14.8
13.2 .
8
541,281
16.5
9.1
28.1
7
608,111
14.7
8.2
31.5
6
2,382
20.4
8.5
29.1
12
596,383
10.4
7.7
38.3
28
935,238
8.9
7.8
46.3
7
1,157,000
13.1
8.7
42.4
6
2,009,000
11.9
7.3
45.9
7
1,185,000
13.1
5.2
46.8
6 10,005,000
19.0
9.8
30.1
7
2,642,000
21.0
7.4
26.8
13
649,165
18.8
8.5
55.1
5
759,417
9.9
5.7
29.1
8
25,690
23.3
6.6
13.0
9
107,685
19.5
7.5
14.9
5
116,901
14.9
7.7
24.4
6
91,169
17.4
6.1
32.0
6
75,984
16.6
4.1
37.9
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MHI
#White SoE SoE Prior
27,367 .
1
30,750 .
1
.
.
1
.
.
1
30,293 .
1
33,944 .
1
28,339 .
1
26,563 .
1
26,926 .
1
.
.
1
26,328 .
1
21,011 .
1
29,680 .
24,253 .
1
22,910 .
33,893 .
1
34,194 .
38,573 .
1
25,079
9,961 32,223
358,845 23,564
6,337
1
31,377
58,828 35,295
91,882 25,927
58,091
1
27,955
50,935 27,401
100,546 27,461
25,012 33,401
124,560
1
23,697
7,381 24,581
28,497
1
26,797
173,253 38,683
15,613 38,046
94,959 36,505
195,743 43,272
537,410
1
30,605 .
1
.
.
.
.
.
.
41,542 .
.
.
42,579 .
32,556 .
.
.
332,372 .
40,509 .
33,744 .
31,996 .
33,229 .
35,749 .
38,918 .
32,740 .
30,207 .
37,652
572,853 31,195
171,538 27,943
66,740 31,484
35,268 22,436
22,036 42,267
598,255 41,734 1,339,135 52,199 .
34,803
433,086 33,385
458,610 31,684
542,627 41,840
364,766 47,110
605,569 45,385
516,893 45,186 1,277,867 41,669
840,845 33,247 2,721,187 28,398
396,762 53,660
217,331 43,272
537,410 23,702
23,503 27,547
95,193 35,450
90,922 34,637
201,923 35,291
202,746 -

SoE Total VicVul
Specifc Victims?
NAIC 813
66
1 poor/black
32
23
.
2,387
23
.
46
44
.
34
23
.
1,964
23
.
243
44
.
130
44
.
194
66
1 poor/black
458
44
.
53
23
.
307
44
.
102
.
.
267
44
.
108
.
.
11
16
.
2,411
.
.
136
16
.
268
.
1 children
11
.
.
992
35
.
8
.
.
59
.
.
106
35
.
67
.
.
59
.
.
153
.
.
48
35
.
235
.
.
56
35
.
31
.
1 firefighters
213
.
.
27
.
.
17
.
.
196
24
.
565
66
1 poor/black
321
.
.
66
.
.
960
.
.
22
.
.
373
.
1 high school students
50
.
.
2,132
.
1 Amish/Female Schoolchildren
661
.
1 Students
4
.
.
523
.
.
1,027
.
.
577
.
.
109
.
.
5,863
.
1 College Students
94
.
1 Government Employees
1,012
.
.
142
.
.
55
.
1 cops
634
.
.
223
.
1 Elderly
110
.
.
67
.
.
25
.
.
975
.
.
1,733
.
1 Troops
45
.
.
610
.
.
747
.
1 Government Employees
646
.
.
282
.
1 school children
935
.
1 students
1,219
.
.
2,210
.
.
1,385
.
.
6,000
.
.
1,763
.
.
3,169
.
1 high school students
565
.
9 .
32
.
1 College Students
4,484
.
.
145
.
1 women
440
.
.
272

per Cap
2,029.7
1,563.5
1,398.5
1,355.8
1,179.7
1,129.6
1,034.4
1,009.5
993.9
976.7
801.5
742.4
649.9
610.3
2,000.6
1,651.2
1,144.9
1,076.5
1,021.5
633.2
1,920.5
1,099.5
1,097.2
1,065.5
997.0
770.3
761.3
389.7
374.5
118.9
1,010.7
701.2
392.9
16.5
1,344.1
1,407.0
735.5
943.9
748.1
1,005.3
853.1
859.3
83.5
2,437.8
1,915.9
1,783.8
861.9
819.1
1,667.9
1,133.0
980.6
833.6
826.7
1,256.8
872.8
792.3
721.9
177.8
918.3
1,763.4
1,216.8
887.3
814.1
3.7
2,114.8
1,000.3
949.1
909.0
855.6
1,667.5
1,498.6
204.8
1,344.1
802.8
24.0
806.2
207.2
279.4

Source
https://www.nola.com/hurricane/index.ssf/20
https://www.weather.gov/hgx/climate_review
https://www.myplainview.com/news/article/
https://www.nola.com/hurricane/index.ssf/20
https://www.google.com/search?q=hurricane
http://www.wpc.ncep.noaa.gov/research/txhu
https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/data/tcr/AL122005
https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/data/tcr/AL122005
https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/data/tcr/AL122005
https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/data/tcr/AL122005
http://www.wpc.ncep.noaa.gov/research/txhu
https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/data/tcr/AL122005
https://www.weather.gov/media/pah/Top10E
https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/data/tcr/AL122005
https://www.newschannel5.com/Global/story
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrh
https://www.spc.noaa.gov/climo/reports/0802
https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/data/tcr/AL092008
https://web.archive.org/web/20100617081151
http://www.tnema.org/news/tema/?p=423
https://www.weather.gov/bmx/event_042720
http://www.timesfreepress.com/news/local/s
https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/deadlyhttp://whnt.com/2016/04/23/dekalb-county-re
https://www.weather.gov/sgf/news_events_2
https://www.weather.gov/sgf/news_events_2
https://www.weather.gov/bmx/event_042720
https://www.weather.gov/bmx/event_042720
https://pilotonline.com/news/local/weather/
https://www.weather.gov/bmx/event_042720
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/natio
https://www.denverpost.com/2013/04/21/col
https://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/all/satellite
https://snohomishcountywa.gov/ArchiveCent
https://www.nola.com/hurricane/index.ssf/20
https://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/04/us/6-k
http://www.cnn.com/2002/US/South/10/03/m
https://www.tcdailyplanet.net/chai-vang-mov
http://www.thejournal.org/issues/issue99/au
http://news.minnesota.publicradio.org/featur
https://www.seattlepi.com/default/article/Ra
https://web.archive.org/web/20061002205912
https://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/08/us/08c
https://web.archive.org/web/20141006080559
https://www.seattlepi.com/local/article/Manhttps://www.reuters.com/article/us-shooting
https://web.archive.org/web/20131015095917
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/27/us/27s
https://web.archive.org/web/20080704030041
https://web.archive.org/web/20080208212628
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/
https://web.archive.org/web/20080628081721
https://web.archive.org/web/20091202064239
https://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=7249853
https://www.wral.com/news/local/story/4837
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/12/us/12a
http://edition.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/03/10/sho
http://www.cnn.com/2010/CRIME/08/03/conn
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2011/
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-shooting
http://blog.cleveland.com/metro/2011/08/sho
https://www.mlive.com/news/grand-rapids/in
http://archive.azcentral.com/news/articles/20
https://www.bellenews.com/2012/07/23/wor
http://www.theoaklandpress.com/general-ne
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2012/
https://abcnews.go.com/US/ian-stawicki-seat
http://www.startribune.com/shooter-busines
http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/06/
https://www.cnn.com/2013/07/27/us/florida-s
https://nypost.com/2013/09/16/dc-cops-fbi-pr
https://web.archive.org/web/20141108071403
https://www.houstonherald.com/news/sherif
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/natio
https://www.cnn.com/2016/09/23/us/washing
https://www.cnn.com/2014/05/26/justice/cali
https://www.mlive.com/news/kalamazoo/ind

APPENDIX B: VIGNETTES & EXPERIMENTAL DOCUMENTS
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B.1- Vignette 1
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Version 1
Imagine that your community was struck by a strong tornado. According to the National Weather
Service winds reached well over 200mph as the tornado tore through the area leaving 2 dead and
many others injured. The community is struggling to heal and many organizations are on scene
to assist and relief efforts are underway.
Version 2
Imagine that your community was struck by a strong tornado. According to the National Weather
Service winds reached well over 200mph as the tornado tore through the area leaving 6 dead and
many others injured. The community is struggling to heal and many organizations are on scene
to assist and relief efforts are underway.
Version 3
Imagine that your community was struck by a strong tornado. According to the National Weather
Service winds reached well over 200mph as the tornado tore through the area leaving 23 dead
and many others injured. The community is struggling to heal and many organizations are on
scene to assist and relief efforts are underway.
Version 4
Imagine that a large car bomb went off in your community killing 2 people and leaving many
others injured. The responsible party was apprehended leaving the area and the incident is
currently being investigated by Federal authorities as an act of terrorism. The community is
struggling to heal and many organizations are on scene to assist and relief efforts are underway.
Version 5
Imagine that a large car bomb went off in your community killing 6 people and leaving many
others injured. The responsible party was apprehended leaving the area and the incident is
currently being investigated by Federal authorities as an act of terrorism. The community is
struggling to heal and many organizations are on scene to assist and relief efforts are underway.
Version 6
Imagine that a large car bomb went off in your community killing 23 people and leaving many
others injured. The responsible party was apprehended leaving the area and the incident is
currently being investigated by Federal authorities an act of terrorism. The community is
struggling to heal and many organizations are on scene to assist and relief efforts are underway.
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B.2- Distractor Question 1
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Question 1: On the next screen you will be asked to rank the first four U.S. presidents in
chronological order
Rank the first four U.S. presidents in chronological order
______ Thomas Jefferson (1)
______ John Adams (2)
______ James Madison (3)
______ George Washington (4)
Question 2: On the next screen you will be asked to rank the last four U.S. presidents with the
most recent first
Rank the last four U.S. presidents with the most recent scored the lowest.
______ William J. Clinton (1)
______ Donald J. Trump (2)
______ George W. Bush (3)
______ Barack H. Obama (4)
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B.3- Vignette 2
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Version 1
Imagine that your community was struck by a strong tornado. According to the National Weather
Service winds reached well over 200mph as the tornado tore through the area. The area is
devastated and the incident is being treated as a mass casualty event due to the number dead. The
community is struggling to heal and many organizations are on scene to assist and relief efforts
are underway.
Version 2
Imagine that a large car bomb went off in your community. The responsible party was
apprehended leaving the area and the incident is being investigated by Federal authorities as an
act of terrorism. The area is devastated and the incident is being treated as a mass casualty event
due to the number dead. The community is struggling to heal and many organizations are on
scene to assist and relief efforts are underway.
Version 3
Imagine that a four-lane bridge lost structural integrity during local rush hour and collapsed
within your community. The area is devastated and the incident is being treated as a mass
casualty event due to the number dead. The community is struggling to heal and many
organizations are on scene to assist and relief efforts are underway.
Version 4
Imagine that a mass murder occurred in your county. An individual shot and killed several
people during an attempted bank robbery which turned into a hostage situation. The responsible
individual was later taken into custody by local law enforcement and charged with the attempted
robbery and numerous murder charges for the deaths he caused. The area is devastated and the
incident is being treated as a mass casualty event due to the number dead. The community is
struggling to heal and many organizations are on scene to assist and relief efforts are underway.
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B.4- Distractor Question 2
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Question 1: On the next screen you will be asked to complete the numerical sequence
What comes next in the numerical sequence:
1 4 9 16 25 __
29 (1)
33 (2)
36 (3)
39 (4)

Question 2: On the next screen you will be asked to complete the numerical sequence
What comes next in the numerical sequence:
-2 5 -4 3 -2 __
0 (1)
1 (2)
2 (3)
3 (4)
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B.5- Vignette 3
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Version 1
Imagine that a mass murder occurred in your county. An individual shot and killed several
people during an attempted bank robbery which turned into a hostage situation. The responsible
individual was later taken into custody by local law enforcement and charged with the attempted
robbery and numerous murder charges for the deaths he caused, mostly school children who
were at the bank for a field trip. The area is devastated and the incident is being treated as a mass
casualty event due to the number dead. The community is struggling to heal and many
organizations are on scene to assist and relief efforts are underway.
Version 2
Imagine that a mass murder occurred in your county. An individual shot and killed several
people during an attempted bank robbery which turned into a hostage situation. The responsible
individual was later taken into custody by local law enforcement and charged with the attempted
robbery and numerous murder charges for the deaths he caused, seemingly random bystanders.
The area is devastated and the incident is being treated as a mass casualty event due to the
number dead. The community is struggling to heal and many organizations are on scene to assist
and relief efforts are underway.
Version 3
Imagine that a four-lane bridge lost structural integrity during local rush hour and collapsed
within your community. Victims are mainly school age children who were on several different
school buses. The area is devastated and the incident is being treated as a mass casualty event
due to the number dead. The community is struggling to heal and many organizations are on
scene to assist and relief efforts are underway.
Version 4
Imagine that a four-lane bridge lost structural integrity during local rush hour and collapsed
within your community. Victims were seemingly random commuters. The area is devastated and
the incident is being treated as a mass casualty event due to the number dead. The community is
struggling to heal and many organizations are on scene to assist and relief efforts are underway.
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B.6- Response Questions
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Question 1: In the week following the event, would any of your social media activity (Facebook,
Twitter, Instagram etc.) be in response to the event? (ex. Posts/hashtags related to event, marking
yourself as “safe,” changing pictures etc.)
Yes (1)
No (2)
Not involved with social media (3)
Question 2: If you had two hours of free time in the week following the event, how much of that
time would you devote to relief efforts? (Out of 120 minutes)
_______ Total Time Spent (1)
Question 3: Would you donate blood in the week following the event?
No (1)
Yes (2)
Question 4: If you had $100 in the week following the event that you were not using for anything
else, how much (if any) would you donate to a charitable or relief effort related to the event?
(Out of 100 dollars)
_______ Total Money Spent (1)
Question 5: Would you attend a large group event immediately following the event meant to
show solidarity with the victims and community? (Ex. candlelight vigil)
Yes (1)
No (2)
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B.7- Demographic/Introductory Questions
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How old are you?
________________________________________________________________

What is your sex?
Male (1)
Female (2)
No Sex (3)
Prefer not to answer (4)

What is the highest level of school you have completed or the highest degree you have received?
Less than High School (1)
High school graduate or equivalent (ex. GED) (2)
Some college (3)
Associates (2 year degree) (4)
Bachelors (4 year degree) (5)
Master's Degree (6)
Doctorate (7)
Professional Degree (MD, JD etc.) (8)

Describe your income (before taxes)
less than $30,000 (1)
$30,000-$39,999 (2)
$40,000-$49,999 (3)

189

$50,000-$59,999 (4)
$60,000-$69,999 (5)
$70,000-$79,999 (6)
$80,000 or more (7)

On the scale below indicate your political leanings

How often do you attend religious services weekly?
None (1)
1 (2)
2-3 (3)
More than 3 (4)

How many social, civic or organizational groups are you a member of? (ex. Alumni associations,
charitable/neighborhood groups, fraternities/sororities etc.)
None (1)
1 (2)
2-3 (3)
More than 3 (4)
Would you go out of your way to do something nice for a stranger?
Very Often (1)
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Often (2)
Occasionally (3)
Not Often (4)
Never (5)

Have you ever experienced an event where a large number of people were killed in a single
incident? (including military service)
No (1)
Experienced firsthand (2)
Knew someone who was a victim and survived (3)
Knew someone who was killed during an event (4)
People often respond to an event or occurrence (such as disasters, assassinations, attacks, strikes,
injustices etc.) in ways that reflect support for the afflicted community. Examples include
something as simple as social media support to participating in charitable events to devoting time
and effort to aid the victims and community.
You will now face the first of three different imaginary scenarios. You will then face a series of
questions regarding your response to the events that take place within your scenario. Some of
your scenarios may seem to be closely related so read carefully and answer truthfully. You are
free to quit at any time.
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B.8- Explanation for Exempt Research
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B.9- Experiment IRB Approval Letter

194

195

B.10- Pearson’s Correlation Table of Descriptive Variables
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Age
Sex
Education
Income
Politics
Religion
Altruism
Prior MCE

Age
1.00
0.0715
0.4963
0.5626
0.0621
0.0562
0.0226
0.2051

Sex

Education Income Politics Religion Altruism PriorMCE

1.00
-0.1222
1.00
-0.0044 0.3375
1.00
-0.1357 0.1273 0.1201
1.00
0.0348 0.0788 0.1495 0.1804
1.00
0.1018 -0.0704 -0.0676 -0.1241 0.0929
-0.0632 0.0088 0.1326 -0.0017 -0.0053
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1.00
0.0859

1.00

B.11- Factor Analysis Matrices
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Experiment 1
Factor

Eigenvalue

Difference

Proportion

Cumulative

Factor1

1.69

0.55

0.33

0.33

Factor2

1.13

0.30

0.23

0.56

Factor3

0.83

0.13

0.16

0.73

Factor4

0.69

0.04

0.14

0.87

Factor5

0.65

-

0.13

1.00

LR test: independent vs. saturated: chi2(10)= 61.01 Prob>chi2=0.00
Variable

Factor1

Factor2

Uniqueness

Social Media

-0.513

0.63

0.33

Time

0.6

0.31

0.53

Blood

0.42

0.57

0.49

Money

0.69

0.28

0.44

Event

-0.63

0.47

0.37

Factor

Variance

Difference

Proportion

Cumulative

Factor1

1.45

0.08

0.29

0.29

Factor2

1.36

-

0.27

0.56

ROTATE

LR test: independent vs. saturated: chi2(10)= 61.01 Prob>chi2=0.00
Variable

Factor1

Factor2

Uniqueness

SocialMedia

0.02

0.81

0.33

Time

0.66

-0.15

0.54

Blood

0.69

0.15

0.49

Money

0.71

-0.23

0.44

Event

-0.17

0.77

0.37

Factor1

Factor2

Factor1

0.75

-0.65

Factor2

0.65

0.75

Variable

Factor1

Factor2

SocialMedia
Time
Blood
Money
Event

0.13

0.62

0.45
0.52
0.47
-0.01

-0.02
0.22
-0.75
0.56

PREDICT
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Experiment 2
Factor
Factor1

Eigenvalue
2.15

Difference
1.24

Proportion
0.43

Cumulative
0.43

Factor2

0.90

0.12

0.18

0.61

Factor3

0.78

0.15

0.15

0.76

Factor4

0.62

0.10

0.12

0.89

Factor5

0.52

-

0.10

1.00

LR test: independent vs. saturated: chi2(10)= 126.36 Prob>chi2=0.00
Variable

Factor1

Uniqueness

Social Media

-0.60

0.63

Time

0.75

0.42

Blood

0.50

0.75

Money

0.71

0.49

Event

-0.69

0.52

Factor

Variance

Difference

Proportion

Cumulative

Factor1

2.15

-

0.43

0.43

ROTATE

LR test: independent vs. saturated: chi2(10)= 126.36 Prob>chi2=0.00
Variable

Factor1

Uniqueness

SocialMedia

-0.60

0.63

Time

0.75

0.43

Blood

0.50

0.75

Money

0.71

0.49

Event

-0.69

0.52

Factor1
Factor1

1.00

PREDICT
Variable

Factor1

SocialMedia

-0.28

Time

0.34

Blood
Money

0.23
0.32

Event

-0.32
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Experiment 3
Factor

Eigenvalue

Difference

Proportion

Cumulative

Factor1

2.38

1.56

0.47

0.47

Factor2

0.83

0.06

0.16

0.64

Factor3

0.77

0.20

0.15

0.80

Factor4

0.56

0.11

0.11

0.91

Factor5

0.45

-

0.09

1.00

LR test: independent vs. saturated: chi2(10)= 179.37 Prob>chi2=0.00
Variable

Factor1

Uniqueness

Social Media

-0.64

0.58

Time

0.76

0.42

Blood

0.53

0.72

Money

0.76

0.42

Event

-0.73

0.46

Factor

Variance

Difference

Proportion

Cumulative

Factor1

2.38

-

0.47

0.47

ROTATE

LR test: independent vs. saturated: chi2(10)= 179.37 Prob>chi2=0.00
Variable

Factor1

Uniqueness

SocialMedia

-0.64

0.58

Time

0.76

0.42

Blood

0.53

0.72

Money

0.76

0.42

Event

-0.73

0.46

Factor1
Factor1

1.00

PREDICT
Variable
SocialMedia
Time
Blood
Money
Event

Factor1
-0.27
0.32
0.22
0.32
-0.30
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APPENDIX C: QUALITATIVE
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C.1- Explanation of Exempt Research
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C.2- Qualitative IRB Approval Letter
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206

C.3- Interview Instrument

207

Semi-Structured Interview Questions Examples:
1. What is your name, job title, job description?
a. What was your job title at the time of the incident?
2. What does your organization do?
a. How does your organization work with existing partners within the community?
3. What was your organizations role in the community before the incident?
a. If organization did not exist then question is omitted.
b. How did your organization form?
c. Did existing members of the community assist in forming the organization?
4. How did the incident change your organizations role in the community?
5. What did your organization do regarding the incident?
6. Whose idea was it to respond in that way?
7. Was your organization prepared in responding to such an event?
a. How did the community as a whole react to the event?
b. What role did the media have in the event?
c. Was your organization asked to assist following the event or did you do so on your
own?
8. What are some of the lessons your organization learned regarding how to respond to such
an event?
a. If another mass casualty event where to take place within your community, how
do you think your organization would react differently?
9. How do you feel the community responded overall?
10. What do you think impacts community response to such events?
a. Other experience with disasters/MCE’s
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